APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Claudell Watkins Carpenter, was convicted of second degree murder, first degree murder in the perpetration of a burglary, especially aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. Additionally, the defendant pled guilty to evading arrest. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, he filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court subsequently granted as to certain of the convictions, reducing the second degree murder conviction to voluntary manslaughter and dismissing the first degree murder and aggravated assault convictions. The defendant then was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, twelve years for the especially aggravated burglary conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction, with all sentences to be served concurrently. Thereafter, the State appealed the trial court’s ruling on the motion for judgment ofacquittal. Rule 29, pursuant to which the defendant filed the motion for judgment of acquittal, requires that, before a judgment is entered following the granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court first should rule on the motion for new trial. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for disposition of the motion for new trial so that a single appeal will result from the defendant’s trial. Since judgments were entered prematurely following the court’s granting the motion, they are set aside, and the jury verdicts for second degree murder (Count 1), first degree murder in the perpetration of a burglary (Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 4) are reinstated. Because the State’s appeal is premature, it is dismissed.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of a post-conviction relief petition. The appellant, Michael South, was convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery and sentenced to serve 60 years and 30 years, respectively.  The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.  In his petition seeking post-conviction relief, the sole issue was whether South had been denied effective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge filed an excellent, detailed opinion. The trial judge found that counsel’s performance was not deficient and denied relief. We have reviewed the briefs, transcript of the hearing, opinion and order denying relief and the entire appellate record. The evidence in the record does not preponderate against the findings and conclusions of the trial court.  The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal appeals.

The Appellant, Michael Anthony Pike, appeals as of right his sentences for simple possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He argues on appeal that the trial judge erred by not placing him in community corrections or, in the alternative, by not giving him the minimum statutory sentences. After a careful review of the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The appellant, Devito Polk, pled guilty to second degree murder¹ and was sentenced to 35 years as a Multiple Range II offender. His sentence was to be served concurrently with seven pending aggravated robbery charges. He, thereafter, filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and an unknowing and involuntary plea. He appeals the denial of the petition. He raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether he knowingly and intelligently entered his plea of guilty; and (2) whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

The petitioner, Glen Cook, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was sentenced improperly. Specifically, he argues that counsel failed to interview witnesses, never discussed trial strategy with the petitioner, and failed to file proper motions. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 23, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for aggravated rape in November 1988, and was convicted of the same in August 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 22, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for aggravated rape in October 1988, and the petitioner pled guilty to the same in January 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

The petitioner, Ronald Turks, a/k/a Asad E. Mujihadeen, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court which denied him post-conviction, habeas corpus and coram nobis relief from his 1979 first degree murder conviction and resulting life sentence. The trial court dismissed the petitioner's case because the postconviction and coram nobis actions were barred by statutes of limitations and the habeas corpus action failed to state a ground for relief. The following issues are presented for review:

(1) Can evidence tending to show actual innocence of the crime for which the petitioner has been convicted be the basis for post-conviction relief under Tennessee law?

(2) Can evidence tending to show actual innocence of the crime for which the petitioner has been convicted be the basis for habeas corpus relief?

(3) Does the one-year statute of limitations for bringing evidence of actual innocence under Tennessee's coram nobis statute violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.

Bryan Matthew Willis appeals his convictions in the Circuit Court of Henry County. He was convicted by a jury of three (3) counts of aggravated burglary and three (3) counts of theft of property. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient for the convictions based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At the conclusion of a bench trial, the defendant, Gary Lynn Sykes, was convicted of aggravated assault. The trial court required restitution of $4,421.00 and imposed a Range I, three-year sentence in the Dyer County jail; all but sixty days were suspended. In his appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

The appellant, Stanley Adams, was indicted for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The state sought the death penalty. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, however, the appellant pled guilty to second degree murder and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to 45 years for second degree murder and 15 years for aggravated robbery. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.

The defendant, Perry A. Cribbs, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, first degree murder during the perpetration of an aggravated burglary, first degree murder during the perpetration of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and attempted first degree murder. The death penalty verdicts were based upon two of the aggravating circumstances prescribed by statute:

(1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person; and

(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing a burglary.

Appellant, Robert Glen Coe, appeals from the dismissal of his third post-conviction relief petition. He has been convicted of first degree murder, aggravated rape, and aggravated kidnaping. He was sentenced to death for first degree murder and received two sentences of life imprisonment for the other charges. Coe contends the trial court erred in dismissing his petition and presents to this Court the following issues for review:

(1) whether the state withheld exculpatory evidence and presented misleading testimony;

(2) whether the use of the felony-murder aggravating circumstance rendered the death penalty unconstitutional;

(3) whether the jury instruction defining “reasonable doubt” was unconstitutional;

(4) whether the jury instruction on first degree murder omitted an essential element of the offense;

(5) whether he was denied the fundamental right to a unanimous jury verdict;

(6) whether the jury instruction on expert testimony was unconstitutional;

(7) whether the jury was unconstitutionally instructed on the effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity;

(8) whether the jury instructions precluded full consideration of the defense of insanity;

(9) whether the failure to instruct the jury about eligibility for parole was unconstitutional;

(10) whether the jury instructions erroneously omitted information about the effect of a non-unanimous verdict;

(11) whether he was denied effective review of the death sentence;

(12) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, including the denial of entitlement to investigative funds;

(13) whether electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment;

(14) whether he was unconstitutionally precluded from consulting with counsel during trial;

(15) whether the death sentence unconstitutionally infringes upon his fundamental right to life; and

(16) whether he was arrested without probable cause.

We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 29, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for robbery with a deadly weapon in January 1989, and the petitioner pled guilty to the same in May 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

The appellant, Billy Joe Harris, appeals as of right from a judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing his motion for a new trial. The appellant claimed he was entitled to a new trial due to newly discovered evidence. The trial court found the motion was not timely filed pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellant was tried and convicted on April 27, 1989. His motion for a new trial was denied. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, and the Supreme Court also affirmed the sentence. He subsequently instituted four suits for post-conviction relief. All four suits were denied at every stage of the proceedings. The present motion was filed June 26, 1995 as a separate action.  After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the law governing the issue presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on November 13, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on December 3, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted on one count each of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping in September 1986, for which the petitioner was subsequently convicted. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508- CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

The appellant, Charles P. Grigsby, entered an Alford plea to one count of aggravated burglary in the Shelby County Criminal Court and received, pursuant to a plea agreement, a sentence of eight years as a range II offender. The manner of service of the appellant’s sentence was submitted to the trial court for its determination. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s request for an alternative sentence and ordered that his sentence be served in the Department of Correction. The appellant appeals this sentencing decision, specifically contending that the trial court erred by failing to impose a sentence under the Community Corrections Act.  After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant appeals to this court as of right from a judgment entered on a Weakley County jury verdict convicting him of attempt to commit first degree murder and aggravated assault. The defendant presents four issues for review: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict for attempt to commit first degree murder; (2) that principles of double jeopardy prohibit his conviction for both attempt to commit first degree murder and aggravated assault; (3) that the twenty-five year sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder is excessive; and (4) that the court erred in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively to four prior sentences of incarceration.   After review of the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s decision.

The petitioner, Adrian Wilkerson, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an appeal as of right pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3. On January 26, 1995, Appellant was convicted by a jury of five counts of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine. As a Range II offender, Appellant received a sentence of eight years and six months for each count. All five of these sentences were concurrent to each other, but consecutive to two previous convictions he was serving on probation. In this appeal Appellant alleges the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts, and that his sentence is excessive. Having reviewed the record in this matter we are of the opinion that the convictions and sentence are fully supported by the law and evidence and that this matter should be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Appellant Michael Bellew pled guilty in the Henry County Circuit Court to operating a motor vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. As a Range I standard offender, Appellant received a sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he presents the following issue: whether his sentence is excessive.  After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal as of right from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Obion County, granting Appellant’s motion to modify her sentence, but denying her full probation. See, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35. Appellant was convicted upon a plea of guilty of the offense of theft of property in excess of $60,000, a Class B felony.  Her original sentence, imposed April 17, 1995, was to a term of eight years in the Department of Correction as a Range I standard offender. The sentence was suspended except for one year which Appellant was ordered to serve in the Obion County Jail. A probationary period was imposed for the balance of the term and restitution ordered as a condition thereof.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on November 12, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on November 15, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted on one count of aggravated rape, one count of incest, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery in June 1989, and was convicted of the same in October 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. There was no evidentiary hearing. While the petitioner submits an extensive brief outlining a number of issues, we have summarized his claims as follows:

(1) whether the trial court erred when it determined that sentence reform legislation adopted in 1979 and 1989 did not apply to petitioner's sentence;

(2) whether the subsequent sentence reform acts deny petitioner equal protection under the law and due process of the law;

(3) whether the petitioner's sentence is cruel and unusual punishment;

(4) whether the trial court erred by not appointing counsel to represent the petitioner during this habeas corpus proceeding;

(5) whether the trial court erred by not allowing the petitioner an evidentiary hearing on this petition; and

(6) whether the trial court erred by determining that it did not have jurisdiction to alter the petitioner's sentence in a habeas corpus proceeding.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Willie Claybrook, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, two issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (2) whether the trial court's order denying relief met the minimum statutory requirements. 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.