APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Sentorya L. Young, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. He received an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole as a repeat violent offender. Thereafter, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that a prejudicial and extraneous piece of paper was sent to the jury room as substantive evidence. The trial court denied the petition. In this consolidated appeal, he raises the following four issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court failed to properly perform its role as thirteenth juror; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to express a personal opinion through the admission of a chart; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying his writ of error coram nobis petition. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Antonio Sanders, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial, and therefore, that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order dismissing the petition.

The Appellant, Jeffrey Lee Turner, appeals the sentencing decision of the Humboldt Law Court for Gibson County. Turner pled guilty to one count of aggravated statutory rape, fifteen counts of statutory rape, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Turner to an effective term of eleven years, eleven months, and twenty-eight days. On appeal, Turner challenges the length of his sentences, specifically alleging (1) that the trial court misapplied enhancement and mitigating factors and (2) that the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm.

After conducting a bench trial, the trial court found the Defendant, Richard Anthony Arriola, guilty of one count of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and two counts o fattempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years. This Court remanded the case to the trial court for an order clarifying its findings on the insanity defense. On appeal, the Defendant claims: (1) the trial court erred when it used an improper legal standard for the insanity defense; and (2) the evidence presented at trial proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court applied an improper legal standard for the insanity defense. Therefore, we reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Anthony Riggs, was found guilty of the offense of rape, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to twelve years for his conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued that the length of the sentence was excessive and contrary to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). Upon review, this Court found that the trial court improperly applied two of the five enhancement factors it found applicable.  Nonetheless, relying on State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005) (“Gomez I”), we concluded that the remaining three enhancement factors were sufficient to enhance Defendant’s sentence to twelve years and affirmed his sentence. State v. Anthony Riggs, No. M2005-02105-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 49553 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, January 8, 2007). Defendant filed an application for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted Defendant’s application for the limited purpose of remanding to this Court for reconsideration of the length of Defendant’s sentence in light of State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (“Gomez II”). After a thorough review of the record, we modify Defendant’s sentence for rape from twelve years to eleven years.

I concur in the majority opinion except I would have not relied upon the presentence report for a Blakely-type admission. See State v. Charles Vantilburg III, No. W2006-02475-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 12, 2008) (holding that statements “made outside the confines of any judicial proceeding . . . do not qualify as admissions for purposes of the Sixth Amendment”).

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of possession of cocaine over 0.5 grams with intent to deliver and one count of delivery of over 0.5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to eleven years on each count to be served concurrently. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to this Court, and we affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Maurice Shaw, No. W2005-02097-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3085503 *1-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 21, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2007). Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court denied the petition, and the instant appeal followed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In November 2005, a Putnam County grand jury indicted the defendant, Shane Delano Hunter, on one count of premeditated first degree murder in connection with an incident that occurred in August 2005. Following a January 2007 jury trial in Putnam County Criminal Court, the jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Willis Ayers, was indicted for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was tried jointly with co-defendant, Charles Curtis, and another co-defendant, David Milken, was tried separately for the charged offenses. Co-defendant Curtis’s case is not part of his appeal. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty-two years for his second degree murder conviction, and as a Range II, multiple offender, to fourteen years for his facilitation of especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively, for an effective sentence of thirty-six years. In his appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that State’s witness Corey Smith was an accomplice to the charged offenses; (3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for severance; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Troy Sollis, was convicted of two counts of possession of more than .5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, one count of felony evading arrest, and two counts of misdemeanor evading arrest. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 20 years, 11 months, and 29 days to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court’s comments during a pretrial conference established bias and that the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Robert Cash, appeals his Bradley County Criminal Court conviction of one charge of aggravated sexual battery of a person under the age of thirteen, alleging that there was insufficient evidence to prove intent. We find that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Scotty D. Hatfield, originally charged with three counts of aggravated assault and one count of felony reckless endangerment, was convicted of one count of attempted aggravated assault and misdemeanor reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of three years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. The case must be remanded, however, for the entry of a corrected judgment reflecting that the defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated assault rather than aggravated assault on Count 1.

The State of Tennessee appeals the decision of the Obion County Circuit Court suppressing evidence obtained as a result of a police search of the residence of the Appellee, Charlotte Yvonne Turner.  Turner, a parolee, was convicted of drug related offenses in Kentucky, with her parole being subsequently transferred to Tennessee. Turner’s vehicle was stopped by Union City police officers, who were familiar with her status as a parolee. After the stop, Turner and the vehicle were searched for drugs based upon one officer’s suspicion that she was involved in drug activity. After a fruitless search for contraband of both her person and vehicle, the officer demanded that Turner allow a search of her home, pursuant to a condition of her parole. No drugs were found during the search of her residence; however, Turner directed officers to a handgun, which was located in a bedroom.  The weapon was seized, and Turner was subsequently indicted for unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Turner filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court granted.  On appeal, the State argues that the search of the residence was lawful under the recent holding of the United States Supreme Court decision of Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006). After review, we conclude that the police search of Turner’s residence was unreasonable and affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The defendant, Torrie Perkins, appeals from convictions of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder rendered by a Haywood County Circuit Court jury, for which he was sentenced to concurrent terms of life without parole and twenty-five years. In his appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for correction of the judgment for the first degree murder conviction.

The defendant, Shakir Adams, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. The defendant appeals his conviction and argues: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction; (2) that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to allow the defendant to administer a jury questionnaire; (3) that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance; (4) that he was prejudiced by the court’s comments both pre-trial and during trial; (5) that he was prejudiced by the admission of evidence that the defendant was a member of a gang; and (6) that he was prejudiced by the erroneous exclusion of evidence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant pled guilty to simple possession of cocaine. Defendant properly preserved the following certified question of law for review, “Whether the informant’s credibility was sufficiently set forth to establish probable cause in the affidavit which provided support for issuance of the search warrant in this case.” After a thorough review of the record, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the indictment against Defendant is dismissed.

Appellant, Charles W. McCaleb, was indicted by the Hickman County Grand Jury for aggravated assault and assault. After a jury trial, Appellant was acquitted of aggravated assault in Count One and convicted of assault by offensive touching in Count Two. As a result, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six months in jail. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve forty-five days in incarceration and the remainder of the sentence was suspended and Appellant was placed on probation. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court because the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for simple assault by offensive touching and the trial court properly sentenced Appellant.

The Petitioner, Raymond David Wright, pled guilty to second degree murder in 1993 in exchange for a fifty year sentence as a Range III offender. He filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming his sentence was illegal because, had he been tried and convicted, he would be considered only a Range I offender. Thus, he claims his fifty-year sentence is illegal. The Petitioner further asserts second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder, and, therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction to sentence him. The habeas court dismissed the petition without a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The petitioner, Jeremy Crosby, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing. The state contends that the trial court properly dismissed most of the petitioner’s claims but admits that the post-conviction court should have appointed counsel to address the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After reviewing the record, we affirm the majority of the post-conviction court’s order but remand the case to the post-conviction court for the appointment of counsel and additional proceedings regarding the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

The Petitioner, Troy Lee Weston, appeals the lower court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites for seeking habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal.

The petitioner, Julius Jones, was convicted in 2002 of facilitation of felony murder, a Class B felony, and sentenced to twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal to this court, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that Tennessee’s 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act was unconstitutional and that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. The post-conviction court denied the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to prove his factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Danny Alexander, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief based on its untimeliness. Upon a review of the record, we are persuaded that the post-conviction court was correct that the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Adrian K. Nelson, was indicted by a Warren County Grand Jury for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, evading arrest, felony reckless endangerment, leaving the scene of an accident, resisting arrest and driving on a suspended license, second offense. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of all of the offenses and sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-two years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. Appellant seeks review of the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial; (2) whether the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, evading arrest and reckless endangerment; (4) whether the trial court 1 erred by failing to instruct the jury with the lesser included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment; (5) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the inference of casual exchange” as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-419; and (6) whether the sentence is excessive. Because we determine that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury with the lesser included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, we reverse Appellant’s conviction for felony reckless endangerment and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Reneshia Kioto Parker, pled guilty to forgery involving $1000 or more and theft of property valued at $60,000 or more. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced her. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we dismiss this appeal because the Defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal.

The defendant, Louis E. Whitecotton, was convicted of failure to timely register as a violent sexual offender, a Class E felony, and sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.