APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Lewis Jeffrey Cox, was arrested for public intoxication. Appellant was a registered violent sex offender at the time of his arrest. He failed to inform the arresting officers or the facility where he was held that he was a registered violent sex offender. Subsequently, Appellant was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury for failure to inform the incarcerating facility that he was a registered violent sex offender under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-204(e). Appellant pled guilty to the charge. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six years as a career offender. Appellant appeals his sentence to this Court. On appeal, he argues that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-204 carries no penal provision, and the penal provisions included in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-208 do not apply to his failure to inform the facility of his status as a registered violent sex offender. After a thorough review of the applicable laws, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kenneth J. Cradic, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child (Class A felony), and three counts of incest (Class C felony). He was sentenced to twenty years for each Class A felony and four years for each Class C felony. The trial court ordered that two of the Class A felony convictions be served consecutive to each other but concurrent to the third conviction and that the three Class C felony convictions be served consecutive to each other and concurrent to the Class A felonies, for a total effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the sentence is improper, and that the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever his offenses and to suppress his statement. After careful review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The appellant urges this court to reverse the post-conviction court’s decision denying him post-conviction relief based upon his allegation that trial counsel’s failure to explain to him, prior to his plea of guilty, the extent of his obligations under the community supervision provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524 constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to undermine the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Specifically, he complains that had counsel informed him adequately regarding the requirements of lifetime community supervision, including the possible associated monthly cost of forty-five dollars, he would not have entered his guilty pleas to aggravated sexual battery and automobile burglary. The appellant claims and counsel conceded at the evidentiary hearing that this omission rendered his guilty plea involuntary, unintelligent and unknowing.

The Petitioner, Chad Alan Parker, pled nolo contendre to one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of burglary of an automobile. The trial court sentenced him to ten years of incarceration and community supervision for life for the aggravated sexual battery conviction, and to two years for the burglary conviction. The trial court ordered that the sentences run concurrently. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel, alleging he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the issues and applicable authorities, we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case for the Petitioner to withdraw his best interest plea.

The petitioner, Marcellus Hurt, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to exercise his influence and persuade the petitioner to plead guilty. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to allege any ground which would establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court.

The petitioner, Larry C. Pittman, pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He argues that he is entitled to relief under Blakely because he submits that he was sentenced illegally. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review, we conclude that the habeas court’s summary dismissal of the petition was appropriate, and we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The Appellant, Walter Pablo, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court in ordering that his sentence for DUI, first offense, be served in total confinement. Pablo and the State reached a guilty plea agreement providing that he would plead guilty to DUI, leaving the scene of an accident, and failure to appear, and receive an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with fifteen days to be served in confinement and the balance to served on probation. At a guilty plea hearing, after questioning by the trial court, Pablo provided information to the court that he was a Mexican citizen, and that he did not know whether the federal authorities were aware of his presence in this country. After four days of guilty plea proceedings over a period from August 7, 2007, to August 28, 2007, during which Pablo was in confinement, the trial court rejected the guilty plea agreement insofar as it provided for a probationary sentence. Pablo was allowed the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, which he declined. The trial court then summarily sentenced Pablo to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration in the workhouse for the DUI conviction. On appeal, Pablo argues that the trial court erred in denying him probation based solely upon his perceived status as an illegal alien. After review, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Pablo’s presence in the United States was unlawful and that the trial court’s summary sentencing decision failed to consider relevant principles of sentencing in denying probation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for resentencing.

The Appellant, Devin James, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court after a jury found him guilty of the reckless homicide of Rodney Steward. After a sentencing hearing, James received a thirty-month sentence in the “workhouse,” with all but ninety days suspended, followed by five years of probation. On appeal, James argues: (1) that the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion was error; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to grant him full probation; and (3) that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence six months beyond the presumptive minimum and in imposing a probationary term of five years. After thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm.

The petitioner, Geraldrick Jones, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he alleged that trial counsel (1) should have requested dismissal of the indictment or a special jury instruction after the State lost samples of his blood; (2) should have moved to suppress evidence found after the police searched his home; (3) and failed to object to improper closing remarks by the State. The post-conviction court concluded that the petitioner failed to prove these claims and dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Morris Neal Davis, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court was without authority or jurisdiction to sentence him outside his statutory sentencing range and, further, that the court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him above the statutory minimum sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to allege any ground which would render the judgments of conviction void, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the Hardeman County Circuit Court.

The Defendant, Lana Billings Henry, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Sullivan County Criminal Court. In October 2007, the Defendant entered guilty pleas to multiple counts of forgery and theft. Under the terms of the agreement, the Defendant received an effective six-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender, and the manner of service was submitted to the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that a sentence of community corrections was appropriate. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Bernard Henry, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the dismissal was erroneous because he did not receive the effective assistance of trial counsel and because the post-conviction court improperly prevented him from presenting evidence that his appellate counsel was ineffective. After a review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court erred in denying the Petitioner an opportunity to be heard on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Accordingly, the case is remanded for further proceedings.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Calvin Landers, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to serve a 20-year sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals and claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the sentence is excessive. Because the record supports the judgment of the trial court, we affirm both the conviction and the sentence.

Appellant, Timothy Lee Demery, was convicted by a Carter County Jury of second degree murder. As a result, he was sentenced to twenty-three years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated the appeal herein. On appeal, he argues that the trial court improperly denied the motion for new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence that exonerated Appellant and was withheld from the defense during trial. We determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to one count of rape and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Petitioner received an eight year sentence for the rape conviction and three year sentences on each sexual battery conviction. The trial court held a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service. At the sentencing hearing, the Defendant complained that his counsel forced him to plead guilty, after which counsel moved to withdraw. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw, and it ordered the Defendant to serve the sexual battery convictions concurrently to each other but consecutively to the rape conviction. The court also denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, the Defendant raises three issues: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to allow Counsel to withdraw during the sentencing hearing; (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing for the sexual battery and rape convictions; and (3) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Eric Shane Heller, was convicted of initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, both Class B felonies. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that the defendant lacked standing to contest the search warrant which led to his arrest, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the trial court erred by issuing a jury instruction on the flight of the defendant. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse and vacate the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the defendant’s convictions.

The appellant, William Earl Starks, was found guilty by a jury in the Tipton County Circuit Court of rape of a child, and he received a sentence of twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the State adduced insufficient proof of venue.  Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Trumaine Winters, appeals his convictions and the resulting sentencing decisions of the Shelby County Criminal Court. After a jury trial, Winters was found guilty of first degree murder and aggravated robbery. Winters was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for first degree murder and twelve years for aggravated robbery. On appeal, Winters argues: (1) that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court “erred in failing to suppress the identification and subsequent identification testimony of State’s witnesses”; (3) that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors at sentencing for the conviction of aggravated robbery; and (4) that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After review, we conclude that issues (1), (2) and (4) are without merit. However, with regard to issue (3), we conclude, following plain error review, that Winters’ sentence for aggravated robbery must be reversed in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and the case remanded for resentencing.

The petitioner, Wiled McMillIan, pleaded guilty in the Dyer County Criminal Court to one count of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. He received a sentence of ten years, to be served in the Department of Correction (TDOC), although the court noted that the petitioner would be allowed to go to long-term drug rehabilitation after he had served six months in the Dyer County jail. Prior to the petitioner’s serving six months in the Dyer County jail, he was transferred to TDOC to serve the remainder of his sentence. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that his guilty plea was involuntary, and that the post-conviction court erred in denying his separate motion to set aside the guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Maurice Tyrone Hendrix, seeks habeas corpus relief from 1988 Davidson County convictions for four counts of second degree burglary and one count of grand larceny and his resulting effective sentence of thirty-five years. The petitioner contends that his sentences have expired and that the judgments of conviction are void. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Lamar Fletcher, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for error coram nobis relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Brian Charles LaDue, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of aggravated assault. As a result, the trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I, standard offender to six years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant seeks review of his sentence on appeal. We determine that Appellant has failed to show that plain error review of his sentence is warranted or that the trial court erred by denying probation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Shamarcus Antwan Hunt, was convicted of the sale of cocaine under .5 grams, a Class C felony, and possession of cocaine over .5 grams with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, a Class B felony. He was sentenced, respectively, to eight years and twelve years in the Department of Correction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court should have declared a mistrial following allegedly improper remarks by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Eric Jason Tolley, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court should have appointed counsel and held an evidentiary hearing to consider his claims.  Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition on the grounds that the petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for habeas corpus relief.

The defendant, Shundell L. Dickerson, was convicted of facilitation of first degree murder (Class A felony) and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to sixty years in prison. He appeals his conviction and sentence. He argues the trial court erred in: (1) precluding him from entering into evidence an anonymous letter mailed to the police in which other persons were named as responsible for the crime; (2) limiting the questioning of a witness regarding his expectations of favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony; and (3) allowing the prosecutor to make improper remarks during closing argument. Finally, the defendant argues enhancement factors were improperly applied to increase his sentence. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.