APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, William Rimmel, III, was indicted by the Marion County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment, one count of false imprisonment, one count of vandalism over $2,500, and one count of burglary of an automobile. The charge of false imprisonment was dismissed prior to trial. A jury found Defendant guilty of attempted aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, attempted reckless endangerment, vandalism under $1,000, and attempted burglary of an automobile. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed an effective sentence of two years on probation following service of 11 months and 29 days in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and in ordering consecutive sentencing, that his convictions should be vacated due to the State’s failure to preserve evidence, and that the trial court gave confusing jury instructions. Based on the record, the briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a judgment in Count 4 and amended judgment in Count 3, reflecting that those counts were dismissed, and for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 5 and 6.

The Petitioner, William Rolandus Keel, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief from his convictions for two counts of rape of a child, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in not admitting relevant evidence consisting of a recorded phone call (“Phone Call Recording” or “recording”) between the victim and her mother, in limiting the Petitioner’s testimony at the remand evidentiary hearing, in finding that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel, and in denying post-conviction relief when the Petitioner is “one hundred percent innocent and [was] wrongfully convicted.” Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Randy O. Reynolds, stands convicted by a Dickson County jury of aggravated vehicular homicide (Count 1), vehicular homicide (Count 2), reckless homicide (Count 3), vehicular assault by driving under the influence (Count 4), simple possession of a schedule II controlled substance (Count 5), leaving the scene of an accident (Count 6), evading arrest (Count 7), and driving on a revoked license (Count 8). On appeal, Defendant argues (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present expert testimony regarding the effects of intoxication; and (3) the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his all of his felony convictions, and his misdemeanor evading arrest conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Paul Tracy Bailes, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s
probation revocation of the fourteen-year split-confinement sentence he received for his
guilty-pleaded convictions for forgery, two counts of theft of property, and two counts of
attempted possession of methamphetamine for resale. On appeal, the Defendant contends
that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation, rather than permitting
him to participate in the mental health court program. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

At the heart of this appeal is a narrow procedural question: whether the 2021 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 permits the Defendant, Byron Black, to move for a hearing on whether he has an intellectual disability and is therefore ineligible for the death penalty. The trial court dismissed the motion after determining that the Defendant was procedurally barred from bringing the issue. On appeal, we hold that because the issue of the Defendant’s intellectual disability has been previously adjudicated, he may not file a motion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(g)(1). We also hold that the General Assembly’s decision not to entitle the Defendant to a second hearing does not subject him to cruel and unusual punishment, nor does it deny him due process of law or the equal protection of the law. Accordingly, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Floyd Hall, III, appeals the Haywood County Circuit Court’s denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder. On
appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his claim that
he received the ineffective assistance of counsel by trial counsel’s failure to file a motion
to suppress a statement the Petitioner gave to the police. We affirm the post-conviction
court’s judgment.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Oberton Curry, Jr., of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, reckless driving, driving while unlicensed, violation of the registration law, and disobeying a stop sign.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for felony possession of a weapon and that an item of evidence was erroneously admitted.  He further contends that the jury instructions were inaccurate and incomplete.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Appellant, Antonio Tywan James, appeals as of right from his convictions of firstdegree
premeditated murder and tampering with evidence, for which he received an
effective sentence of life imprisonment. The Appellant argues the trial court erred in
denying funds to obtain expert services and in excluding the Appellant’s conversation with
his aunt, Annie Merriweather, as inadmissible hearsay. Based upon the combination of
these two alleged trial errors, the Appellant contends reversal under the cumulative error
doctrine is required. The Appellant additionally argues the trial court erred in not requiring
the State to elect which item it was using in its prosecution of tampering with evidence.
Upon our review, we affirm.

A Rutherford County jury found Defendant, Sebakire Crode, guilty of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with Defendant to serve 150 days in jail and the balance on probation. On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him of driving under the influence and that he received an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Hopie Conley, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, one count of
reckless aggravated assault, and one count of reckless endangerment, with an agreed
sentence of six years, split confinement, with Defendant serving 180 days incarcerated and
the remainder of her sentence on supervised probation. Following a restitution hearing,
the trial court ordered Defendant pay $83,366.68 in total restitution through monthly
payments of $500. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in determining the
restitution amount because the total amount awarded could not be satisfied prior to the end
of her sentence, Defendant lacked the financial ability to pay the ordered monthly
restitution amount, and the State failed to prove the victim’s pecuniary loss. The State
concedes that the trial court erred in ordering a monthly restitution payment schedule that
would not satisfy the total restitution award prior to the end of Defendant’s sentence.
However, it contends the trial court properly determined the monthly restitution amount
and submits that the matter does not need to be remanded. After reviewing the record, the
briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and considering the applicable law, we reverse the
judgments of the trial court in part and remand for a new restitution hearing consistent with
this opinion.

Petitioner, Jose Gonzalez Bonilla, appeals as of right from the Sumner County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel (1) did not inform Petitioner during plea negotiations that he would be subject to lifetime community supervision and registration on the sex offender registry if he was convicted at trial; (2) failed to object to the admission of the victim's forensic interview recording during a pretrial severance hearing; and (3) failed to object to the racial composition of the jury venire. Petitioner also argues that the cumulative effect of these errors requires relief. Following our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Quincy D. Moutry, appeals the dismissal of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence for his possession of a firearm with
the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction.
Specifically, the Defendant argues that the trial court’s entry of corrected judgment forms
increasing the mandatory minimum service term on his sentence constituted an ex parte
sentencing in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a)(3). After review,
we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of a corrected
judgment form.

Defendant, William Vess Binkley, stands convicted by a Dickson County jury of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial after the State introduced evidence during trial that had not been disclosed to Defendant during discovery; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the victim's forensic interview as substantive evidence; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing arguments; and (4) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Ovitta Vaughn, of driving with a blood
alcohol concentration of .08 percent or more (DUI per se) and driving under the influence
of an intoxicant (DUI) for which she received a sentence of 11 months and 29 days,
suspended to supervised probation after serving 10 days in confinement. On appeal, the
defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her
convictions. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in failing to allow the
introduction of Deputy Goodman’s prior adjudication for untruthfulness, in failing to issue
a curative instruction following the prosecution’s inappropriate closing argument, in failing
to allow the inclusion of a special jury instruction on the operability of the defendant’s
vehicle, and in failing to require the State to make an election as to whether the defendant
was driving her vehicle or merely had physical control. After reviewing the record and
considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we
remand the case for a corrected judgment form in count two.

The defendant, Christopher David McIntosh, appeals his effective 10-year sentence
imposed by the Union County Criminal Court as a result of his guilty-pleaded convictions
of six counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and two counts of theft of property
valued at $1,000 or less. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in
imposing partially consecutive sentences and in ordering him to serve nine months of his
sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Latrice Rogers, appeals the trial court's order denying her motion to withdraw
her guilty plea. Defendant pled guilty to multiple charges as indicted with sentencing to
be determined. One week after the trial court sentenced Defendant to three years'
imprisonrnent, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea. Before the trial court ruled
on the motion, Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment. The trial court
later denied the motion to withdraw the plea. Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of
her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. After a thorough review of the record and the
parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Steven Craig Griffin, Petitioner, claims the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his
petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Discerning no error we affirm.

The Appellee, Joseph Lester Haven, Jr., was originally convicted of rape of a child and two
counts of aggravated sexual battery for crimes committed against his stepchildren, for
which he received an effective forty-year sentence. After his convictions were affirmed,
State v. Joseph Lester Haven, No. W2018-01204-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 3410242, at *1-
2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020), the Appellee filed a petition seeking post-conviction
relief based on trial counsel’s failure to challenge the State’s compliance with the
Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123, the statute which authorizes a video
recording of a child to a forensic interviewer to be introduced as evidence at trial, but only
when certain requirements are met. The Obion County post-conviction court granted relief,
and the State now appeals. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the postconviction
court, reinstate the Appellee’s convictions, and remand for execution of
judgments consistent with this opinion.

A Maury County jury convicted Stacy Matthews, Defendant, of two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school zone and one count of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the trial court struck the school zone sentencing aggravator for two of the convictions and entered judgments on three counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. The trial court imposed three concurrent sentences of twelve years, as a Range I, standard offender, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: he was prejudiced by the language of Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment; that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Charles Randolph Johnson, was convicted by an Anderson County Jury of one
count of possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin within 1,000 feet of a drug free
school zone; possession of more than 14.175 grams of marijuana with intent to sell or
deliver; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an effective thirtyyear
sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant appears to argue that (1)
the length of time between his trial and the hearing on his motion for new trial violated his
right to due process; (2) the search warrant was invalid; (3) the untimely “constructive
amendment” of the indictment rendered it invalid; (4) the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and the
parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Gregory Hickman, of rape of a child, and
the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to forty years in prison. On
appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction
and that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to submit a rebuttal closing argument.
After our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Raymon Muhammad, filed a post-conviction petition in the Shelby County
Criminal Court, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and
resulting life sentence. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner
appeals. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Timothy Travis Jenkins, appeals the trial court’s order imposing confinement after finding that the Defendant violated his probation. The Defendant’s probation began in 2019, when he was convicted of sale of methamphetamine and given a six-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. In 2022, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant, the Defendant’s third, which alleged multiple violations. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and when it ordered him to confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Cory Lamont Batey, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On appeal, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely because he was actively misled by his appellate counsel. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Angela Buchanan, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, wherein she challenged her convictions for criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child neglect. On appeal, the Petitioner argues: (1) she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) her convictions were based on inadmissible Rule 404(b) evidence; (3) she received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (4) the trial court, in violation of Tennessee law and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, failed to inform her that she could make a statement of allocution at sentencing. 1 We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.