APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the Petitioner, Christopher Lance Shockley, on four counts of rape of a child and nine counts of aggravated sexual battery. The Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixteen years. This Court affirmed the sentence on appeal. The Petitioner then filed a post-conviction petition claiming that: (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s holding that lifelong community supervision is not a direct punitive consequence of the petitioner’s pleading guilty to aggravated sexual battery. Tennessee expressly makes life supervision a part of the sentence. See T.C.A. § 39- 13-524 (providing for “a sentence of community supervision for life”). Thus, I agree with the conclusions reached in New Jersey and Nevada. See State v. Jangochian, 832 A.2d 360, 362 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2003); Palmer v. State, 59 P.3d 1192, 1196-97 (Nev. 2002). The post-conviction court’s factual findings, though, fail to reflect whether the court accredited the petitioner’s testimony that he was unaware of this consequence at the time he signed the documents and that he would not have pled guilty had he been told about such a consequence. Thus, I

The Appellant, Laquenton Monger, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Appellant fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The pro se petitioner, Michael J. Floyd, appeals as of right the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Wayne County Circuit Court. The petitioner alleges that his conviction and resulting sentence for aggravated robbery is illegal and void due to an involuntary guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Buford C. Throneberry, appeals his conviction of disorderly conduct that followed a bench trial in the Rutherford County Circuit Court. The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Because we conclude that the State failed to prove that the defendant’s words or actions prevented anyone from carrying on lawful activities, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.

The defendant, Mustapha Boutchiche, was convicted of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the victim was untruthful in a prior proceeding, admitting the victim’s 9-1-1 phone call, not requiring the State to make an election of offenses, and ordering that he undergo a psychosexual evaluation prior to sentencing. He also argues that his sentence was excessive because the trial court enhanced his sentence based on enhancement factors not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and denied probation because he refused to undergo the psychosexual evaluation. We affirm the defendant’s conviction and the trial court’s denial of probation but modify his sentence to one year.

The petitioner, Arthur W. Stamey, III, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In this appeal, he contends that due process principles require the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations and that newly discovered, exculpatory evidence warrants coram nobis relief. Because the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing the petition for writ of error coram nobis, the judgment of that court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a determination of whether due process principles require the tolling of the coram nobis statute of limitations.

The petitioner was found guilty of five counts of rape, all Class B felonies; twelve counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, all Class C felonies; and seven counts of statutory rape, all Class E felonies. He was sentenced to nine years for each Class B felony, three years for each Class C felony, and one year for each Class E felony. His sentences for the Class B felonies were ordered to be served consecutively. His sentences for the Class C felonies were ordered to be served consecutively but concurrently to the Class B felonies. His sentences for the E felonies were ordered to be served consecutively but concurrently to the B felonies, for an effective sentence of forty-five years. In this post-conviction appeal, the petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective and that the post-conviction court erred in rejecting the challenge to his sentence because it was previously determined on appeal. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Ben Thomas Dowlen, Jr., pled guilty to attempted possession of a schedule I substance, a Class C felony, and agreed to a sentence of ten years as a Range II offender. The trial court imposed the agreed upon sentence, denied alternative sentencing, and ordered the Defendant to serve his ten-year sentence in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant an alternative sentence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we conclude the trial court did not err when it denied alternative sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant urges this court to reverse his conviction for aggravated robbery based upon his argument that the proof is insufficient to support the element that the robbery was either accomplished with a deadly weapon or by the display of something the victim might have reasonably believed to be a deadly weapon. After analyzing the defendant’s actions in isolation before and after disarming the victim, the majority concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support this element of aggravated robbery and modifies the conviction to robbery. For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent from this conclusion.

The Defendant, Mark Anthony Foulk, was convicted by a jury of: one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of vandalism in the amount of $500 or less and one count of driving under the influence, both Class A misdemeanors; one count of speeding and one count of failure to obey a traffic control device, both Class C misdemeanors. He was sentenced to an effective term of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the vandalism, aggravated burglary, or aggravated robbery, and was otherwise insufficient to prove the elements of aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated burglary; (3) he was effectively denied his right to a jury trial; (4) the court improperly instructed the jury that a certain State’s witness, Detective Dale Quillen, was an expert on gunshot wounds and stippling; (5) the court improperly enhanced his sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery; and (6) the court improperly ordered consecutive sentences. We agree with the Defendant that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of aggravated robbery, and accordingly modify this conviction to the lesser included offense of robbery. We also conclude that the trial court improperly enhanced the Defendant’s sentences and failed to make the required findings to impose consecutive sentences.  We conclude that the Defendant’s other points of error lack merit. The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

The petitioner, Christopher Hatcher, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder, and reckless endangerment. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

Appellant pled guilty in the Wilson County Criminal Court to one count of vehicular homicide, one count of vehicular assault, and one count of leaving the scene of the accident. In exchange for the guilty pleas, Appellant received sentences of three years, two years, and one year, respectively. The trial court held a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service of the sentence. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve eight months of the sentence day-for-day, followed by ten years of probation. Appellant seeks review of the sentence on appeal. We determine that the trial court erroneously deprived Appellant of good conduct credits by ordering him to serve eight months of the sentence day-for-day. Consequently, we reverse that portion of the sentence and remand to the trial court for entry of an order deleting the requirement that the sentence be served day-for-day. The remainder of the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner was originally indicted on multiple sex offenses and felony failure to appear. A Morgan County jury found the petitioner, Alden Joe Daniel, Jr., guilty of felony failure to appear but deadlocked as to his eight other sex offense charges. Before a retrial on the sex offenses and before a judgment of conviction was entered on the felony failure to appear conviction, the petitioner pled guilty to multiple counts, and the parties agreed that the judgment of conviction arising from the jury trial would reflect that the petitioner was convicted of misdemeanor failure to appear rather than felony failure to appear. The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming that his convictions were void because he had been convicted by a jury of a felony but the trial court agreed to allow that conviction to be reduced to a misdemeanor. Further, he asserted that the reduction of this charge from a felony to a misdemeanor was a material element of the plea agreement, and he sought habeas corpus relief from all of his judgments. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, R. L. Williams, appeals from the denial of his 2007 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2003 rape convictions. He asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because trial counsel failed to effectively challenge the DNA evidence, which he posits was the only convicting evidence because the testimony of the victim was unreliable. Holding that he has failed to establish that his counsel was ineffective, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Mickey Jeffries, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by his failure to adequately communicate a plea agreement to him. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Darrell Franklin, was convicted of one count of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony over his hearsay objection and in violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) the State presented evidence insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction; (3) he received an excessive sentence; and (4) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury. We conclude that the State presented evidence sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err in sentencing him. We also conclude, however, that the trial committed plain error by admitting certain testimony in violation of the Defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. We accordingly vacate his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

The Defendant, Eddrick Devon Pewitte,1 was convicted by a Gibson County jury of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the admission of certain statements he made to police; (3) the State violated a discovery order; and (4) the trial court misapplied enhancement factors in sentencing him. We conclude that the Defendant’s first three points of error lack merit. We also conclude, however, that the trial court erred in the application of certain enhancement factors. We remand for resentencing.

Petitioner, David Cantrell, appeals from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner failed to comply with the procedure defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Randall A. Myers, appeals the sentence imposed by the Blount County Circuit Court following his open guilty plea to two counts of filing a false report, Class D felonies, and one count of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. After hearing the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of four years, three years, and eleven months and twenty-nine days. The court further ordered the sentences to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the two felony sentences are excessive; (2) the court erred in denying an alternative sentence; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences as imposed.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Bobby Joe Rollins, was convicted of aggravated robbery. For this Class D felony, he was sentenced to twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case is before this court upon the petitioner’s, Timothy E. Higgs, motion to late-file his notice of appeal. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Von Arlen McKinney, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense; driving on a revoked license, fourth offense; possession of drug paraphernalia; and violation of the implied consent law. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent for his DUI offense; eleven months and twenty-nine days for driving on a revoked license, to run concurrent to the DUI; eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia, to run concurrent to the other sentences; and eleven months and twenty-nine days for violation of the implied consent law, with five days to run consecutive to his other sentences, for a total effective sentence of eleven months and thirty-four days. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient and that the sentence imposed was excessive. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The defendant, Britt Alan Ferguson, was convicted by an Obion County jury of facilitation of the initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class C felony; two counts of promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony; unlawful drug paraphernalia use and activities, a Class A misdemeanor; and two counts of possession of a controlled substance, a Class E felony;1 and was sentenced by the trial court as a multiple offender to an effective sentence of six years in the Department of Correction. Following the denial of his untimely motion for new trial, he filed an untimely notice of appeal to this court, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia convictions and arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. The State responded with a motion to dismiss on the basis that both the motion for new trial and notice of appeal were untimely. This court granted the motion in part, ruling that the defendant had waived the suppression issue by his untimely motion for new trial but that we would waive the untimely notice of appeal in order to consider the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant pled guilty to three counts of forgery, one count of theft of less than $500, and two counts of failure to appear. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a career offender to six years on each count of forgery to be served concurrently with each other and six years on each count of failure to appear to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the sentence for the forgery convictions. Defendant was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the theft under $500 to be served concurrently to the other sentences. These sentences were then run consecutively to the nine year sentence Defendant was already serving. On appeal, Defendant argues that the sentence is excessive and contrary to law. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.