APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Jerry Timberlake, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief based on his failure to verify the petition under oath. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Jimmy Stuart Mynatt, appeals his convictions of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life plus twenty-five years.  On appeal, he contends that: the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress statements made to the police; and the trial court erred in instructing the jury. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The petitioner, Cornelius Richmond, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which rendered his guilty pleas involuntary and unknowing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Earice Roberts, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the trial court should have granted him relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence that a police officer and witness for the State had committed crimes in her official capacity as manager of the evidence and property room. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the petition.

The defendant, Brian A. Lowman, was denied pretrial diversion by the district attorney general for Hamilton County and requested review of the denial by the trial court. After review, the trial court reversed the denial of pretrial diversion by the district attorney general. The State then appealed the decision of the trial court to this court for review. After careful review, we conclude that the district attorney general did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion and reverse the decision of the trial court granting pretrial diversion.

Appellants, Edward Earl Allen, Jr. and Carlos A. Branch, entered best interest guilty pleas in Davidson County to one count of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a weapon on school property after an incident at Vanderbilt University. The plea agreement did not specify the length or manner of service of the sentences but specified that the sentences would run concurrently to each other. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellants to six years for aggravated assault and two years for possession of a weapon on school property, as Range I Standard Offenders. Appellants seek a review of their sentence on appeal. Because the record supports the sentences and the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing as to Appellant Branch, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Carmi Binkins, was convicted of two counts of attempted second
degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction with one of the attempted murder convictions and sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for each of the attempted second degree murder convictions and to twenty-four years at 100 percent for each of the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions. The court ordered that the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions be served concurrently with the attempted murder convictions but consecutively to each other, for an effective sentence of fortyeight years at 100 percent in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) his right to confrontation was violated when a crying victim was allowed to display his injuries to the jury despite being found incompetent to testify; and (2) the trial court provided erroneous instructions on the elements of especially aggravated kidnapping when answering a question from the jury. The State argues that the defendant has waived the issues by failing to include an adequate record on appeal and that the trial court’s jury instructions were proper. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions but remand to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect that count four is to be served concurrently with count two and that Defendant’s especially aggravated kidnapping sentences are to be served at 100 percent release eligibility.

The Petitioner, Curtis Tate, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order denying hispetition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and, thereafter, sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the denial of post-conviction relief was error because he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial. He submits that trial counsel failed to call several crucial witnesses to establish his self-defense claim and that trial counsel was impaired during trial because of alcohol use. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Almeer K. Nance, appeals the judgment of the Knox County Criminal court denying post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated robbery. He subsequently accepted an agreed sentence of life plus twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) erroneously advising him not to testify at trial, which he asserts effectively deprived him of his constitutional right; and (2) failing to raise the issues of sufficiency of the evidence and severance on direct appeal. After a thorough review of the record before us, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

In October 2005, a Madison County grand jury indicted the defendant, Jim Gerhardt, on one count of child abuse and neglect, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a July 2006 jury trial, the defendant was acquitted of the offense as charged in the indictment but convicted of attempted child abuse and neglect, a Class B misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the defendant received a six month sentence, with the defendant to serve sixty days in the county jail and the balance of the sentence on probation. As part of the defendant’s probation, the trial court instituted a 8:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. curfew, ordered the defendant to have no contact with the victim, and required that the defendant receive counseling. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by failing to require the state to elect offenses; (3) the trial court erred by failing to answer a question posed by the jury during its deliberations; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecuting attorney to ask the defendant and his wife whether a particular witness was lying; (5) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecuting attorney to make improper statements during the state’s closing argument; (6) the trial court improperly denied the defendant the transcript of the sentencing hearing; (7) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; (8) the defendant received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; and (9) the cumulative effect of these and other errors prejudiced him. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the defendant’s issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kenneth L. Davis, was convicted by a Madison County jury of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to sell and/or deliver, possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia, reckless driving, and driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. He received an effective ten-year sentence for these convictions, with said sentence to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his automobile and that the evidence was insufficient at trial to establish that he possessed the contraband. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

The petitioner, Ricky Northern, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. This is the petitioner’s second attempt to secure habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to allege any ground which would render the judgment of conviction void. We grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court in accordance with Rule 20.

The Appellant, John Whatley, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction and/or habeas corpus relief. The Appellant previously filed a post-conviction petition which was decided on the merits and the claim presented in the instant petition does not warrant reopening the prior petition. Moreover, the Appellant fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Fred Zonge, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. On appeal, the petitioner argues that due process tolled the statute of limitations based upon our supreme court’s holding in State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (“Gomez II”), which the petitioner claims announced a new rule of  constitutional law, and the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Danforth v. Minnesota, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008), which changed the standard for determining if new rules of law were entitled to retroactive application. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that the petition was timely filed or that a recognized exception to the rule applies, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the Obion County Circuit Court.

The defendant, James D. Peebles, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of one count of sale of a Schedule II drug, cocaine, under .5 grams (a Class C felony). Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced, as a Range II offender, to a term of ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Salvador Velazquez Alvarez, pled guilty to possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver, Class B felonies, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the two possession of cocaine convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of ten years, six months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation or other alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Phillip Anthony Farris, pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The sentencing court determined that he should serve his aggravated kidnapping sentences concurrently. Those sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to his sentence for second degree murder. The Defendant now appeals the decision to order consecutive sentences. After conducting a de novo review, we affirm the judgment of the sentencing court.

The defendants, Brenda Faye Brewington and Brian Dewayne Brewington, were convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies, and two counts of child neglect, Class E felonies. For their convictions, the defendants each received an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment to be served at 100 percent. On appeal, the defendants raise the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victims, and photographs and a videotape of their home; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain their convictions for aggravated child neglect; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence.

After a bench trial, the Lauderdale County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Brittany Ann Kiestler, of two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and ordered her to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that  the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Patrick Smallwood, was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, Ben Blevins, pled guilty to eight counts of passing worthless checks, four counts of forgery, and five counts of attempted money laundering. According to the plea agreement, Appellant’s effective sentence was three years, the manner of service to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied alternative sentencing based on Appellant’s prior criminal history, inability to pay existing restitution, failure to abide by terms of prior probation, behavior of continually reoffending and in order to deter similar behavior. The trial court ordered the sentence served in incarceration. Appellant appeals, pro se, arguing that he should have been granted some form of alternative sentencing. We determine that the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The petitioner, Keith Collins, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the Petitioner, Christopher Lance Shockley, on four counts of rape of a child and nine counts of aggravated sexual battery. The Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixteen years. This Court affirmed the sentence on appeal. The Petitioner then filed a post-conviction petition claiming that: (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s holding that lifelong community supervision is not a direct punitive consequence of the petitioner’s pleading guilty to aggravated sexual battery. Tennessee expressly makes life supervision a part of the sentence. See T.C.A. § 39- 13-524 (providing for “a sentence of community supervision for life”). Thus, I agree with the conclusions reached in New Jersey and Nevada. See State v. Jangochian, 832 A.2d 360, 362 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2003); Palmer v. State, 59 P.3d 1192, 1196-97 (Nev. 2002). The post-conviction court’s factual findings, though, fail to reflect whether the court accredited the petitioner’s testimony that he was unaware of this consequence at the time he signed the documents and that he would not have pled guilty had he been told about such a consequence. Thus, I