APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Thomas Lamont Coleman, was found guilty following a bench trial of violating the implied consent law. He appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding him guilty absent a showing by the State that the breathalyzer test was administered in accordance with the standards set forth in State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992). After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Johnny Justin Postles, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief as it relates to the petitioner’s convictions for aggravated criminal trespass and assault in case assignment 04-720, and aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and theft under $500 in case assignment 04-721. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Toneka Y. Reid, appeals as of right from her jury conviction in the Williamson County Circuit Court of theft of property valued at five hundred dollars or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in jail. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress and in denying probation or alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Mark Anthony Buntley, was convicted by a jury of bribing a witness, a Class C felony. For his conviction, the defendant was sentenced to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence.

The defendant, David Mark McDade, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to four years in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying the defendant full probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Corey Moten, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the suppression of his statement on the grounds that it was involuntarily given. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion that proof of prior drug sales by the defendant was properly admitted. I conclude that this proof was prejudicial and essentially irrelevant to the issues in the trial. I would reverse the judgment of conviction and grant a new trial.

Defendant-Appellant, Byron Lebron Roshell, appeals his conviction by a Davidson County jury of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2006). He argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting a former co-defendant’s testimony that he had bought drugs from Roshell in the past and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Kassy Janikowski, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court order dismissing her petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Damien Clark, appeals from his conviction by a jury in the Criminal Court for Shelby County for second degree murder, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to twenty years’ confinement as a violent offender. He contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for second degree murder, (2) the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior robbery conviction as character evidence, (3) the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s prior robbery conviction when the probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and notice of impeachment was “inadequate and inaccurate,” and (4) the jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit the defendant of second degree murder before examining voluntary manslaughter as a conviction offense deprived the defendant of his constitutional rights to due process and to trial by jury. Although the required procedure was not used to admit the defendant’s prior conviction, we conclude the errors were harmless, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Anthony Bufford, pled guilty in October 2005 to driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and violating the seat belt law, a Class C misdemeanor. For the Class E felony, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to four years in community corrections with sixty days to be served in jail. For the Class A misdemeanor, he received eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served on probation in the community corrections program. For the Class C misdemeanor, the defendant received thirty days’ incarceration at seventy-five percent. All sentences were to be served concurrently. The trial court revoked the defendant’s community corrections sentence in April 2008 after finding that the defendant failed to remain drug-free. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in removing him from community corrections and ordering him to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Carlos Bonding, LLC, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s order granting partial exoneration from the final forfeiture of a $20,000 bond and ordering the company to forfeit $6,000 of the bond. On appeal, Carlos Bonding argues that the trial court, by referencing the concept of treble damages, abused its discretion in its method of calculating the amount to be forfeited. Because the trial court must be afforded broad discretion in a bail forfeiture proceeding, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery, which were merged into two counts, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. He was sentenced to ten years for each of the aggravated robbery convictions and twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, with all sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, this court found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions and that the record supported that the sentences be served consecutively. However, the matter was remanded to the trial court for the defendant to be sentenced under the pre-2005 amendments to the 1989 Sentencing Act. Subsequently, the defendant was resentenced to eight years for each of the aggravated robberyconvictions and twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping, with all sentences to be served consecutively. He again appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the court erred in sentencing. The State asks that this matter be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and, following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20.

The petitioner, Brandon Biggerstaff, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his conviction is void or his sentence illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Kelly Hill, by means of a Rule 10 interlocutory appeal, seeks review of the Maury County Circuit Court’s ruling that the assistant district attorney general did not abuse his discretion in denying her application for pretrial diversion. Following review of the record, we conclude that the relevant factors were properly considered by the assistant district attorney general and that no abuse of discretion occurred. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s application for diversion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Gregory A. Frye (“Frye”), pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense, and was sentenced to eleven months, twentynine days in confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court  ordering Frye to serve his sentence consecutively to unrelated convictions for which he was currently serving a sentence. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jason Calvert, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Algie Lavell McClure, appeals as of right his jury convictions in the Hamilton County Criminal Court for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, reckless endangerment, and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed Range I sentences of two years and three years for the reckless endangerment and aggravated burglary counts, respectively. The two year sentence is to be served consecutively to the life sentence for the merged first degree murder conviction, with all other sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant contends on appeal that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of numerous prior bad acts of the defendant through multiple witnesses, that the trial court erred in admission of impeachment evidence, and that the trial court erred by not giving a credibility instruction relative to expectations of favorable treatment certain witnesses may have had in exchange for their testimony.1 Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant, Herman Jones, pleaded guilty to theft of property over $1,000 and evading arrest, Class D felonies. As a result, he was sentenced to concurrent sentences of four years as a Range II offender to be served in community corrections with the first year to be served in the Synergy drug treatment program. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the community corrections sentences and resentenced the defendant to concurrent twelve year sentences as a career offender. From that order, the defendant appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but modify the defendant’s concurrent sentences to eight years in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. The case is remanded for entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion.

Appellant, Lora Ashley, appeals the Moore County Circuit Court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Appellant pled guilty to one count of facilitation of a violation of the sex offender registry and agreed to an open plea, where the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing on the basis that Appellant’s criminal history supported a denial of alternative sentencing and that measures less restrictive than confinement had been unsuccessfully applied to Appellant. As a result, the trial court ordered her to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail. Appellant appeals this decision. We determine that the record supports the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the result reached by the majority and agree that the trial court correctly denied alternative sentencing in this case based upon the defendant’s criminal history and past failed efforts at rehabilitation. However, I write separately to note that the trial court revoked the defendant’s bond and denied her bond in a misdemeanor case pending appeal in contravention to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-104 and Rule 32(d)(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, which grant a defendant in a misdemeanor case “a right to have bail set or to be released on recognizance pending the exhaustion of all direct appellate procedure in the case.”

Appellant, Gale Marleen Krizka, was indicted for first degree murder for the death of her husband. At the conclusion of the proof at trial, the trial court dismissed the first degree murder charge. The case proceeded to the jury on several lesser included offenses. After deliberating, the jury found Appellant guilty of second degree murder. As a result, the trial court sentenced her to twenty-two years in incarceration. Appellant seeks a review of her conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for second degree murder and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on criminal responsibility for the acts of another. We determine that the evidence presented at trial supports a jury instruction on criminal responsibility for the acts of another and that the evidence was sufficient to support the second degree murder conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Herman Parham, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to retrieve a bullet from a tree at the crime scene. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The defendant, Marcus Antonio Logan, was convicted by jury of one count of delivering less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine), a Class C felony. Thereafter, he was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant presents three issues for review: (1) whether the trial court properly overruled the defendant’s objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) whether the jury should have been instructed on the state’s failure to preserve evidence; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerry Dale Tigner, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we conclude that the petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating either that counsel was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies in representation prejudiced the outcome of his case. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition.