APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

My colleagues and the trial court determined that Detective Corcoran was without probable cause to believe that the defendant was involved in the murder of Emma Fuller, that taking the defendant into custody violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and that the defendant’s subsequent confession acknowledging his involvement in the murder should be suppressed. I agree with the relevant law cited by the majority and recognize that probable cause must have been established at the time of the defendant’s arrest. I simply disagree with the majority’s conclusion that probable cause was not established on the facts known to Detective Corcoran.

The defendant, Jose Noe Gutierrez, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and two counts of attempted aggravated rape. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress a statement he made to police after his arrest, alleging that “his initial detention at his place of employment was made without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and all his statements were therefore fruit of the poisonous tree and should be suppressed.” The trial court granted the motion and also granted the State’s request for an interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the State argues that the defendant’s arrest was supported by probable cause, or, in the alternative, that the defendant’s statement was not tainted by the illegal arrest. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The petitioner, Robert M. Winters, was convicted of felony murder and aggravated robbery. He received a total effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his convictions were void because of faulty indictments and that his counsel was ineffective. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to allege grounds upon which habeas corpus relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the summary dismissal. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Herman Parham, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to retrieve a bullet from a tree at the crime scene. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The defendant, Marcus Antonio Logan, was convicted by jury of one count of delivering less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine), a Class C felony. Thereafter, he was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant presents three issues for review: (1) whether the trial court properly overruled the defendant’s objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) whether the jury should have been instructed on the state’s failure to preserve evidence; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerry Dale Tigner, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we conclude that the petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating either that counsel was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies in representation prejudiced the outcome of his case. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The pro se petitioner, Rickie Reed, appeals the dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary review of the dismissal of his motion, this court has no jurisdiction in the case.  Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, James Alfred Goodman, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and evading arrest – endangering others, a Class D felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years and three years, respectively, to be served consecutively in confinement. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in not considering his motion to proceed in propria persona; (2) his right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the State’s failure to produce all of his property in its possession; (3) his right to confront witnesses was “abridged and violated”; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, David W. Frazier, was convicted by a Weakley County jury of one count of driving under the influence, second offense, (“DUI 2nd”), a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to a term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, sixty days of which was to be served in the county jail. The defendant was initially indicted by a Weakley County jury for DUI 2nd and violation of the implied consent law. He subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, as the preliminary hearing tape was inaudible. The State agreed, and the court dismissed the indictment. Subsequently, a second preliminary hearing was held, and the defendant was reindicted by a grand jury. The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the second indictment upon grounds that he had previously been charged and indicted for the same offenses. The court denied the motion. On appeal, he raises the single issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the second indictment because the State failed to timely reindict the defendant and because the second   indictment violates double jeopardy principles. After review of the record, we find no merit to the defendant’s contentions and affirm the judgment of conviction.

The Petitioner, Oliver J. Higgins, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The petitioner, Artis Whitehead, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing as untimely his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that his petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court tolled the one-year limitations period for filing a post-conviction petition, and because his petition was filed within one year of the Supreme Court’s order denying certiorari, his post-conviction petition was timely. The petitioner also argues that because counsel incorrectly informed him that the deadline for filing his postconviction petition was one year after the Supreme Court denied certiorari, due process requires the tolling of the one-year limitations period. After reviewing the record, we conclude that while the petition was untimely, further development of the record is necessary to determine whether counsel’s advice regarding the limitations period constituted “misrepresentation, either attributable to deception or other misconduct,” see Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Tenn. 2001), that necessitated due process-based tolling of the limitations period. As such, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.

The defendant, Stanley Blue, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of facilitation of premeditated first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed sentences of thirty-four years, fifteen years and six years, respectively; the trial court also ordered the thirty-four-year sentence to be served consecutively to the six-year sentence for a total effective sentence of forty years. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to define premeditated murder and felony murder during voir dire, (2) the trial court erred in denying an excusal for cause of a juror, (3) the trial court erred in its instructions regarding facilitation, (4) the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony, and (5) the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for attempted second degree murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Zandy Orlando Nelson a/k/a Vandy A. Nelson, appeals as of right his Davidson County Criminal Court conviction of aggravated assault for which he received a sentence of eleven years as a persistent offender, consecutive to a previously imposed sentence. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in denying a motion for continuance when the State filed a notice to seek enhanced punishment on the day of trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Dennis Charles Arellano, a/k/a Chuck Arellano, a/k/a Dr. Chuck Arellano, pled guilty to one count of TennCare fraud valued between $10,000 and $60,000, one count of impersonating a licensed professional, and one count of reckless endangerment. The defendant agreed to a total effective sentence of six years and restitution in the amount of $30,000, with the manner of service of the defendant’s sentence left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to nine months in the county jail and the balance of his sentence on probation. He was also ordered to perform 200 hours of public service work. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion or, in the alternative, a sentence of full probation. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jason Clark, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner was indicted for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and he ultimately pleaded guilty as charged. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the indictment against him was fatally defective and, thus, deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and violated principles of due process. Specifically, he argues that the indictment did not state the charges against him; i.e., failed to include the words “especially aggravated robbery” and “first degree felony murder.” The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. We agree and affirm the order summarily dismissing the petition.

The defendant, Bruce Warren Scarborough, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated rape, Class A felonies, and was sentenced to consecutive terms of sixty years as a career offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress the in-court and out-of-court identifications of him and his tattoos, (2) failing to grant a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, (3) classifying him as a career offender, and (4) ordering consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, James Terry, was convicted by a Cocke County Circuit Court jury of one count of rape, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Claiborne County jury convicted the Defendant, Anita Kay Broughton, of one count of premeditated first degree murder. The trial court sentenced her to life in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the State presented insufficient evidence of premeditation; (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it did not admit a DVD video of the crime scene; (3) the trial court erred when it did not admit prior inconsistent statements of witnesses; and (4) the prosecuting attorney improperly argued that the Defendant had previously raped one of the witnesses. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendants, Eric D. Turner and Robert Dee Scribner, II, were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in a three-count indictment for rape of a child, a Class A felony, with Scribner charged with two counts and Turner charged with one count. Following their jury trial, Scribner was convicted of one of the two counts with which he was charged and sentenced as a child rapist to sixteen years at 100 percent in the Department of Correction. Turner was convicted of the lesser-included offense of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. Both defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on appeal. Turner additionally argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted rape of a child, and Scribner argues that the trial court erred by admitting DNA evidence without a proper chain of custody, by not granting a requested special jury instruction, and by enhancing his sentence beyond the minimum in the range. Having reviewed the record and found no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Harvey Baker, appeals the denial of habeas corpus relief by the trial court. Petitioner contended that the indictment on which his conviction was based was duplicitous, vague, ambiguous, faulty, and incomplete. As a result, Petitioner contended that the indictment was void. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Harvey L. Webb, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Having determined that the trial court properly denied the petition, this Court hereby affirms the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael H. Palmer, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petitions for post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court for Sullivan County. He claims to have entered guilty pleas to reckless endangerment and telephone harassment and to have entered a nolo contendere plea to assault. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the petitions without appointing counsel and in refusing to rescind the order dismissing the post-conviction petitions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Reggie Carnell James, of one count of first degree murder and one count of tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life in prison for the murder conviction and ten years as a Range II, multiple offender, for the evidence tampering conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Curtis Palmer, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective as follows: (1) counsel admitted the petitioner’s guilt during the trial without the petitioner’s consent; (2) counsel failed to adequately investigate possible grounds for a speedy trial; (3) counsel failed to challenge invalid indictments; and (4) counsel failed to properly litigate the suppression of evidence. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction
relief is affirmed.