APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Oliver J. Higgins, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing or making adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State has responded with a motion that we affirm the summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner filed his petition well outside the statute of limitations and has not shown any reason why the limitations period should be tolled, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Ronnie Bradfield, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his conviction is void or his sentence illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

I respectfully dissent. I concur with the analysis in the majority opinion, as far as it goes.  I am concerned, though, with the trial court’s ruling that the Petitioner’s claims against trial counsel had been previously determined. I conclude that the record reflects that the Petitioner did not receive a full and fair hearing regarding trial counsel’s representation. I believe the case should be remanded to allow such a hearing on that issue.

The petitioner, Ronald Fielding, appeals as of right the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for three counts of rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of rape for which he received an effective fifty-year sentence to be served in the custody of the Department of Correction. On appeal, he alleges that his guilty plea was involuntary and that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Phyllis Ann Amos, entered pleas of guilty to possession of marijuana, a Class E felony; possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony; maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are kept or sold, a Class D felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and felony possession of dihydrocodone, a Class D felony. In accordance with the negotiated plea agreement, Defendant accepted concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for her misdemeanor conviction, one year for her Class E felony conviction, two years for each Class D felony conviction, and ten years for her Class B felony conviction. The felony sentences are as a Range I, standard offender. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the agreed upon sentences and ordered Defendant to serve her sentences in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Tony Jamerson, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the petitioner argues that: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to fully investigate police techniques used in obtaining the petitioner’s confession, and (2) the trial court and counsel failed to ensure proper jury instruction. The petitioner also asserts in brief that he is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. After review, the judgment of the court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The defendant, Joseph May, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed a premeditated and intentional murder. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Richard D. Baker, appeals the revocation of his six-year probationary sentence. He contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation before the commencement of the probationary term and by ordering incarceration. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Ontrell James, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his aggravated robbery conviction because the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly obtained or exercised control over the property of another. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Junior Aldridge, guilty of one count each of first degree murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the two murder counts and imposed concurrent sentences of life in prison for the first degree murder conviction and forty years as a Range II, multiple offender for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court’s exclusion of testimony regarding statements made by the victim denied the defendant his right to present a defense. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded the testimony and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Lamario Hill, of first degree felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life in prison for the defendant’s murder conviction, nine years for his attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction, and four years for his aggravated assault conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jairie Pierce, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court for Shelby County of theft of property valued over $1000, a Class D felony, and theft of property valued over $500, a Class E felony. He received respective sentences of four years and two years to be served concurrently in the Shelby County Correctional Center. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of theft of property valued over $1000 and that it was only sufficient to convict him of unauthorized use of a vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Darrell Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to thirty years as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a career offender. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Ronald Eugene Hall, was convicted by a Davidson County Jury of two counts of second degree murder. The convictions were merged into a single count of second degree murder, for which Petitioner received a twenty-year sentence to be served at one-hundred percent incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. See State v. Ronald Eugene Hall, M2003-02326-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 292432, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 8, 2005). Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals the judgment of the post-conviction court. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that he was incompetent to stand trial.

The Petitioner, Chaurice Bagley, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Petitioner, Matthew M. Jackson, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Defendant, Michael Eugene Chittum, was charged with one count of reckless vehicular homicide, a Class C felony. His application for pretrial diversion was denied by the district attorney general and that denial was upheld by the Criminal Court of Trousdale County. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in upholding his denial of pretrial diversion because the district attorney general considered an irrelevant factor in his denial memorandum. On appeal, the State concedes that the district attorney general impermissibly considered an irrelevant factor and asks us to remand this case to the district attorney general for reconsideration. The Defendant, in response, asks us to reverse the decision of the trial court and remand to the trial court for entry of an order granting him pretrial diversion. After our review, we reverse, remand, and direct the entry of an order granting the Defendant pretrial diversion.

Defendant was indicted for rape of a child, a Class A felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant, Robert Charles Taylor, was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, Career Offender, to thirty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Anthony H. Dean, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Appellant, Alfred C. Whitehead, pled guilty to possession of more than .5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. As part of the guilty plea, Appellant reserved the following certified question of law for appeal pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure to determine whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. We determine that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress where the initial seizure occurred after police officers entered the residence based on consent. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Respectfully, I dissent from the majority view that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of tampering with evidence. The evidence did not establish the defendant’s guilt of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

The petitioner, Tony Martin, appeals the dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner claims on appeal that State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (Gomez II) established a previously unrecognized constitutional right to have a jury, rather than the trial judge, determine the existence of facts necessary to enhance his sentence. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of the motion to reopen pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Curtis Lee Majors, on one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, a Class B felony, and one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor.1 The jury also convicted the defendant of evidence tampering as charged in Count 2 of the indictment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for tampering with evidence; (2) the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction regarding tampering with evidence; and (3) the trial court refused to apply one of the mitigating factors proposed by the defendant at his sentencing hearing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, De’Andre Kendall, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition for post-conviction relief fails as it is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The petitioner, Ronald Donnell Moore, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. In 1994, the petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In seeking post-conviction relief on appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner asserts that his counsel was ineffective: (1) in failing to seek proper jury instruction on the burden of proof; (2) in failing to request jury instruction on the lesser-included offenses of first degree murder, in particular, the offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide; and (3) in failing to object to the presence of a mannequin in the courtroom. After review, the judgment of the court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.