APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Alejandro Avila-Salazar, pleaded guilty on September 6, 2006, to one count of second degree murder and one count of attempted aggravated rape. He was sentenced to serve forty years for the second degree murder conviction and twelve years for the attempted aggravated rape conviction, those sentences to be served concurrently at 100%. He later filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that his guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. A post-conviction hearing was held on March 10, 2008, after which the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in holding that he received the effective assistance of counsel and that he entered his guilty plea knowingly and intelligently. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Danny Ray Lacy, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life without parole. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that his conviction was void due to erroneous jury instructions at trial and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Wayne County Circuit summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. After our review of the record, we agree and affirm the order summarily dismissing the petition.

Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Defendant-Appellant, Brian David Thomason (“Thomason”), appeals from the denial of his application for pretrial diversion to the Gibson County District Attorney General’s office, which was upheld by the trial court. Upon review of the record and applicable authority, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the trial court to grant Thomason pretrial diversion under such terms and conditions as are deemed appropriate under all circumstances.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Corey Danielle Wellman, of one count of possessing with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, one count of attempted felony possession of a weapon, and one count of introducing contraband into a penal facility. The defendant appeals his convictions, maintaining that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that he argues resulted from an illegal search. The defendant also challenges the sufficiency of evidence for all his convictions except for his introducing contraband into a penal facility conviction. We hold that the defendant has waived his suppression issue. We affirm the judgments of the trial court regarding his drug and drug paraphernalia convictions, and we reverse his attempted felony possession of a weapon conviction, and dismiss that charge.

After a trial by jury, Victor L. Powell, the petitioner, was convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication and three counts of vehicular assault. He now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Maurice Currie, was found guilty of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant, as a Range I, standard offender to eight years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance; (3) the sentence imposed is excessive; and (4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion that he be declared indigent for appellate purposes. Upon our close review of the evidence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State appeals the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of a search of the vehicle of Defendant, Jonathan Frederick Walker. The seized items led to Defendant’s indictment for possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. Because the State was unable to prosecute the case without the suppressed evidence, the trial court entered an order dismissing the charges against the Defendant. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Timothy Garvin Odom, was found guilty of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range One, standard offender, to eighteen years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement; and (3) the trial court erred in its sentencing determinations. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Wiley Rathbone, was convicted by a jury in Cocke County Circuit Court of three counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and one count of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed sentences of five years for each aggravated assault offense and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the domestic assault offense, ordering all sentences to be served concurrently except for one aggravated assault sentence which is to be served consecutively and on probation, for a total effective sentence of five years incarceration followed by five years probation. In this appeal as of right, he contends (1) that the State’s comments before the jury denied him a fair trial, (2) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and (3) that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence both in length and manner of service. Following our review, we affirm the convictions but remand the case for reconsideration of the lengths of the sentences and imposition of consecutive sentences.

The petitioner, Jerry Sandridge, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and, upon his direct appeal, this court modified one of the convictions to aggravated assault and remanded for resentencing. The resentencing was affirmed on direct appeal. On January 15, 2009, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting prosecutorial misconduct and denial of the effective assistance of counsel. Concluding that the petition was untimely, the post-conviction court dismissed it without a hearing, and this appeal resulted. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal.

The defendant, Johnny Peterson, was convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. He received a life sentence for his first degree murder conviction and a sentence of twenty-one years for his attempted first degree murder conviction to run concurrently with his life sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeffery Yates, was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced as a career offender to confinement for thirty years at sixty percent. Following his unsuccessful appeal of his conviction, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court determined that the petition was without merit, and we affirm the dismissal.

The petitioner, Timothy Casterlow, pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his writ of error coram nobis as being filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. He contends due process principles should toll the running of the statute of limitations because the newly discovered evidence was not timely sent to him by his attorney. After review of this record, we conclude that due process does not require the tolling of the statute of limitations.

The defendant, Melvin Jerome Reed, Jr., pled guilty to possession of 300 grams or more of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony, in exchange for a Range I sentence of twenty years, to be served consecutively to two other sentences. As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant reserved three certified questions of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the legality of the traffic stop, detention, and search of his vehicle on March 16, 2007. We conclude that the questions are properly certified and that the trial court ruled correctly in denying the motion to suppress.

Petitioner, Jose Zacarias Quinteros, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleges that his guilty plea was involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel after he pled guilty to driving without a license in Davidson County in April of 2007. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance or that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant, Atavis Cortez Cunningham, was convicted by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and sentenced to eight years as a Range II offender. On appeal, he argues that the jury was unconstitutionally empaneled and the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Robert J. Lewellen, pled guilty in two different cases to nineteen counts of burglary, thirteen counts of theft, five counts of vandalism, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card and was sentenced to sixteen years, suspended to probation after service of twenty-four months in jail. On appeal, he argues that the trial court’s imposition of an effective sixteen-year  was excessive. After review, we remand for entry of a judgment in Count 20 of Case Number 08-310 judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

Appellant, Aldrick D. Lillard, and two other individuals were indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for first degree murder, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property in connection with the death of Randy Betts. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.1 The trial court merged the felony murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction. The jury sentenced Appellant to life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction. On the remaining convictions, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The remaining sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with the life sentence. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated a timely appeal. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the Appellant was prejudiced because one judge ruled on pre-trial motions and a different judge presided over the trial; (3) whether the trial court improperly allowed the jury to view the trial exhibits in the jury room; (4) whether the trial

The Defendant-Appellant, Jermaine Gwin, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony. He received a twenty-year sentence to be served at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, Gwin challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, (2) the admission of a prior bad act under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), (3) the admission of a photograph of the crime scene (4) the excessiveness of his sentence, and (5) the cumulative effect of the alleged errors. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Rex A. White, requested that the trial court accept a negotiated plea agreement, and the trial court obliged. Armed with new counsel, the defendant now appeals his agreed to sentences, claiming the trial court erred in sentencing him. This appeal is dismissed as the defendant waived his right to appeal his sentence when he entered a negotiated plea agreement.

The defendant, Quartes Williams, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and was sentenced as a Range I offender to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and nine years, respectively. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) the trial court erred in admitting autopsy photographs; (3) the trial court erred in allowing Captain David Cupp to testify as a handwriting expert; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Rickey Lee Beamon, ¹ appeals the denial of post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court for Hamilton County from his convictions for theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony; two counts of burglary, a Class D felony; aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor; and three counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. For the felony theft, he received a sentence of fifteen years as a career offender. For the two burglaries, he received concurrent twelve-year sentences as a career offender, to be served consecutively to the felony theft sentence. The four misdemeanor sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days, were ordered to run concurrently to the twelve-year burglary sentences, for an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying relief because: (1) counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to sever offenses in case 238463; (2) counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to include in the appellate record the transcript of the suppression hearing in case 245041; and (3) counsel provided ineffective assistance by waiving the issue of retained counsel of choice on appeal by failing to support his claim through argument, citation to authority, and references to the appellate record. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, John Johnson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we conclude that the petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating either that counsel was deficient or that any of the alleged deficiencies in representation prejudiced the outcome of his case. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Joe Strawther, pled guilty to aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery in Rutherford County in exchange for an effective eight-year sentence. Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals the denial of the petition. However, the issue raised by Petitioner on appeal was not raised in his petition for post-conviction relief and, therefore, is not properly before this Court. The Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty pleas were entered involuntarily. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Mario Marquis Gray, also known as Mario Marquis Grey, entered a best-interest plea in Davidson County to one count of aggravated burglary in exchange for a sentence of six years, to run consecutively to a prior conviction for which he was on probation at the time of his arrest. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was improperly denied relief by the post-conviction court. After a review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily. Accordingly, the judgment of the postconviction court is affirmed.