APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this interlocutory appeal, the State asks this court to review the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for new trial. After reviewing the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s order.

In 2015, a Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jabriel Linzy, of first-degree murder,
attempted first-degree murder, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a
dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison for the first degree murder
conviction, fifteen years for the attempted first degree murder conviction, and six years for
the conviction of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The
trial court ordered that the two shorter sentences be served consecutively to each other but
concurrently with the life sentence. The Petitioner appealed his convictions, and this court
affirmed. State v. Linzy, No. E2016-01052-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3575871, at *1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2017). The Petitioner filed
a petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted
post-conviction relief, concluding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
inadmissible social media evidence in conjunction with not eliciting testimony about the
Petitioner’s prior conflict with the victim and that trial counsel’s performance prejudiced
the Petitioner. On appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court erred because
trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision when failing to object to the social media
evidence and because the Petitioner cannot show that trial counsel’s performance
prejudiced him. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jacquiz McBee, of first-degree murder, and
the trial court sentenced him to life in prison to be served consecutively to his prior threeyear
sentence for aggravated assault. The Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence,
and this court affirmed both. State v. McBee, No. E2021-01048-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL
16833562, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 9, 2023).
The Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act asking
that evidence in his case be tested for DNA and undergo fingerprint analysis. The postconviction
court summarily dismissed the petition. The Petitioner appeals, maintaining
that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition for fingerprint and DNA
analysis of evidence in his case. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s
judgment.

The defendant, Raymond Benson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of reckless homicide and convicted felon in possession of a handgun for which he received an effective sentence of four years suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless homicide and asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to impeach a State’s witness with prior convictions. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Rhea County jury convicted the Defendant, Heather Fisher, of possession with intent to
sell or deliver a controlled substance, schedule II, to wit: methamphetamine in an amount
in excess of 0.5 grams (count one); three counts of possession of a schedule IV drug with
intent to sell or deliver (alprazolam, diazepam, and clonazepam) (counts three through
five); possession with intent to sell or deliver a schedule VI controlled substance, to wit:
marijuana in excess of 0.5 grams or more (count six); possession of a weapon during
commission of a drug offense (count seven); maintaining a drug involved dwelling (count
eight); and possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia (count nine), for which she received
an effective thirteen year sentence.1 In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges
only her conviction in count seven for possession of a weapon during the commission of a
drug offense and argues (1) the evidence failed to establish that she possessed a weapon
and failed to establish that she had the requisite intent to go armed; and (2) that the trial
court erred in determining that the offense of carrying a weapon was not established by the
evidence and that it erred in excluding carrying a weapon as a lesser-included offense of
count seven.2 Upon our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Bobby V. Summers, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to facilitation of first degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Rickey Benson, acting pro se, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. After review, we affirm.

In this case of first impression, Petitioner, Armon Yusef Pazouki, entered a conditional guilty plea to domestic assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (“the judicial diversion statute”). As part of the plea agreement, the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner judicial diversion and placing him on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-nine days. At a subsequent revocation hearing, Petitioner conceded that he had violated the conditions of his diversionary probation, and pursuant to a new agreement with the State, the trial court revoked Petitioner’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the revocation proceedings and that his plea agreement in that proceeding was unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner could not collaterally attack a revocation of judicial diversion through a post-conviction petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act does not apply to proceedings relating to the revocation of judicial diversion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this case of first impression, Petitioner, Armon Yusef Pazouki, entered a conditional guilty plea to domestic assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (“the judicial diversion statute”). As part of the plea agreement, the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner judicial diversion and placing him on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-nine days. At a subsequent revocation hearing, Petitioner conceded that he had violated the conditions of his diversionary probation, and pursuant to a new agreement with the State, the trial court revoked Petitioner’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the revocation proceedings and that his plea agreement in that proceeding was unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner could not collaterally attack a revocation of judicial diversion through a post-conviction petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act does not apply to proceedings relating to the revocation of judicial diversion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

Defendant, Ronald Eugene Fox, II, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, tampering with evidence, and initiating a false report. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for his first degree murder conviction, the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue, and the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of first degree murder. Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial warrants reversal of his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

The Defendant, Marlikka Jordan, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony, for which she is serving an effective fifteen-year sentence in confinement. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2025) (subsequently amended) (aggravated child abuse and neglect). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s injuries observed on or about August 1, 2020, and that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Benjamin Hartshaw, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Zachary Thompson, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he failed to establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the Defendant’s application for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Defendant seeks review of the trial court’s order transferring the Defendant to the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) for safekeeping prior to trial. The Defendant argues that the trial court lacked statutory authorization to transfer a pretrial detainee to TDOC custody or, alternatively, that the facts of this case do not support such a transfer. The State has filed a response in opposition, arguing that the trial court has not so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review. We conclude that extraordinary review is “necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a)(2). Therefore, we hereby GRANT the Defendant’s application for extraordinary appeal. However, further briefing and argument are not required. See Tenn. R. App. P. 10(d). For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.

Billy Jack Reprogal, Defendant, admitted to violating the terms of his community-based alternative to incarceration (“community corrections”) sentence. Following a hearing, the court ordered Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Defendant claims the trial court erred because it failed to properly consider the ends of justice and the best interest of the public and Defendant when it sentenced him. Discerning no error, we affir

Defendant, Keion Lamonte Jemison, appeals from his convictions for reckless homicide, aggravated assault resulting in death, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony crime of violence, for which he is serving an effective twenty-three-year sentence. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him for Class B felony possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime of violence, arguing that aggravated assault by recklessness is not included in the statutory definition of a “crime of violence.” We affirm.

Defendant, Frank E. Fankam, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of rape. A petit jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years with one year to be served in confinement and nine years to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: 1) it was plain error for the trial court to allow into evidence text messages between Defendant and the victim; 2) the State impermissibly delayed in bringing an indictment against him in order to gain a tactical advantage at trial; 3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its cross-examination of Defendant and during closing argument; 4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction; and 5) cumulative error requires reversal. Having reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Before the court is the petition of the Defendant, Erwin Tyrone Halfacre, for an
accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2, seeking
review of the trial court’s December 30, 2025 order denying the Defendant’s motion for
recusal. The Defendant also seeks a stay of the trial proceedings, which are scheduled to
begin on January 6, 2026. On January 5, 2026, this court denied the Defendant’s request
for a stay. Following our de novo review, we now affirm the trial court’s order denying
the Defendant’s motion for recusal.

The Defendant, Charles Randolph Carter, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his
probationary sentence stemming from his guilty-pled convictions for attempted aggravated
assault and aggravated cruelty to animals. While on probation, the Defendant absconded
from supervision and committed new misdemeanor offenses, among other violations.
Following several revocation hearings, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s three-year
and eight-month probationary sentence and ordered him to serve the balance in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion (1)
by determining that he violated his probation based upon disciplinary infractions
committed while in custody on this sentence and (2) by fully revoking his probation given
his contrition and need for additional drug treatment. Following our review, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Gabriel Dotson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective by conceding guilt during closing argument against Petitioner’s wishes. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Billy J. Coffelt, was convicted in March 2000 by a Davidson County jury of felony escape, two counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, for which he is serving an effective ninety-year sentence. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, alleging that the trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence and that his consecutive sentencing was not consistent with other similarly situated defendants. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in summarily denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kevin Dewayne Stinnett, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner is serving an effective eighteen-year sentence following his jury trial convictions for multiple drug-related offenses. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to trial counsel’s failures to: (1) move for a dismissal for one count of the indictment, (2) object to the State’s introduction of evidence, and (3) request a jury instruction. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Kwame D. Chihombori-Quao, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for four counts of statutory rape, for which he was sentenced to two years in confinement and six years on supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to register as a sex offender. Following our review, we affirm.

Defendant, William Roger Campbell, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive life sentences. In his direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions but reversed the imposition of consecutive sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing, during which the trial court was to address the consecutive sentencing factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). State v. Campbell, No. M2023-00779-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 3888342, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2024). Following a hearing in which no new proof was presented, the court again aligned the sentences consecutively. Defendant now asserts that the trial court erred in doing so. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Marcus Willingham, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.