APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In 1981 a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Larry McKay, and his co-defendant, Michael Sample, of two counts of felony murder and imposed upon both men a sentence of death. On direct appeal, the Petitioner's convictions and sentence were affirmed. State v. McKay, 680 S.W.2d 447 (Tenn. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034 (1985). The Petitioner filed multiple post-conviction petitions, one of which was filed in 1995 and is the subject of this appeal. In that petition, the Petitioner contended that the prosecution violated his right to due process and a fair trial by suppressing exculpatory evidence against him. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and, after a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Israel Dean Bolinger, was indicted by the Greene County Grand Jury on one count of aggravated robbery. He was convicted of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to five years in prison. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal, failing to apply the physical facts rule, denying certain redactions in a statement, and in determining his sentence. We affirm.

In January 2007, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Timothy Webber, for one count of second degree murder and one count of aggravated assault in connection with the death of a homeless woman and the beating of a man. On October 22, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder. As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to seventeen years to be served at 100%. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did not explain to Petitioner that he was pleading guilty to a "knowing killing." In addition, Petitioner alleged that because he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel, his plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the issues. In a written order, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed to this Court. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that trial counsel and the trial court explained to Petitioner that he was pleading guilty to a knowing killing and that Petitioner understood that fact. Therefore, he was not afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and his plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

On March 13, 2007, Appellant, Catherin Vaughn, pled guilty in Rutherford County Circuit Court to child abuse of a child under the age of six. The trial court ordered her to serve three years on probation. On December 18, 2008, Appellant made several threatening comments about a juvenile court judge in front of the worker who was teaching Appellant parenting skills and anger management. These threats were reported to the police. As a result, on January 1, 2009, Appellant was arrested for retaliation for past actions against a judge. A probation violation warrant was filed against Appellant. The trial court held a probation violation hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had violated her probation. The trial court revoked her probation and sentenced her to serve twenty-one days in incarceration and serve two more years on probation. Appellant appeals from the revocation of her probation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant's probation. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Frederick Carey, pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to three counts of the sale of cocaine, Class B felonies, two counts of assault, Class A misdemeanors, and one count of resisting official detention, a Class B misdemeanor. The petitioner agreed to a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each Class B felony, to be served concurrently, and to time served for the misdemeanor convictions. On appeal from the post-conviction court's denial of relief, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel presented an unenforceable plea agreement upon which he relied in choosing to plead guilty. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Demario Tabb, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. He was subsequently sentenced to an effective life sentence without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that counsel was ineffective by failing to remain with the petitioner after a failed proffer session to ensure that he was escorted back to his cell in light of the fact that the petitioner gave an incriminating statement to police after counsel left. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Kevin McDougle, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was subsequently sentenced to consecutive sentences of twelve years for the robbery and six years for each assault, resulting in an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the imposition of consecutive sentences, specifically contending that the court erred in relying upon his juvenile record to establish that he was an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentences as imposed.

The defendant, Daniel Lopez, was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies. He was sentenced to life for each murder conviction and to twenty-five years for each especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively for a total effective sentence of life plus fifty years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in: denying his request to give a jury instruction for accomplice testimony; sustaining the State's objection to testimony of a co-defendant; granting the State's motion to have an anonymous jury; denying his motion for a mistrial; and instructing the jury to disregard a question from defense counsel during cross-examination. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Newt Carter, of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to twenty years at 100% for aggravated rape consecutive to five years at 30% for aggravated burglary, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant by misapplying enhancement factors and ordering the defendant to serve the sentences consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Linda Pinkins, pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a Class C felony, on July 22, 2009. The trial court sentenced her to three years in the workhouse and ordered that she serve six months in confinement and five years on probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion and by sentencing her to a term of confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, James David Allen, III, pled guilty to vandalism, a Class E felony, and received a sentence of two years of probation under the judicial diversion program. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 40-35-313(a)(1)(A). Following the filing of a violation of probation warrant and an amended violation of probation warrant, the Defendant was sentenced to serve seven consecutive weekends in the Blount County Jail. Following the service of the seven weekends in jail, the Defendant was directed to return to supervised probation for the balance of his sentence. On April 7, 2009, a second violation of probation warrant was filed. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's sentence of probation and ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of the two-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Phillip G. Harris, pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, in the Circuit Court for Coffee County. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced as a violent offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The judgment order did not impose lifetime community supervision following the expiration of Harris' sentence as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524. Consequently, the State filed a motion to amend the judgment order. The trial court entered a corrected judgment order that imposed lifetime community supervision. On appeal, Harris challenges the validity of his guilty plea and the constitutionality of the lifetime supervision statute. The State contends this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure does not provide for an appeal as of right. Upon review, we agree with the State and dismiss Harris' appeal.

The Defendant-Appellant, Timothy Dell Hilton, was convicted by a Cumberland County jury of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He received an eight-year sentence for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, and a concurrent, three-year sentence for aggravated assault conviction. On appeal, Hilton claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Dominic Delvekio Carter, was convicted of three counts of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of theft of property under $500. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a multiple rapist to an effective sentence of fifty years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, David Jones Milton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Vincent Byron Rose, appeals from the trial court's order revoking his probation and ordering that he serve his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm.

The State appeals the Chester County Circuit Court's decision to order pretrial diversion for the Defendant-Appellee, Terry Rainey. Rainey was indicted for reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, Class C and D felonies. The State claims it properly appealed as of right under Rule 3(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Alternatively, the State asserts the circumstances of this case warrant review as an extraordinary appeal under Rule 10(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Upon review, we hold that the State cannot appeal the trial court's decision to order pretrial diversion under Rule 3(c). We also decline review under Rule 10(a). Accordingly, the State's appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, William George Soller, Jr., was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony. The Defendant pled guilty to violation of the implied consent law (Count 2) and driving on a revoked license (Count 3), both Class A misdemeanors. Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced as a multiple offender to forty months to serve at 35% for the DUI conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, suspended to five days and the remainder on supervised probation for Count 2, and eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, suspended to forty-five days and the remainder on supervised probation for Count 3. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently to one another but consecutively to sentences imposed in a separate case. In his appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI, and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant as a Range II offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgment but conclude that the trial court improperly classified the Defendant as a Range II offender. Accordingly, we remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, William George Soller, Jr., appeals from his Sevier County Circuit Court jury convictions of felony reckless endangerment, reckless aggravated assault, fourth offense driving under the influence ("DUI"), and leaving the scene of an accident. In this appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by refusing his request for a change of venue; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to excuse a potential juror for cause; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to permit the testimony of an expert witness for the defense; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for felony reckless endangerment and DUI; (5) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; (6) the trial court should have dismissed one count of the indictment as duplicitous; and (7) the trial court erred by classifying the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender for sentencing purposes. After a review of the record, we affirm the defendant's convictions but vacate the defendant's sentences on the felony convictions of reckless aggravated assault and fourth offense DUI and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.

The Defendant, Patrick Trawick, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of premeditated first degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault related to the death of his estranged girlfriend and the aggravated assault of her companion. The jury found life without the possibility of parole to be the appropriate sentence for the premeditated first degree murder count. Following a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent six year sentences for the two aggravated assault counts to be served consecutively to the sentence of life without the possibility of parole. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) failing to recuse itself, (2) ruling admissible for impeachment purposes the Defendant's prior rape conviction, (3) admitting crime scene photographs of the victim's body, and (4) failing to instruct the jury regarding all lesser included offenses for premeditated first degree murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Danurico Dujuan Grundy, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Circuit Court for Dickson County. On November 17, 2005, he pled guilty to theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and five counts of uttering a forged instrument under $1,000, a Class E felony. Grundy received an effective sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and was ordered to pay $26.50 to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund and $546.50 in court costs. On appeal, Grundy claims the trial court erred by revoking his probation and reinstating his original sentences of confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.