APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Danny Lee Greene, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-three years as a violent offender. On appeal, he contends that the trial court improperly denied him a jury instruction concerning voluntary intoxication. After careful review, we conclude no error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

Petitioner, Ivan Moreno, a/k/a Fernando Fileto a/k/a/ Roberto Lepe-Cervantes, pled guilty to felony murder, aggravated rape, and especially aggravated robbery. Petitioner received an effective sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and an involuntary guilty plea. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner seeks a review of the post-conviction court's decision. Because Petitioner has failed to prove that his guilty plea was involuntary or that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Daniel Livingston, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Robin Lynn Cooper, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; rape, a Class B felony; aggravated rape, a Class A felony; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; and three counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. The convictions for the Class B felony kidnappings were merged into one count. The defendant was sentenced to life without parole as a repeat violent offender for the rape, aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and three convictions of aggravated kidnapping and to a concurrent sentence of twelve years at thirty percent for attempted second degree murder. On appeal, he argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred in admitting evidence; the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant a continuance; and the presence of his parole officer's folder on the witness stand violated a court order that the State could not mention that he was on parole. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The petitioner, Eric P. Lumpkin, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of appellate counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Joe Marvin Ellison, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Donovan Michael Munroe, appeals from his jury convictions in the Sullivan County Criminal Court for attempted second degree murder, possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, both Class B felonies, possession of oxycodone with the intent to sell, a Class C felony, and maintaining a dwelling where drugs are sold, a Class D felony. The trial court imposed Range I sentences of twelve years, eight years, three years, and two years, respectively; the trial court also ordered the sentences for the drug-related offenses to be served concurrently with one another and on supervised probation, but consecutively to the twelve-year sentence of incarceration for attempted second degree murder. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence seized in Virginia, (3) the trial court improperly limited the examination of witnesses, (4) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing arguments, (5) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence, and (6) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived the Defendant of due process and a fair trial. Following our review, we conclude that the fines imposed were excessive and order them modified consistent with this opinion. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded.

The Defendant, Bobby Dwaine England, pled guilty in the Cumberland County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, a Class A felony, with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of twenty-four years as a Range I, standard offender, for a total effective sentence of forty-eight years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence both in length and manner of service. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Manuel Haynes, of two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II multiple offender to serve an effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, twenty years for the first count consecutive to fifteen years for the second count. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors when sentencing the defendant on the first count; (3) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences; (4) the trial court erred by failing to re-read portions of the jury instructions; (5) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on the intoxication of a juror. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Brent Richardson, was convicted of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, carjacking, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and sentenced the defendant to an effective term of life plus forty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend two counts of the indictment after the jury had been sworn and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dennis Ray Bailey, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Dickson County of driving under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended after serving 45 days in confinement, and ordered to pay a $600 fine. Bailey claims on appeal that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Billy Ray Farris, pled guilty in the Chester County Circuit Court to second degree murder, and he received a sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Jesse B. Gilliland, was arrested at the Cool Springs Mall in Franklin, Tennessee for videotaping underneath women's skirts. Officers obtained a search warrant and while conducting the search, discovered marijuana. The Williamson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for one count of possession of marijuana weighing less than a half of an ounce. Appellant filed a motion to suppress based on lack of probable cause for the search warrant. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant entered a negotiated plea to the marijuana charge with a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. As part of his plea agreement, Appellant reserved a certified question arguing that there was not probable cause to support the search warrant because the facts as alleged, of Appellant photographing underneath women's skirts in a public place, did not constitute a crime. On appeal, the State concedes that the facts as presented do not actually constitute crime under our State's current statutory scheme. Therefore, we must reverse trial court's judgment, order that the evidence found as a result of the execution of the search warrant be suppressed, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Donald Clark, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Patty Sue Lawrence, was convicted of two counts of prostitution, a Class B misdemeanor, and one count of submitting a false police report, a Class D felony. The trial court ordered an effective sentence of three years in custody. She appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm.

After the appellant, Lonnie L. Cross, led police on a high-speed chase, a Bradley County Criminal Court jury convicted him on two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, felony evading arrest with risk to others, driving on a revoked license, and speeding. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of eight years in custody. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support two of his convictions: the evading arrest conviction and one of the reckless endangerment convictions. The appellant also challenges the trial court's reliance on two sentencing enhancement factors. Upon review, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the appellant's convictions. We also conclude that, although the trial court erred in its application of one of the enhancement factors, the error was harmless. However, our review of the record reveals that the trial court committed plain error. The appellant's conviction on the reckless endangerment in count three violates constitutional double jeopardy protections. We therefore affirm the judgements of the trial court as to count one, reckless endangerment, and count two, evading arrest. The judgment of conviction in count three is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for merger of the conviction in count three with the evading arrest conviction in count two.

The defendant, David Smith, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony under the dying declaration exception; (2) the trial court erred in conducting its own voir dire of the defendant regarding his decision to testify; (3) the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on flight; (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (5) the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence based on the use of a firearm. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Bruce Huffines, appeals pro se the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for forgery, a Class E felony. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. The State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Dickson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Julie Petty, for one count of sexual battery by an authority figure and one count of statutory rape by an authority figure. These charges came about as a result of Appellant's sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-old girl who was a student at the school where Appellant was a substitute teacher and softball coach. Appellant entered an open plea to one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four years with one year to be served in confinement and the remaining three years to be served on probation. Appellant appeals from the trial court's imposition of this sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court should have imposed a three-year sentence with the entire sentence to be served on probation. After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that there is no basis for reversal of the trial court's judgment. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1981 a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael Eugene Sample, and his co-defendant, Larry McKay, of two counts of felony murder and imposed upon both men a sentence of death. On direct appeal, the Petitioner's convictions and sentence were affirmed. State v. McKay and Sample, 680 S.W.2d 447 (Tenn. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034 (1985). The Petitioner filed multiple post-conviction petitions, one of which was filed in 1995 and is the subject of this appeal. In that petition, the Petitioner contended that: (1) the State violated his right to due process and a fair trial by suppressing exculpatory evidence against him; (2) the State knowingly presented false testimony; and (3) his sentence of death violates Apprendi because the jury imposed the sentence based upon aggravating circumstances that were not contained in the indictment, presented to the grand jury, or proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and, after a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Ernest Hurd, appeals as of right from the Anderson County Criminal Court's denial of his motion to set aside the judgment declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO). See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 55-10-601, et seq. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the default judgment declaring him to be a MVHO is void because it was not properly certified under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58. Therefore, he argues that he cannot be convicted of violating the MVHO statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 55-10-616. Following our review, we hold that the default judgment met the requirements of Rule 58 and that, even if the judgment had not met these requirements, a delay of over sixteen years in challenging the judgment precludes any relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.