APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s
conviction of second degree murder should be upheld despite the absence of any proof that the defendant knowingly inflicted the lethal wound. The majority agrees that the evidence did not establish a knowing killing, the elemental and factual foundation for second degree murder. Indeed, the majority agrees that the trial court should not have instructed the jury on second degree murder as a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder. Despite these conclusions, the majority relies upon the mens rea regime for felony murder to impart culpability to the defendant for second degree murder.

The appellant, Joe Michael Turner, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court Jury of two counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of one hundred years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court should have merged the kidnapping convictions. Therefore, the judgments of conviction for the especially aggravated kidnapping and the aggravated kidnappings are vacated and the case is remanded for entry of a judgment of especially aggravated kidnapping that includes the merged aggravated kidnapping convictions. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

The Defendant, Joshua Lynn Parker, was convicted by a Cocke County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and attempted rape, a Class C felony. See T.C.A.__ 39-13-210 (1997) (amended 2006) (second degree murder); 39-12-101 (2006) (criminal attempt); 39-13-503 (2006) (rape). The defendant was sentenced to serve thirty-five years years at 100 percent for second degree murder conviction and eight years at thirty-five percent for attempted rape conviction. The sentences were imposed to run consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the admission of hearsay statements by the victim violated his Confrontation Clause rights; and (3) testimony regarding his service on the "can crew," a work group of jail inmates, prejudiced him at his trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Timothy Delando Metcalf, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Sullivan County to burglary, a Class E felony, and theft of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, and appeals the denial of his request for an alternative sentence. Metcalf received a sentence of one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the burglary conviction and a suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the theft conviction. In this appeal, Metcalf claims the trial court should have also granted probation for the burglary conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Leonard Edward Smith, appeals as of right from the May 21, 2004 and March 2, 2007 orders of the Hamblen County Circuit Court denying his initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his 1985 conviction and life sentence for the first degree felony murder of John Pierce, his 1989 conviction for the first degree felony murder of Novella Webb, and his 1995 sentence of death for the murder of Novella Webb.1 On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in both the trial and appellate proceedings related to these convictions and sentences and because multiple other constitutional violations call into question the validity of these convictions and sentences. After a careful and laborious review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief relative to the Petitioner's conviction and life sentence for the murder of John Pierce and the Petitioner's conviction for the murder of Novella Webb, but we reverse the denial of postconviction relief relative to the Petitioner's death sentence for the Webb murder and remand for a new sentencing hearing in that case. We do so based upon the conclusion that the postconviction court erred in denying the Petitioner's claim that his trial attorneys provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in their investigation and presentation of available evidence in support of their motion to recuse the 1995 resentencing judge.

The Petitioner, Leonard Edward Smith, appeals as of right from the May 21, 2004 and March 2, 2007 orders of the Hamblen County Circuit Court denying his initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his 1985 conviction and life sentence for the first degree felony murder of John Pierce, his 1989 conviction for the first degree felony murder of Novella Webb, and his 1995 sentence of death for the murder of Novella Webb.1 On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in both the trial and appellate proceedings related to these convictions and sentences and because multiple other constitutional violations call into question the validity of these convictions and sentences. After a careful and laborious review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief relative to the Petitioner's conviction and life sentence for the murder of John Pierce and the Petitioner's conviction for the murder of Novella Webb, but we reverse the denial of postconviction relief relative to the Petitioner's death sentence for the Webb murder and remand for a new sentencing hearing in that case. We do so based upon the conclusion that the postconviction court erred in denying the Petitioner's claim that his trial attorneys provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in their investigation and presentation of available evidence in support of their motion to recuse the 1995 resentencing judge.

The petitioner, Jeremy Trent Keeton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He originally agreed to plead guilty to the sale of a Schedule II drug (methamphetamine), a Class C felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to twelve years, to be served concurrently with each other but consecutive to two other cases for a total effective sentence of thirty-nine years. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in ruling that he had failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective and in ruling that his guilty plea was entered voluntarily. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Christopher Metcalf, pled guilty to initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine and agreed to a nine-year sentence, with the trial court to determine the manner of service. At sentencing, the defendant requested an alternative sentence, but the trial court ordered the defendant to serve his entire sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred when it denied his request for an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Derrick Johnson ("Johnson"), of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to life with the possibility of parole and a six-year consecutive term of imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Johnson argues: (1) the insufficiency of the convicting evidence as to the first degree premeditated murder; and (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An Anderson County jury found Appellant Michael J. Bell guilty of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, appellant claims that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted an inculpatory statement he made to police; (2) there was insufficient evidence for a finding of premeditation; (3) the trial court improperly admitted an autopsy report; (4) the trial court erred in giving the jury a "sequential" determination jury instruction; (5) the trial court improperly reiterated the sequential determination jury instruction in its verdict forms; and (6) the trial court improperly characterized appellant's statement to the police as a "confession" in its instructions to the jury. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Adam Clyde Braseel, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, attempt to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged defendant's convictions for first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment for his murder conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to fifteen years for each Class A felony conviction, three years for his Class C felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction. The trial court ordered defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for murder, especially aggravated robbery and aggravated assault and argues that the pre-trial identification processes were unduly suggestive. After a thorough review, we conclude as plain error that defendant's convictions of the attempted first degree premeditated murder of Rebecca Hill in count four of the indictment and the aggravated assault of Ms. Hill in count five violate double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, we merge defendant's conviction of aggravated assault into hisc conviction of attempted first degree murder. We also find that the trial court's judgments of conviction for first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder do not clearly reflect the trial court's merger of the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgments as to defendant's convictions of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and assault, and his effective sentence of life with the possibility of parole. We remand solely for the correction and entry of appropriate judgments consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Alphanza Dale Pitts, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. __ 39-14-403; -103 (2006). The trial court sentenced the defendant as a persistent offender to fifteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction and as a career offender to twelve years for the theft conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the prosecutor made improper comments during opening and closing arguments, and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum term of fifteen years for aggravated burglary. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Shannon Jones, was convicted by a jury in Lauderdale County of facilitation of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance less than 0.5 grams, a Class D felony, and delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to twelve years for facilitation and to six years for delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance. The trial court ordered these sentences to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to another unrelated case. On appeal, Jones challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Terrence Woods, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to first degree premeditated murder and his life sentence. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys failed to request an independent mental health evaluation to determine if mental health defenses were available. He also contends that he was unable to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to enter his guilty plea because of trial counsels' failure to perform this independent mental evaluation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Originally charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault, the defendant, Leo Mays, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated criminal trespass and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seven years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Finding sufficient evidence to support the verdicts of the jury, we affirm.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted testimony about items in the Defendant's possession when he was arrested; (2) the record contains insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (3) the trial court erred when it denied his request for Community Corrections. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Jerry Phillip Haley, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; and aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sixty year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony from the victim; and (2) the conviction for aggravated kidnapping violates due process in violation of State v. Anthony and State v. Dixon. Initial review of the record reveals that the defendant has waived both issues based upon his failure to raise them in his motion for new trial. Further review leads us to the conclusion that neither issue rises to the level of plain error. As such, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The pro se petitioner, Emanuel Oliver, appeals from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He entered a guilty plea to criminal attempt to unlawfully possess a controlled substance, cocaine, with the intent to sell, a Class C felony, in exchange for a four-year sentence to be served at thirty percent in the Shelby County Correction Center. On appeal, he argues that the statute of limitations for prosecution has run and that he should not be held responsible for his plea agreement. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, George T. Haynie, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his 2007 guilty-pleaded convictions of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and failure to appear. Discerning no error in the judgment of the post-conviction court, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Larry D. Guthrie, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court Jury of delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, and he received a sentence of six years and one month in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the trial court's denial of his request for two special jury instructions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Freeman Clay, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and three counts of assault, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to four years for each sexual battery conviction and six months for each assault conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of nine years and six months in the custody of the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court failed to fulfill its duties to approve the jury verdict under Rule 33 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Lynn Stanton, filed in the Knox County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the denial pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly denied. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.