APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Vincent Jordan, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court's order revoking his probation for robbery, a Class C felony, and ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Viola Darlene Stephens, pled guilty to theft of property valued at less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the theft conviction, to serve six months, and six months for driving on a revoked license, to be fully served in incarceration. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in not stating whether it had considered a sentence of community corrections. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Petitioner, Victor L. Dobbins, was found guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17- 1307(b)(2). This Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. Victor L. Dobbins, No. M2007-01751-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2648951 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 3, 2008), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2008). The petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because: (1) trial counsel failed to properly investigate his case and (2) the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors entitles him to a new trial. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kelvin Reed, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the offenses of first degree murder and felony murder, and defendant was sentenced to serve concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for his murder conviction and three years for aggravated burglary. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, including testimony about the music played at defendant's birthday party, testimony that one witness had seen defendant with a gun, and photographs of the victim; and (3) that the judgment for aggravated burglary should be corrected to reflect defendant's actual sentence. Following review, we affirm the convictions and remand to the trial court solely for entry of a corrected amended judgment for aggravated burglary in accordance with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Phillip Lowell Bledsoe, appeals from the Gibson County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to pursue potentially exculpatory evidence; failed to impeach a detective's credibility based on his police misconduct in a different case; failed to object to numerous references to the petitioner's gang membership; and failed to file a motion in limine, make an objection, or request a limiting instruction regarding references to a polygraph examination. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Donna Harvey, and a codefendant pled guilty in the Sevier County Circuit Court to theft of at least $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. __ 39- 14-103, -105(3) (2006). The defendant received a four-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender, suspended to time served with the balance on supervised probation. The trial court ordered the defendant and codefendant to pay $64,852 in restitution with joint and several liability. At issue in this appeal is the amount of restitution for damages caused by the crime. We reverse the order setting the restitution amount and remand for a restitution hearing, at which the trial court shall consider the defendant's financial resources and ability to pay and determine the proper amount and schedule of restitution.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Vershawn McCoy, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to twenty years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court inadequately responded to a jury question raised during deliberation requesting a definition of "state of passion." After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The petitioner, Rick D. Hanebutt, appeals the Carroll County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving concurrent sentences of life and twenty years for his convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to continue the postconviction hearing; and (2) denying his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that the court erred in denying relief because he claims he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to: (1) investigate the case and present viable witnesses, proof, and argument as to self-defense; (2) obtain a ballistics expert; (3) obtain unadulterated copies of phone records and obtain the phone records of another witness; (4) properly impeach a witness with inconsistent evidence, statements, and testimony; (5) contest the search warrant; (6) renew a motion to change venue; (7) object to statements made by the prosecution during voir dire; and (8) request additional jury instructions on drug usage and witness credibility. He further contends that the cumulative effect of all the alleged errors supports a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a thorough review of the record before us, we find no error and affirm the denial of the petition.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Evelyn Cotton Self, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days with defendant's sentence suspended and defendant placed on probation after service of seventy-three days in confinement. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying defendant's request for a jury instruction on involuntary intoxication; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury concerning prescription medicines; (4) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of defendant's psychologist; and (5) the trial court erred in ordering defendant to serve seventy-three days in confinement. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court should have rejected the guilty plea as being deficient pursuant
to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(g)(1). That subsection provides that when restitution is a component of alternative sentencing and there is “no sentencing hearing or presentence report because the defendant’s sentence is agreed upon and the payment of restitution is a part of the sentence, the plea agreement shall include the amount of restitution and the other performance requirements set out in subsection (c).” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 304(g)(1). In a theft case, payment of restitution must be “a part of the sentence” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-116. See id. § 40-20-116(a) (providing that the trial court “shall . . . order the restitution of the property” in theft cases). In the present case, the plea agreement left no sentencing issues undecided except for the amount and payment method of restitution; no presentence report was entered into evidence. Under the circumstances, the “restitution hearing” was not a “sentencing hearing” as contemplated by section 40-35-304(g)(1); to say otherwise is to render the provisions of subsection (g)(1) meaningless. I cannot fathom why the subsection reads the way it does, but it says what it says.

The defendant, April Jennifer Warren, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to one count of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant agreed to a sentence of ten years a Range II, multiple offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to confinement. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her request for alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ladarius Tyree Springs, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Hamilton County Criminal Court sentenced the defendant to six years incarceration suspended to intensive probation after the service of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement. While on probation, the defendant pleaded guilty to assault. A violation of probation warrant issued and, following a revocation hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Franklin County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Lanny Wayne Waddell, of domestic assault, see T.C.A. _ 39-13-111(b) (2006), and the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant Jimmy L. Gladden Jr., appeals from the revocation of his community corrections sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his sentence in confinement. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jonathan Ray Sender, pled guilty to reckless aggravated assault, with an agreed sentence of four years and the trial court to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion, and ordered the defendant to serve thirty days of his four-year sentence in confinement, with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred when it denied him judicial diversion and ordered a sentence of split confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Domonte O. Briggs, of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, and the trial court imposed a Range I sentence of two years' incarceration to be served consecutively to previously imposed sentences from North Carolina. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we agree. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is dismissed.

The defendant, Joseph Nelson, was convicted by a Madison County jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant has raised the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

In Davidson County Criminal Court, following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of felony escape, two counts of aggravated assault and three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. State v. Lyle T. Van Ulzen, No. M2004-02462-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2874654, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 31, 2005); State v. Billy J. Coffelt, No. M2002- 01214-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22116628, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 11, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 2, 2004). After direct appeal to this Court and resentencing, Petitioner's effective sentence was ninety years. Lyle T. Van Ulzen, 2005 WL 2874654, at *6-7. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition. Petitioner specifically argues that trial counsel was ineffective because trial counsel: (1) refused to allow Petitioner to testify at trial and failed to request a Momon hearing; (2) failed to request Pattern Jury Instruction 8.02 and an instruction on the elements of false imprisonment as a lesser included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping; (3) failed to request a jury instruction for the natural and probable consequences rule; (4) failed to raise in either the motion for new trial or on direct appeal the issue of stipulation of the offense for which Petitioner was incarcerated at the time of his escape; and (5) failed to request a severance from the co-defendant. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The defendant, Sean Terrell Horton, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession with the intent to deliver or sell 26 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Aubrey Tremaine Eisom, of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery and convicted the defendant, Cedric Moses, of two counts of the facilitation of first degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Mr. Eisom to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for both of the felony murder convictions and a consecutive sentence of 40 years' incarceration for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court sentenced Mr. Moses to 25 years' incarceration for each of his three convictions and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of 25 years. In this appeal, Mr. Eisom contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a bill of particulars, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever his trial from that of Mr. Moses, that the trial court erred by prohibiting him from presenting a "third party defense," and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Mr. Moses also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, claiming that the State failed to sufficiently corroborate the testimony of accomplice Ewan Dewayne Anthony. Mr. Moses additionally asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to sever his trial from that of Mr. Eisom and that his sentence is excessive. Discerning no error in the judgments of the trial court in Mr. Eisom's case, we affirm Mr. Eisom's convictions and the accompanying sentence. Because the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony relative to Mr. Moses' involvement in the crimes, we reverse Mr. Moses' convictions and dismiss the charges against him.

A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, William Anthony Jones, of aggravated assault. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erroneously prohibited him from"argu[ing] that the defendant lacked the mental state of intentionally or knowing[ly] with respect to causing serious bodily injury." Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Jeffrey Thomas Pardue, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for burglary of a motor vehicle and theft of property valued at more than $1,000. A jury found aAppellant guilty of both charges. The trial court sentenced appellant to two years for burglary and three years for theft, and the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The trial court suspended the sentences and placed appellant on probation. Appellant was also ordered to receive alcohol treatment and pay restitution in the amount of $1,184. After the denial of a motion for new trial, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for burglary of a vehicle and theft of property valued at more than $1,000. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Petitioner, Kathy Michelle Fowler, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in one indictment for domestic assault, harassment, and aggravated criminal trespass. Petitioner subsequently pled guilty to domestic assault. The remaining two charges were dismissed. Petitioner was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served on probation. Petitioner filed a petition to expunge the dismissed charges pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition, concluding that the plain language of the statute excluded expungement of "cases in which the defendant has been convicted of a charge within the case." Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. We granted the petition in order to determine if the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has acted illegally. After a review of the record, we determine that based on this Court's decision in State v. Gerald Gifford, No. E2006-02500- CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 1813105 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 23, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2008), the trial court herein improperly denied the petition to expunge the dismissed charges where petitioner was indicted in a multi-count indictment, pled guilty to one count of the indictment, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, including granting petitioner's petition to expunge the dismissed charges of harassment and aggravated criminal trespass.