APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Madison County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, J’Menski C. Holt, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

Sheila Marie Lott (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief alleging (1) that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with her open plea and effective sentence of eighteen years and six months to one count of theft over $1000, eight counts of criminal simulation, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card; and (2) that her plea was not voluntarily made. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

A Hamilton County grand jury charged the defendant, Jereme Dannuel Little, in case number 253372, with two counts of aggravated robbery, see T.C.A. § 39-13-402 (2006), and, in case number 253374, with one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, see id. § 39-13-305. At the close of proof at trial, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgments of
acquittal on the two aggravated robbery counts. The jury, however, convicted the defendant of especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 18 years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) failing to inform the jury regarding the judgments of acquittal of the aggravated robberies; (2) failing to instruct the jury regarding corroboration of accomplice testimony; (3) instructing the jury regarding criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; (4) prohibiting counsel from “putting into evidence or mentioning” during closing argument that the defendant had been acquitted of the two counts of aggravated robbery; and (5) allowing the district attorney to argue at closing that the defendant had committed the aggravated robbery offenses, as relevant to motive for the especially aggravated kidnapping charge. Additionally, the defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors denied him a fair trial. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Based on the cumulative effect of the errors committed in this case, I would reverse the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. Accordingly, for the reasons outlined below, I respectfully dissent.

The defendant, Sherri A. Elliott, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation. On appeal, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve eight months of split confinement. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Tom Perry Bell, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1979 convictions for two counts of second degree criminal sexual conduct and petition for post-conviction relief from his 1984 conviction for attempt to commit a felony. The trial court summarily dismissed both petitions as untimely. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his petitions without an evidentiary hearing and the appointment of counsel. The Petitioner also contends that the original trial court erred by failing to advise him of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. My concern is with the summary disposition of the Defendant’s due process claim of an impermissibly suggestive photographic lineup. The majority opinion relies on State v. Butler, 795 S.W.2d 680, 686 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), to conclude that the analysis provided in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), need not be used if the identification process was not “unduly suggestive.” “Unduly suggestive” is not a term used in Biggers, which focused on suggestive and unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-200.
 

The defendant, Dontayvis Brown, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced by the trial court to concurrent terms of ten years for each conviction. He raises the following three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the State could impeach his testimony with his prior conviction for facilitation of aggravated robbery; and (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge certain lesser-included offenses. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Walter Thomas Godsey, Jr., was convicted by a Chester County Circuit Court jury of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, and sentenced to six months in the county jail. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted Defendant-Appellant, Albert W. Bentley, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a ten-year term of imprisonment in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, Bentley presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the photographic lineup in which the victim identified Bentley as impermissibly suggestive; (2) whether the evidence, primarily the victim’s in court identification of Bentley, was sufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Washington County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Ryan Love, of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. He received a suspended sentence of two years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the element of serious bodily injury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Justin Gibson, pled guilty to driving under the influence with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or more, a Class A misdemeanor. He agreed to a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, all of which was suspended after seven days’ incarceration. Gibson entered a conditional plea agreement and attempted to reserve a certified question of law under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. The certified question of law addressed whether the search of Gibson’s home violated his constitutional rights and whether evidence obtained as a result should be suppressed. On appeal, he argues that the warrantless search was not justified by either consent or exigent circumstances. We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the order stating the certified question was not filed until after Gibson filed his notice of appeal. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed.

On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s order denying his motion to reinstate probation. Upon review, we conclude that the appellant does not have a Rule 3, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, appeal as of right from the order. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Kevin D. Buford, of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life for the felony murder conviction and ten years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Miguel Angel Salinas, entered a best-interest plea to one count of possession of marijuana, a Class D felony, and one count of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to sell over 300 grams, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the negotiated agreement, the defendant received an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. The only issue which remained undetermined by the agreement was whether the defendant’s ten-year sentence would be served concurrently with or consecutively to a twenty-five year Georgia sentence which he had received in 2004. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the separate sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant contends that this was error. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences.

The Defendant-Appellant, Patsy Lynn McCoy, appeals the DeKalb County Criminal Court’s revocation of her probation in two cases. She originally pled guilty to aggravated burglary, burglary, and theft under $500. She received an effective seven-year sentence, all of which was suspended to probation after sixty days’ incarceration. On appeal, McCoy argues that (1)Tennessee’s statutory scheme allowing incarceration after a revocation of probation based on judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence is unconstitutional, and (2) the trial court erred in revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the sentences in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Michael Harden, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order granting the forfeiture of his automobile. The forfeiture proceedings were instituted pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-33-101 through -111 following his guilty pleas to aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. On appeal, Harden argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the forfeiture because the delay in the institution of forfeiture proceedings constituted a violation of his due process rights. Upon review, we determine that Harden does not have an appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

A Wilson county jury convicted the Defendant, Anthony Whited, of second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to serve twenty years at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erroneously ruled that the State could cross-examine the Defendant about two prior misdemeanor convictions if the Defendant chose to testify; (3) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to give evidence in the form of an opinion when (a) the State did not tender the witness as an expert and (b) the testimony was outside any area of expertise possibly attributable to the witness; (4) the trial court erroneously overruled the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (5) the trial court’s jury instructions illegally shifted the burden of proof to the Defendant; and (6) the trial court erred by using the Defendant’s prior convictions to determine the length of the Defendant’s sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, David Steven Austin, was convicted by a Fayette County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence, second offense, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation except for forty-five days. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Alvin Dortch, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of making a false report, a Class D felony. See T.C.A.§ 39-16-502(a) (2010). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years, with 120 days’ confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following the discovery by police of numerous materials commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine on property controlled by Defendant Randall Keith Smith, he was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction for manufacturing methamphetamine and to a concurrent eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant Nicholas Ryan Flood, who was in the company of Defendant Smith when the materials commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine were discovered on the property, was convicted of a single count of manufacturing methamphetamine. Defendant Flood was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Smith claims that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence seized from his property under the auspices of a search warrant. Defendant Flood claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. After carefully reviewing the record and the defendants’ arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court merged the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction into the aggravated assault conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury by failing to instruct the jury about voluntary intoxication and by misstating the definition of attempt; (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences; (3) the assistant district attorney committed misconduct by repeatedly using a racial slur to inflame the jury; and (4) the trial court erred by admitting irrelevant testimony. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Darius Darrell Lee, of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant filed an untimely motion for new trial and untimely notice of appeal. The State urges this court to dismiss the appeal; however, we have chosen to waive the untimely notice in the interest of justice to consider the defendant’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing, which are not waived by an untimely filing of a motion for new trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellants, Ronnie Dobson and Milton Rance, were convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor. Both Dobson and Rance were sentenced as Range I, standard offenders and received effective sentences of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions of attempted second degree murder and reckless aggravated assault. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Bobby Lee Robinson, of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class A felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The jury convicted the Defendant, Jamie Nathaniel Grimes, of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class A felony; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Robinson to seventeen years as a standard offender for the cocaine offense, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor offense, with all of the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court sentenced Grimes to thirty years as a multiple offender for the cocaine offense and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor offense, ordering all of the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, Robinson argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce a redacted tape recording and transcript of statements he made during his arrest; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Grimes argues that the trial court erred when it: (1) improperly admitted evidence about the weight of the cocaine; (2) denied his motion for disclosure of the confidential informant’s identity; and (3) admitted a transcript of a recorded conversation between him and the confidential informant into evidence. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as to both Defendants.