APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Antonio J. Beasley, Sr., appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for error coram nobis relief from his 1989 conviction for grand larceny and his 1990 convictions for possession of cocaine and attempted arson. He claims his convictions should be vacated because trial counsel and the trial court did not inform him that his convictions could be used to enhance future sentences, thus rendering his guilty pleas involuntary and unintelligent. The State has moved this court to dismiss the Petitioner’s appeal as untimely, or, in the alternative, affirm the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion for a memorandum opinion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Emmett Russell McGee, Jr., appeals from the Bedford County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions based upon guilty pleas on two counts of possession with intent to sell three hundred grams or more of cocaine and the resulting sentences of ten and eleven years to be served consecutively. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance provided by trial counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel gave him improper advice concerning the possible sentences he could receive if he proceeded to trial. In addition, for the first time on appeal, the petitioner raises a challenge to the consecutive nature of the sentences, asserting that it is illegal and excessive in light of the fact that the elements of both convictions arose out of the same transaction. Following review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly determined that trial counsel was not ineffective. Further, we conclude that the petitioner has waived review of his second issue. As such, the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.

In 2007, 2008, and 2009 in Sullivan County, Appellant, Alfred Gettner, was charged by presentment, indicted, and consented to prosecution by information for various counts consisting of four counts of violating an habitual traffic offender order, one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense, and one count of failing to yield to an emergency vehicle. On May 1, 2009, Appellant entered a negotiated plea to four counts of violation of a habitual traffic offender order, one count of DUI, first offense, and one count of failing to yield to an emergency vehicle. The agreed to sentence was an effective sentence of six years. Appellant requested an alternative sentence. The trial court held a hearing and denied Appellant’s request. Appellant appealed to this Court and argued that the trial court erred in denying his request for an alternative sentence. Because Appellant failed to include a copy of the transcript from his guilty plea hearing, he has waived the presentation of his issue to this Court. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal.

The defendant, Deshawn Wentz, was convicted bya Montgomery County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and was sentenced bythe trial court to concurrent terms of eleven and seven years, respectively, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in results because, respectfully, I disagree that we should per se presume the correctness of the sentencing judgment based upon the absence of the plea submission hearing transcript. I believe that the presentence report contained in the record provides this court with an understanding of the nature and circumstances of the offenses such that we can perform our mandated duty of conducting a de novo review upon the record. On the other hand, I believe that the trial court’s judgment is supported in the record and should be affirmed on that basis.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Kenneth Hayes, of reckless aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated assault, criminal attempt to commit the intentional killing of an animal worth over $1000, theft of property over $1000, and evading arrest. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of forty years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and that it erred when it denied him alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Petitioner, James W. Vanover, was convicted following a jury trial, for one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He was given an effective sentence of 36 years. On appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions but remanded for sentencing. State v. James Vanover, No. E2005- 1192-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 521496 (Tenn. Crim. App. March 2, 2006). Upon resentencing, he was again sentenced to serve 36 years. On appeal, this Court held that the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentencing at the second sentencing hearing. State v. James Vanover, No. E2006-01342- CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2323386 (Tenn. Crim. App. August 15, 2007) perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 7, 2008). Petitioner timely filed a petition for post- onviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Guy Alvin Williamson, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun and possession of a firearm while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. He was sentenced to an effective term of three years, suspended to probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence and dismiss the indictment and that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for convicted felon in possession of a handgun. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Montreal Lyons, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of four counts of aggravated robbery and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping. State v. Montreal Lyons, No. W2006-02445-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2699657, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, July 9, 2008), , (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2009). Petitioner received an effective sentence of forty-four years. Petitioner was unsuccessful on appeal to this Court. Id. at *7. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Among other issues, Petitioner argued that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to properly cross-examine the victims during the trial. The post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred because he was prejudiced by the trial counsel’s failure to properly cross-examine the victims. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the trial counsel’s cross-examination of the victims. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

A Dickson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, David Enrique Leon, of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of life and ten years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Roderick Moore, of first-degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery, reckless homicide, and especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder, two years for the reckless homicide, and eighteen years for the especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by limiting the cross-examination of the investigating police officer and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for first-degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. We remand for entry of a judgment reflecting that the reckless homicide conviction merged into the first-degree murder conviction.

The petitioner, Brandon Mobley, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2005 convictions of two counts of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and setting fire to personal property for which he is now serving two consecutive life sentences plus 19 years in the custody of the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief based upon allegations that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and other constitutional deprivations. Because we determine that the petitioner is entitled to relief on the issue of the ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the use of expert testimony, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I concur in the holding of the majority that the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel save for the failure to ask the expert witness whether Petitioner could premeditate do not have merit. However, I dissent from the holding that counsel was ineffective in failing to ask the defense’s expert the ultimate question of whether Petitioner could have “premeditated” the murders for which he was convicted.

The petitioner, Jarvis Harris, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his convictions of first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder. In this appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the performance of his attorneys at trial and on appeal. Because the first two issues are either waived or previously determined, see T.C.A. § 40-30-106(g)-(h) (2006), and because the petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Sentoryia Lawand Young, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his jury conviction of second degree murder and two convictions of aggravated assault. Following our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, James Johnson, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and received a ten-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lamont Hogan, pled guilty as indicted by the Dickson County Grand Jury for sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony, with the length and manner of service for the sentences left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as Range III, persistent offender to ten years for the Class C felony conviction and a concurrent four years for the Class E felony conviction. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his total effective sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying alternatively sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Quincy Bryan Banks, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated rape and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, class A felonies. He was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty years’ confinement for each conviction. The kidnapping conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to the rape convictions, for an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Bankston, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to a twelve year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael D. O’Guin, appeals as of right from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that his sentence is illegal because it is in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-523(b) and (2) that his sentence has expired because he has served 85 percent of it. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court

The Petitioner, Isaac Eugene Jones, III, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to 25 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that he was given the opportunity to testify at trial and for failing to object to his statement in which he said that he had molested his cousin. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, George Tucker, of theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more but less than ten thousand dollars, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Darrel Watson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Willie Hampton, of theft of property in excess of $10,000, a Class C felony. The Defendant-Appellant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender, to a term of fifteen years imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the Defendant-Appellant’s conviction of theft over $10,000. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Bradley County jury convicted the Defendant, Maurice Johnson, of one count of especially aggravated robbery and three counts of first degree murder in the perpetration of an especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for each of the felony murder convictions and to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, that the district attorney engaged in repeated instances of misconduct substantially prejudicing the jury against him, and that the lead detective’s wrongdoing warrants a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences for first degree murder during the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate an especially aggravated robbery. The Defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated robbery is reversed and dismissed.