APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Williamson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Malcolm Dudley Thomas, of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by ruling that the State’s rebuttal witnesses could testify about the victim’s character for truthfulness and (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct throughout the trial by placing or attempting to place prejudicial and irrelevant facts before the jury. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State’s rebuttal witnesses to testify about the victim’s character for truthfulness. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

The defendant, Jason Wayne White, appeals the revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering execution of the original sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A final forfeiture was entered against the Appellant, Gary’s Bonding Company, in the Marion County Circuit Court ordering the complete forfeiture of the bail bond in the case of criminal defendant Judson Layne. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in ordering a final forfeiture and in denying its petition for exoneration. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed in this matter, we are without jurisdiction to determine whether the trial court erred. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Dissatisfied with his conviction of aggravated assault, the defendant, Keith Lonell Richardson, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he should have been permitted to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice. Discerning no error, we affirm

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Courtney Watkins, of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years of imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the hearsay testimony of several witnesses, that photographs depicting the victim’s injuries were prejudicial, that the trial court erred by allowing him to be impeached with evidence of a prior conviction, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Dwayne R. Cross, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictments in this case, and the State moves this court to affirm the circuit court’s order summarily via Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. The State’s motion is well taken, and accordingly, the circuit court’s order is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Marcos Enrique Collazo, Sr., of three counts of rape of a child, seven counts of rape by fraud, seven counts of statutory rape by an authority figure, and seven counts of misdemeanor assault. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 130 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude pornographic videos found in his bedroom, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for rape by fraud and statutory rape by an authority figure, and that the trial court erred in sentencing. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s severance motion. However, the error was harmless. Finding no further error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Aggrieved by his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of ten counts of harassment, one count of attempted aggravated burglary, one count of vandalism of property valued at $500 or less, one count of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and one count of setting fire to personal property, for which he received an effective sentence of 19 years’ incarceration, the petitioner, Delmar Reed, filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Markquitton Sanders,pled guilty to two felony drug offenses and was allowed to serve his sentences in community corrections. Thereafter, the trial court found him guilty of violating his community corrections sentences and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of a term of incarceration. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joshua Lee Brown, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of felony murder; attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; and attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2006) (amended 2007), 39-12-101 (2010), 39-13-403 (2010). He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for each of the felony murder convictions, to twenty years’ confinement for attempted first degree murder, and to ten years’ confinement for attempted especially aggravated robbery. The attempted first degree murder conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to the remaining convictions, for an effective sentence of life plus twenty years. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to redact a portion of the video evidence; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike the State’s notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibilityof parole; (3) the trial court erred bydenying his motion to strike the felony murder aggravating circumstance from the State’s notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; (4) the trial court erred by granting the State’s requestto augmentthe pattern juryinstruction on the “heinous,atrocious, and cruel” aggravating circumstance; (5) the trial court erred by rejecting his requested sentencing instruction regarding the statutorymitigating circumstance thathe acted underthe substantial domination of another person; (6) his rights to due process and a fair trial were violated when the trial court failed to give the jury meaningful guidance or directions as to their deliberations during the punishment phase of the trial; (7) the trial court erred by imposing partially consecutive sentences; and (8) the evidence was insufficient to establish the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravating circumstance as to one of the victims during sentencing. We conclude that although the trial court erred when giving a special jury instruction, the error was harmless in light of the whole record. Furthermore, we conclude that although the evidence was insufficient to establish an aggravating circumstance and the trial court failed to make the necessary findings when imposing consecutive sentences, the sentences imposed were appropriate. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, George Eugene Cody, of two counts of criminally negligent homicide, see T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2006), two counts of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery,see id.§ 39-13-202(a)(2), two counts of especially aggravated robbery,see id.§ 39-13-403,and two counts of identity theft, see id. § 39-14-150. At sentencing, the trial court merged the criminally negligent homicide convictions into the felony murder convictions and imposed a total effective sentence of life plus 20 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. Discerning no infirmity in the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

The petitioner, Danny E. Rogers, filed in the Johnson County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Much aggrieved by his guilty-pleaded convictions of rape and introduction of drugs into a penal institution, the petitioner, Daniel Ewing, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered as a product of the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendants, Benjamin Patterson and Charles P. Yokley, were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a child care facility in Count 1 and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a child care facility in Count 2. Following a jury trial, Defendants were both convicted as charged, and the trial court merged the delivery offenses with the sale offenses. Defendant Patterson was sentenced as a standard offender to serve three years incarcerated,and Defendant Yokley was sentenced as a multiple offender to serve seven years incarcerated. Both defendants raise several issues on appeal, including the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, alleged errors regarding the jury instructions, and the trialcourt’s refusal to exclude certain evidence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The defendant, Joshua W. Eads, was convicted by a Union County jury of facilitation of burglary, a Class E felony; theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor; and theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to an effective term of six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the defendant committed the instant crimes; and (2) charging the jury with the lesser included offense of criminal responsibility for facilitation of burglary because the evidence indicated that the defendant did not promote or assist in the crimes. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgments of conviction.

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Wayne Boykin, was convicted of fraudulently using a credit card to obtain goods with a value in excess of $60,000, which is punishable as a Class B felony. The Circuit Court of Madison County sentenced the defendant to ten years incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant maintains that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) his sentence was excessive. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Renwick A. Earls, Jr., pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and received a sentence of forty years as a Range II offender. He now appeals the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, arguing that the trial court did not have the authority to sentence him to forty years, rendering the judgment void. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his judgment is void or that he is otherwise entitled to relief, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

The Petitioner, Jason Kayser, appeals the Weakley County Circuit Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his conviction upon his guilty plea for second degree murder, a Class A felony, for which he is serving seventeen years as a violent offender. The Petitioner contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea and that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Hamilton County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, William Toby Johnson, charging him with aggravated burglary, resisting arrest, and four counts of aggravated robbery. By agreement, count six of the indictment was amended to charge attempted aggravated robbery rather than aggravated robbery. It also appears that the resisting arrest charge was dismissed before trial. At trial, following the close of the State’s proof, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal regarding the aggravated robbery of Luis Lopez, and the charge was reduced to robbery. The jury convicted Defendant of aggravated criminal trespass, theft of property valued under $500 from Luis Lopez, and two counts of the lesser-included offense of robbery involving Edgar Perez and Valentina Soto Santizo. Defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty nine days each for aggravated criminal trespass and theft, and fifteen years for each robbery conviction. The trial court ordered the two robbery sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other two sentences. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce an audio recording of the 911 call made by one of the victims at the time of the offenses; and (3) that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Anthony M. Reliford, pled guilty to domestic assault and aggravated assault, receiving concurrent sentences of four years and eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in confinement. The court further ordered that the defendant pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $830.19. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by: (1) imposing a fully incarcerative sentence and (2) improperly ordering restitution. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences of incarceration but remand for reconsideration of restitution in light of the defendant’s ability to pay.

The State appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s granting of the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a sobriety checkpoint. The State claims that the trial court erred by concluding that the Defendant was unreasonably seized at the checkpoint due to the failure of the advance publicity to comply with Tennessee Department of Safety General Order 410-1. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

A Wilson County jury convicted the defendant of attempted unlawful photographing, a Class B misdemeanor; sexual battery, a Class E felony; attempted sexual battery, a Class A misdemeanor; and unlawful photographing, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony conviction. The court sentenced him to six months at 75% in the county jail for the Class B misdemeanor conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days at 75% for each Class A misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for unlawful photographing and attempted unlawful photographing because the victim was in a public place where she had no expectation of privacy and (2) the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for a continuance to give his attorney an opportunity to obtain the defendant’s medical records. Following our review, we reverse and dismiss the defendant’s convictions for unlawful photographing and attempted unlawful photographing. We affirm the defendant’s convictions for sexual battery and attempted sexual battery.

The Defendant, Bryant K. Pride, pled nolo contendere to one count of felony possession of 26 grams of cocaine for sale or delivery in a Drug-Free School Zone, one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and one count of felony conspiracy to possess more than 26 grams of cocaine for sale or delivery in a Drug-Free School Zone. The Defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictments due to a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. After review, we conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because it does not meet the requirements of State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner, Antonio Oliver, of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and motion to toll limitations period alleging that he was deprived of second-tier review of his conviction by the Tennessee Supreme Court based on various misrepresentations by appellate counsel. Specifically, the petitioner argues that appellate counsel failed to notify him of this court’s opinion on direct appeal, which caused him to be “unaware” that a Rule 11 application needed to be filed or that the statute of limitations for post-conviction relief had expired. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner now appeals. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the petitioner was denied second-tier review of his conviction through no fault of his own. In reversing the judgment of the post-conviction court, we grant the petitioner a delayed appeal and stay further proceedings on his remaining claims of post-conviction relief.

On August 6, 2009, the defendant pleaded guilty in case number 92306 to theft over $1,000, a Class D felony, in exchange for a sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant was released on December 20, 2009, and placed on supervised probation. On March 12, 2010, the defendant pleaded guilty in case number 91245 to theft over $10,000, a Class C felony, in exchange for a sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court suspended the defendant’s sentence in 91245 and placed the defendant on probation. On November 8, 2010, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation, alleging that the record does not demonstrate that the defendant was in violation of his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.