APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, James Beeler, an attorney, was cited for contempt of court in the Washington County Criminal Court because, during a court proceeding, he communicated with his client’s co-defendant who was represented by other counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court found Defendant in contempt of court and imposed a fine and a sentence of ten days in jail. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court suspended Defendant’s sentence. Defendant now appeals his conviction and asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for contempt of court. He specifically argues that it was error for the trial court to enforce Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8 or to charge Defendant with criminal contempt for a violation of Supreme Court Rule 8. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Van Buren County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jerrie Bryant, of second degree murder. This Court affirmed the Defendant’s convictions,but we vacated her sentences and remanded the case for resentencing. State v. Jerrie Bryant, No. M2007-02057-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 544650, *1-13 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 20, 2008), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Jeremy Brandon Scott, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010, 2011). Although he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years and six months with six months’ confinement, a conflict exists regarding the length of probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion and his request for three years’ probation. We affirm the denial of judicial diversion and the imposition of six months’ confinement. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the Davidson County Criminal Court for clarification of the length of probation and entry of a corrected judgment.

Defendant-Appellee, Clifford Edward Clark, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. Clark filed several motions to suppress evidence and dismiss the indictment because of lost or destroyed evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), which were denied. Clark then filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court took under advisement. The trial court subsequently dismissed the indictment and suppressed certain evidence pursuant to both Ferguson and Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). In this appeal by the State, it argues that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment and erred in granting Clark’s motions to suppress based on its holdings that: (1) the search of Clark’s vehicle violated Gant, and (2) the State’s loss or destruction of certain evidence violated Ferguson. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment, reinstate Clark’s indictment, suppress the photographic evidence of the camera housing, and remand for trial.

The Petitioner, Dolwin D. Cormia, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence—a Naval document diagnosing the Petitioner with “antisocial personality disorder”—mandated a new trial. The Hamilton County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not state a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. For the first time on appeal, the Petitioner alleges that the coram nobis judge erred by not sua sponte recusing himself based upon the fact that the coram nobis judge “was possibly an Assistant District Attorney and/or the Executive District Attorney” at the time his case was being prosecuted. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege the existence of subsequently or newly discovered evidence that would warrant relief under a writ of error coram nobis. We also find that the Petitioner has failed to support his claim of recusal with sufficient documentation to require reversal. The order of summary dismissal is affirmed.

On August 4, 2008, the Montgomery County grand jury charged the defendant, Lejeanra E. Polk and a co-defendant, Nicole T. Davis, with one count of premeditated first degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (1991 and Supp. 1995), and one count of first degree felony murder, see id. § 39-13-202(a)(2), for the November 1995 stabbing death of Carolyn Vega-Velasquez. Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder and felony murder. At sentencing, the trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction and imposed a life sentence by operation of law. See id. § 39-13-208(c). The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Discerning no infirmity in the evidence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Brandon Ryan Weston, pleaded guilty to two counts of burglary of an automobile, Class E felonies, and to two counts of theft of property over $1,000, Class D felonies. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to an effective sentence of two years and one day in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve his sentences consecutively to his sentences in case number 08CR365 and Hamblen County case number 08CR437. The trial court also revoked the defendant’s probation in case numbers 08CR365 and 08CR437. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Polk County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Davis Bradley Waldroup, Jr.,for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of first degree murder, and one count of attempted first degree murder. These charges stemmed from an altercation Appellant had with his wife and her best friend at his trailer on Kimsey  Mountain. A jury convicted Appellant of one count each of aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, voluntary manslaughter, and attempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of thirty-two years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aggravated kidnapping, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for change of venue, erred in allowing the introduction into evidence of a photograph of one of the victim’s injuries, and erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tiffany Nicole Nance, pled guilty to theft of property valued under $500, with an agreed sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation. A probation violation warrant was issued, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation, finding that she had violated the terms of her probation. The court ordered her to serve sixty days of her sentence in confinement, followed by a reinstatement of her probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the trial court’s revocation of her probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Roy A. Jamison, Jr., pled guilty to possession with the intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, with a possible sentence range of eight to twelve years. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years and ordered the Defendant to serve the first year of his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction and the balance in the Community Corrections Program. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it: (1) used the Defendant’s criminal history to enhance his sentence; and (2) sentenced him to confinement. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In 1994, the Petitioner, Terrence G. Motley, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty to aggravated assault and aggravated burglary and was sentenced to three years in the Shelby County workhouse for each crime, with the sentences to be served concurrently. In 2010, the Petitioner filed “A Motion In The Nature of Writ Of Error Coram Nobis,” which the trial court dismissed without a hearing. The trial court held that the Petitioner’s claim was timebarred and that coram nobis relief was not applicable to the Petitioner’s claim. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Tammy Thompson, was found guilty by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-101 (assault) (Supp. 2008) (amended 2009, 2010), 39-16-602 (resisting arrest) (2010). She was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with sixty days to be served, for assault, and to six months on probation for resisting arrest. The sentences were imposed concurrently. On appeal, she contends that (1) the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the resisting arrest conviction, (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s conduct after she was taken to the jail, and (4) the trial court erred in failing to give a self-defense jury instruction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

In 1995, a Gibson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Timothy Roberson, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, his second such petition, alleging that his conviction is void. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to state a cognizable claim, and the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, he contends: (1) the jury found him guilty of felony murder without first determining whether he had the intent to commit the predicate felonyof robbery; (2) the indictmentfor felonymurder failed to allege facts that constitute an offense; (3) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict because both convictions were based on one criminal episode, violating double jeopardy; (4) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide; and (5) during sentencing, the trial court improperly instructed the jury that torture is an aggravating factor. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.
 

The Petitioner, Dimarko B. Williams, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. The Petitioner contends that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v.Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), created a new constitutional right, tolling the limitations period. Following our review of the record and the relevant case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

The Defendant, Timothy Brian Morton, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-403 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years’ confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

A Sumner County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Jeffery Allen Boston, of second degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2006); domestic assault, see id. §39-13-111; and assault, see id. § 39-11-101. At sentencing, the trial court merged the assault conviction into the domestic assault conviction and imposed a sentence of 25 years’ incarceration for the second degree murder conviction to be served consecutively to a sentence of 11 months and 29 days for the domestic assault conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress photographs of the murder victim taken before the victim’s death and by refusing to instruct the jury regarding voluntary intoxication. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Appellant, Michael Lewis, was indicted by the Bledsoe County Grand Jury for child abuse. Appellant waived his right to counsel and represented himself at trial. He was convicted and sentenced to three years in incarceration. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was granted by the trial court. The State filed an application for permission to appeal pursuant toTennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 and an application for stay. This Court granted the appeal and found that the trial court improperly granted the new trial, reinstating Appellant’s convictions and sentence. State v. Michael Lewis, No. E2008-02141-CCA-R9-CD, 2009 WL 4017158 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 20, 2009). On remand, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. Appellant appeals to this Court, seeking resolution of the following issues: (1) whether the indictment was valid; (2) whether the verdict form was invalid; (3) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury; (4) whether the trial court improperly allowed testimony from Tonya Hickman and Rhonda Sills about statements made by the victim; (5) whether the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of Appellant’s children at the sentencing hearing; and (6) whether the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant is not entitled to relief with respect to issues 1-5. However, we determine that the trial courtimproperly ordered Appellant to serve his sentence consecutively to a sentence for civil contempt. Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect that Appellant’s sentence is to be served concurrently to his sentence for civil contempt. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted Rodreigors Jefferson (“the Defendant”) of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to eighteen years, six months. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, and that the trial court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement factor. Following a careful review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence.

A Bradley County jury convicted the Defendant, David Duggan, of facilitation to commit theft of property valued between $1000 and $10,000, facilitation of fraudulent alteration of a manufacturer’s identification number, and facilitation of identity theft, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals his convictions, claiming that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied the Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude the use of the Defendant’s prior convictions during trial; (2) denied the Defendant’s motion for acquittal; and (3) denied the Defendant a new trial based upon the State’s improper closing argument. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. Based upon a clerical error on one of the judgments of conviction, as will be discussed below, we remand this case to the trial court to amend the judgment of conviction form to reflect the proper statute section for the Defendant’s conviction for facilitation of fraudulent alteration of a  manufacturer’s identification number.

The petitioner, Anthony M. Collier, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court of Davidson County. He pled guilty to nine counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, three counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and one count of rape, a Class B felony. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the petitioner received an effective sentence of twenty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner claims that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to request a mental health evaluation; and (2) his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily. Upon review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.
 

The Defendant,TerriL.Newsome,was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with ninety days’ confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Christopher Lee Pettigrew, appeals the Circuit Court of Hardeman County’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Rebecca Ann Galyean, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of one count of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, two counts of vehicular assault by intoxication, a Class D felony, and two counts of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the convictions for driving under the influence into the conviction for vehicular homicide. The Defendant-Appellant received an effective eleven-year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the Defendant-Appellant’s blood analysis tested positive for “less than 0.25 µg/ml” of Tramadol; (2) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial based on the removal of Defendant-Appellant’s mother from the courtroom during trial; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon our review, we affirm the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions; however, we conclude that the trial court erroneously sentenced her beyond the statutory maximum for vehicular assault. Therefore, we modify the Defendant-Appellant’s sentences for vehicular assault to four years, the maximum in the range, and remand to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments.
 

The petitioner, Shawn Merritt, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se petition to set aside his guilty pleas. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas because the trial court failed to inform him of the lifetime supervision requirement attending his convictions of rape of a child, rendering his pleas involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Nelson Troglin, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his attempted first degree murder conviction, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, at the motion for new trial, and on appeal. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.