APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Robert Page, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to serve thirty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on facilitation was reversible error. State v. Robert Page, No. W2003-01342-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 3352994, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 26, 2004). Upon further review, our Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals judgment concluding that the failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses in the Petitioner’s case did not constitute plain error. State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 226 (Tenn. 2006). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant-Appellant, Jimmie Royston, of two counts of prostitution near a school, a Class A misdemeanor. The two counts were merged into one judgment, and he received a sentence of nine months and a $1,000 fine. On appeal, Royston asserts that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for prostitution, and (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach Royston at trial with prior misdemeanor theft convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Greene County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeremy Curtis Workman, of five counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twentyfive years confinement for each rape of a child conviction and six years for each incest conviction and ordered that the rape of a child sentences run concurrently to each other but consecutively to each incest conviction, for a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statements; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever the offenses; (3) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the prosecutor’s failure to establish jurisdiction or proper venue of the trial court; (4) the trial court erred when it overruled his motion to exclude members of the clergy from testifying at trial; (5) there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings; (6) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial based on improper, prejudicial testimony from a DCS investigator; and (7) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial based on the prosecutor’s improper comments to the jury. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Timothy Christopher Pillow, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to declare a mistrial based upon a detective’s testimony that the Defendant had previously been incarcerated; and (3) the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude no error exists in the trial court’s judgment. The trial court’s judgment is,therefore, affirmed.

The appellant, Donald Smith, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), reserving the following certified question of law: “Whether the [appellant’s] detention at [the] scene of a traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged such that it violated . . . Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution and/or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Bryan Keith Good, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that the judgment against him is void because the State failed to include the name of the victim in the indictment and (2) that subsequent amendment of the indictment did not cure the alleged defect. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Jerry W. Dickerson, filed in the Johnson County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition.

The Petitioner, Erskine Leroy Johnson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his 1985 conviction for felony murder. He contends that newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. He also contends that the trial court improperly weighed the newly discovered evidence and failed to assess that evidence in the context of the evidentiary record as a whole in determining whether the result of the trial may have been different. We reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the Petitioner’s felony murder conviction, and remand the case for a new trial.

This case arises from charges that Diane Forrest (“the Defendant”) concealed from police certain items used to make methamphetamine that her son had been using when his mobile methamphetamine lab exploded. A jury convicted the Defendant of one count of tampering with evidence and one count of accessory after the fact. The trial court merged the accessory after the fact conviction into the tampering with evidence conviction. The Defendant was sentenced to three years, with forty-five days incarceration to be served prior to her release on probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) excluding extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement made by an eyewitness; (2) admitting testimony about a second two-liter bottle found at the scene of the methamphetamine lab; (3) failing to dismiss the tampering with evidence charge at the close of the State’s proof; (4) rendering a sentence that was disproportionately harsh; and (5) increasing the Defendant’s appeal bond to $18,000. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kenneth Spencer, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment. He raises the following four issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts; and (4) whether the trial court impermissibly commented upon the evidence by issuing an incomplete statement to the jury on the element of premeditation. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings. We further conclude, however, that the trial court committed reversible error by improperly commenting on the evidence and giving an incomplete statement of the law in its expanded premeditation instruction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant,Christine Caudle,pled guiltyto recklessendangerment with a deadly weapon and theft of merchandise over $500, Class E felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-103, 39-14-146 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years for each conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by failing to apply applicable mitigating factors and by failing to grant probation or an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I, however, would affirm the trial court on the merits of its sentencing decision.

The petitioner, Markese Brooks, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Following his guilty pleas to nine felonies, the appellant, Derrick Lamont Parrish, received a total effective sentence of sixteen and one-half years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

Petitioner, Jerry McGaha, pled guilty in the Cocke County Circuit Court to nine counts of rape of a child. He was sentenced to twenty-five years on each count. After imposing consecutive sentences, Petitioner received an effective sentence of fifty years. After his direct appeal to this Court, his effective sentence was reduced to forty-six years. State v. Jerry McGaha, No. E2001-01547-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 499273, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 3, 2002). After a delayed appeal to the supreme court, which was achieved through the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner filed a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that the enhancement of his sentence was illegal under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Appellant argues that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to raise Apprendi. We conclude that he must fail on this issue because at the time of the sentencing hearing our supreme court had held that Apprendi did not affect the Tennessee sentencing scheme. Therefore, trial counsel could not be ineffective for failing to raise the issue. Petitioner also argues that it was plain error for the trial court to not raise Apprendi. Because this issue was not a basis for relief included in his petition, this issue is waived. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Appellant, Timothy Bryant Burton, appeals his Bedford County conviction for violation of the sex offender registry and the State’s use of his prior convictions to establish his status as a violent sex offender. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant failed to timely register with a law enforcement agency within forty-eight hours of his change of residence in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-203 or, in other words, that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Additionally, Appellant waived any issue with regard to the admission of evidence by failing to object at trial or raise the issue in a motion for new trial and is not entitled to plain error review. As a result, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Chester County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Robert Charles Brown, of eighty-five counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective one-hundred-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial, (2) allowing a State witness to testify about an incriminating hearsay statement made by the appellant, and (3) failing to require the State to make an election of offenses. The State acknowledges that the trial court erred regarding the election of offenses but argues that the error is harmless. We conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to require the State to make an election of offenses. Therefore, the appellant’s convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

Defendant, Victor D. McMiller, was charged with two counts each of the sale and delivery of dihydrocodeinone, a Schedule III controlled substance. Defendant was convicted on all four counts. His convictions for delivery of a controlled substance were merged into his convictions for sale of a controlled substance, and Defendant was sentenced to 12 years for each conviction, and his convictions were ordered to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of 24 years. On appeal, Defendant argues that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; 2) the trial court erred by allowing testimony of Defendant’s prior bad acts; 3) the presentment was facially invalid because it states that sale or delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance is a Class C, rather than Class D, felony; and 4) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. After a careful review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The petitioner, Walter Leon Cross, pled guilty in the Tipton County Circuit Court to felony failure to appear, eleven counts of forgery, three counts of theft over $1,000, and two counts of identity theft. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective sentence of twenty years. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

On appeal, the appellant, David Harris, Jr., complains that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his two-year probationary sentence for the promotion of methamphetamine manufacturing and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. He contends that after revoking his sentence, the trial court should have granted him a sentence of split confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Willie D. Robinson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery and received a sentence of life imprisonment. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Morgan County CriminalCourt, which was summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the indictment charging him with first degree felony murder was so defective as to deprive the convicting court of jurisdiction to impose judgment. Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Petitioner, Patrick Thurmond, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of aggravated burglary (count 1), two counts of aggravated rape (counts 2 and 3), one count of attempted aggravated rape (count 4), and one count of aggravated sexual battery (count 5). He subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Johnson County Criminal Court, which was summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues: (1) the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing, and (2) his judgments for counts one, three, four, and five are void because they violate the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Marease Antonio Crawford, Appellant, was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury in July 2010 in a multi-count indictment. Appellant entered an open plea to the indictment with sentencing to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of twelve years. Appellant appeals the imposition of consecutive sentences and the failure of the trial court to merge two of the convictions. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant did not waive the issue of double jeopardy by virtue of his guilty plea but that double jeopardy does not bar the convictions for Count Three, sale of marijuana, and Count Seven, possession of marijuana for resale. However,we conclude that double jeopardy bars Appellant’s convictions for both simple possession and possession of marijuana for resale where the offenses arose out of one incident of possession. We affirm the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing on the basis that Appellant had an extensive criminal history. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s conviction for simple possession. Appellant’s remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Angela Colley, entered guilty pleas to selling 0.5 grams or more of cocaine on June 9, 2008 (count one), delivering 0.5 grams or more of cocaine on June 9, 2008 (count two), selling less than 0.5 grams of cocaine on June 17, 2008 (count three), and delivering less than 0.5 grams of cocaine on June 17, 2008 (count four) in the Sullivan County Criminal Court. Pursuant to her plea agreement, count two merged with count one and count four merged with count three, and Colley received a sentence of eight years at thirty percent for count one and a concurrent sentence of three years at thirty percent for count three, for an effective sentence of eight years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied all forms of alternative sentencing. On appeal, Colley argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for an alternative sentence. Upon review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of judgments sentencing Colley to community corrections and for consideration of other terms and conditions that the trial court deems appropriate pursuant to the Community Corrections Act.

The defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), first offense, and reserved the following two certified questions: (1) “Whether a magistrate that conducts field sobriety tasks upon a defendant prior to issuance of a warrant is qualified as [a] ‘neutral and detached’ magistrate for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or its laws and/or in violation of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and its laws”; and (2) “Whether the issuance of a warrant after the administration of field sobriety tasks by a magistrate to a defendant [was] in violation of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and/or its laws.” After the challenged warrant was issued,the Grand Jury indicted the defendant, charging him with one count of DUI. We hold that the certified questions are notdispositive of the defendant’s case because the subsequent indictment cured any defects in the warrant. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.