APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Maury County jury convicted Stacy Matthews, Defendant, of two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school zone and one count of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the trial court struck the school zone sentencing aggravator for two of the convictions and entered judgments on three counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. The trial court imposed three concurrent sentences of twelve years, as a Range I, standard offender, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: he was prejudiced by the language of Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment; that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Charles Randolph Johnson, was convicted by an Anderson County Jury of one
count of possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin within 1,000 feet of a drug free
school zone; possession of more than 14.175 grams of marijuana with intent to sell or
deliver; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an effective thirtyyear
sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant appears to argue that (1)
the length of time between his trial and the hearing on his motion for new trial violated his
right to due process; (2) the search warrant was invalid; (3) the untimely “constructive
amendment” of the indictment rendered it invalid; (4) the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions, and the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and the
parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Gregory Hickman, of rape of a child, and
the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to forty years in prison. On
appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction
and that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to submit a rebuttal closing argument.
After our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Raymon Muhammad, filed a post-conviction petition in the Shelby County
Criminal Court, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and
resulting life sentence. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner
appeals. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Timothy Travis Jenkins, appeals the trial court’s order imposing confinement after finding that the Defendant violated his probation. The Defendant’s probation began in 2019, when he was convicted of sale of methamphetamine and given a six-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. In 2022, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant, the Defendant’s third, which alleged multiple violations. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and when it ordered him to confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Cory Lamont Batey, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On appeal, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely because he was actively misled by his appellate counsel. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Angela Buchanan, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, wherein she challenged her convictions for criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child neglect. On appeal, the Petitioner argues: (1) she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) her convictions were based on inadmissible Rule 404(b) evidence; (3) she received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (4) the trial court, in violation of Tennessee law and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, failed to inform her that she could make a statement of allocution at sentencing. 1 We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Michael Marcell Brown, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate robbery;
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; and attempt to perpetrate
aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently
amended) (first degree felony murder), 39-12-103(a) (conspiracy) (2018); 39-13-402(a)
(2018) (aggravated robbery); 39-12-101(a) (2018) (criminal attempt). The trial court
sentenced the Defendant to life for first degree murder and to six years for each of the two
remaining convictions. The court imposed the sentences concurrently to each other but
consecutively to the Defendant’s sentences in another case. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement, (3) the court erred in
excluding hearsay evidence, (4) the court erred in admitting a photograph exhibit because
it was not properly authenticated, and (5) the cumulative effect of multiple trial errors
requires relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Darius Alston, appeals from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court's denial
of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of first degree premeditated
murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated
robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm and his sentence of life imprisonment. On
appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect
of counsel's multiple instances of deficient performance. We affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Appellant, Luis Santiago, entered a guilty plea to
attempted aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and aggravated stalking and received a
total effective sentence of seven years and two months with the manner of service to be
determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the
Appellant’s request for probation and ordered the seven-year-two-month sentence to be
served in confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of separate judgment forms reflecting
dismissal of counts two, four, and five.

The Defendant, Demario Antijuan Jones, pleaded guilty to unauthorized use of an
automobile and three counts of driving while license was cancelled, suspended, or revoked,
and received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days at seventy-five
percent service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing
the maximum sentences and by denying him an alternative sentence. We affirm the trial
court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Robert Vernon Gouge, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child,
one count of attempted rape of a child, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The
trial court imposed an effective sentence of ninety-nine years. On appeal, the Defendant
challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of aggravated
sexual battery in count four and his conviction of rape of a child in count five.1 He also
argues that his effective sentence of ninety-nine years is excessive. We respectfully
disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In August of 2018, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) secured an
ex parte order placing B.B.,1 the minor daughter of Wendy Dawn Hancock, Defendant, in
the custody of DCS after a referral prompted an investigation. During the span of several
days, Defendant and B.B. stayed at both a hotel in Lebanon and Defendant’s attorney’s,
Connie Reguli’s (“Ms. Reguli’s”) home in Brentwood without ever being formally served
with the ex parte order. Police eventually located B.B. and Defendant in Brentwood.
Defendant was indicted for one count of custodial interference, in violation of Tennessee
Code Annotated section 39-13-306. Ms. Reguli was also charged with several offenses for
her actions. Defendant sought a dismissal of the indictment before trial. The trial court
denied the motion. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of custodial interference.
She was sentenced to two years on supervised probation. The trial court denied the motion
for new trial; Defendant appealed. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) the indictment
should be dismissed because it fails to allege all of the elements of custodial interference;
(2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the elements of custodial interference;
(3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury that the ex parte custody order was “valid
and enforceable”; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; and (5)
Tennessee should adopt an advice of counsel defense for specific intent crimes. Because
the trial court improperly instructed the jury essentially removing one of the elements of
the offense and lowering the burden of proof, we reverse the judgment of the trial court
and vacate Defendant’s conviction. We remand the case to the trial court for any further
proceedings that may be necessary.

The Defendant, Jeremiah Sweet, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s
revocation of his probation and execution of his four-year sentence for aggravated statutory
rape, simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance, and theft of property valued
at $1000 or less. Although the Defendant admits to violating the terms of his probation,
he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the balance of
his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm.

The defendant, Philip Mainer, appeals his conviction of aggravated cruelty to animals that
he received following a bench trial before the Sullivan County Criminal Court. On appeal,
the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon
review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Anthony D. Martin, Petitioner, was convicted of rape of a child and sentenced to 40 years
in incarceration. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. State v.
Anthony Martin, Alias, No. E2018-01066-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 2714379, at *1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. June 28, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 11, 2019). Petitioner sought
post-conviction relief based on several alleged instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition after a hearing.
This appeal followed. After a review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Sevier County jury convicted Defendant, Gabriel Enrique Turcios, of first-degree
premeditated murder. At sentencing, the jury found that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that
necessary to produce death, and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole. On appeal, he claims the evidence is insufficient to support the application of
the aggravating circumstance for the sentence. After a thorough review of the record and
the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Wojnarek, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence in confinement, arguing that the trial court erred by considering evidence found in violation of the Fourth Amendment and by failing to make adequate findings in support of its decision. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Appellant, Charles Rutledge, was convicted of second-degree murder, for which he received a sentence of twenty-eight years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, the Appellant presents two issues for review: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction, and 2) whether the State failed to disclose witness information in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Upon our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Miron D. Johnson, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of evading arrest,
a Class D felony; misdemeanor evading arrest; felony reckless endangerment; and driving
on a revoked license, fourth offense. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain his convictions for felony evading arrest and felony reckless
endangerment. Relative to his felony evading arrest conviction, the Defendant specifically
argues that his conduct did not create a risk of death or injury to others. For his felony
reckless endangerment conviction, the Defendant argues that his vehicle was not used as a
deadly weapon and that the threat of death or serious bodily injury was not imminent. The
Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by imposing fines without making
findings regarding the Defendant’s ability to pay. Following our review, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Isaias Rodriguez, was convicted of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and
sentenced to forty years at 100% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant
argues: (1) there was insufficient proof of the forensic interviewer’s years of experience as
required by statute for admission of the victim’s forensic interview; (2) the trial court erred
in failing to make specific findings regarding the qualifications of the child advocacy center
as required by statute for admission of the victim’s forensic interview; and (3) the evidence
is insufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction without the improperly admitted
forensic interview of the victim. After review, we affirm the trial court’s finding regarding
the interviewer’s years of experience and determine the defendant has waived his issue
regarding the qualifications of the child advocacy center. In addition, we determine that
the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction. Therefore, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant, Latosha Starks-Twilley, of
first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of life
imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the
State to ask the defense expert prejudicial questions; (2) the trial court erred in allowing
the State to ask the defense expert whether the Defendant met the criteria for antisocial
personality disorder; (3) the trial court erred in prohibiting the defense from asking its own
expert about whether the Defendant lacked the capacity to form the mens rea required for
the offense; (4) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s request for the pattern jury
instruction on reckless homicide; (5) the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs
of the deceased victim into evidence; and (6) the evidence is insufficient to sustain her
conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tavarius Goliday, was convicted in the Montgomery County Circuit Court
of first degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and reckless
endangerment with a deadly weapon and received an effective sentence of life in
confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by overruling
his objection to evidence about a gang-related tattoo on his hand and that the evidence is
insufficient to support his convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the
parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for correction
of the judgment of conviction as to count one, first degree murder.

In this post-conviction appeal, the Petitioner-Appellant, Gregg Merrilees, seeks relief from his original convictions of aggravated robbery and robbery in concert with two or more persons, for which he received an effective sentence of sixteen years’ imprisonment. He subsequently filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, which was denied by the postconviction court. The Petitioner now appeals and raises a stand-alone challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. In addition, the Petitioner argues four grounds in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim: (1) trial counsel’s failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence based on the lack of accomplice corroboration in a motion for judgment of acquittal or on direct appeal; (2) trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on accomplice corroboration; (3) trial counsel’s failure to object based on speculation to the hotel clerk-victim’s accusation that the Petitioner was involved in the offenses based on the hotel clerk-victim’s “gut”; and (4) trial counsel’s failure to object to “the unconstitutional show-up” identification of the Petitioner by the hotel clerk-victim at trial. Upon our review, we affirm.

I have the privilege to join the majority’s well-reasoned opinion in large part. For example, I agree that a post-conviction petitioner cannot raise a stand-alone claim seeking dismissal based upon an alleged legal insufficiency of the convicting evidence. I also agree that the Petitioner here has not shown that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the victim’s testimony and the in-court identification.2 Finally, I agree that trial counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to raise and argue that the accomplice’s testimony was not sufficiently corroborated. Where I respectfully part ways with the majority concerns its analysis of whether the Petitioner has shown that the reliability of his verdict was undermined by trial counsel’s failure to argue a lack of corroboration.