APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Roderick Baldwin, appeals the order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court revoking his community corrections sentence for his convictions for aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kevin Joel Hernandez, appeals the Davidson CountyCriminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than seventy pounds of marijuana within one thousand feet of a school zone and resulting fifteen-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. The appellant contends thathe received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel (1) failed to investigate his case adequately, consult with him, or prepare for trial and (2) failed to request a jury instruction on facilitation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court

The Petitioner, Mannaka Oung, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2000 conviction for aggravated assault and resulting three-year suspended sentence. Oung filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to advise him of the plea’s possible effects on his immigration status and potential deportation. The post-conviction court concluded that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed the petition. On appeal, Oung argues that his claim is based on a constitutional right that did not exist at the time of his plea, such that the statute of limitations does not bar his claim. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson CountyCriminalCourt jury convicted the appellant, Jamar Ed-Wae Scott, of two counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of second degree murder, and two counts of attempted robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life plus eight years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify about a statement made by a co-defendant pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(1.2)(E), the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief from two counts of facilitation of second degree murder and resulting thirty-eight-year sentence. She alleged that her guilty pleas to these offenses were not entered knowingly; that her convictions were based on a violation of her privilege against self-incrimination; and that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, Bobby Joe Young, Jr., of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him, as a multiple offender, to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following a review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Gibson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, David Hooper Climer, Jr., of first degree premeditated murder and abuse of a corpse, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of life and two years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the premeditated murder conviction and shows he was insane when he abused the victim’s corpse, (2) the trial court should have granted his motion to sever, (3) the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress his statements to police, (4) he was denied his right to a speedy trial, and (5) the trial court should have dismissed a prospective juror for cause. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s conviction of first degree premeditated murder but that the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. The appellant’s first degree murder conviction is reduced to second degree murder, and the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing. The appellant’s conviction of abuse of a corpse is affirmed.

Ricky Nelson (“the Petitioner”) filed a motion for post-conviction deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, requesting DNA analysis of a knife used in the perpetration of a rape. After a non-evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After reviewing the record, we have determined, in light of the recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Powers v. State, 343 S.W.3d 36, 56 (Tenn. 2011), that a remand of the case to the postconviction court is necessary for the post-conviction court to consider and rule upon whether the Petitioner has satisfied the first of four factors necessary for the Petitioner to demonstrate his right to DNA analysis and to address whether the Powers decision would affect the postconviction court’s analysis and finding on the second of the four factors.

The Petitioner, Billy Lee Simmons, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein he seeks relief for his eight-year sentence for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell and within 1,000 feet of a school. The crux of the Petitioner’s argument is that his Class A felony sentence is illegal because it was enhanced pursuant to the Drug-Free School Zone Act. We agree that the Petitioner’s sentence is illegal, albeit for a different reason—his sentence for a Class A felony not being authorized by law—and that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. We remand to the Johnson County Circuit Court for the appointment of counsel and a hearing to determine the proper remedy.

The Defendant, Thomas G. McConnell, pled guilty in the Circuit Court for Williamson County to driving under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2008) (amended 2010). He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with forty-five days of the sentence to be served. On appeal, he presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to his arrest. Because the certified question was not properly reserved, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Christopher Black, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to an effective term of fifty years imprisonment. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions but remanded for a resentencing hearing “regarding [the defendant’s] sentencing status with respect  to the 2005 sentencing act and regarding the issue of consecutive sentencing.” State v.Christopher M. Black, No.M2007-00970-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 26, 2010). Following a hearing on remand, the trial court, applying the single enhancement factor for prior criminal history, sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years for each count of aggravated rape and to ten years for each count of aggravated robbery. The court further found the defendant to be a dangerous offender and ordered that the two aggravated rapes be served consecutively, but concurrently to the sentences for robbery, again resulting in an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in the imposition of consecutive sentences. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentences as imposed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Leonard Brakefield, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), fourth offense, and refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test (“BAC”). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI, fourth offense. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Michelle Tipton,appeals the Davidson CountyCriminal Court’s denial of her petition for habeas corpus relief from her 2000 conviction for first degree felony murder and resulting life sentence. She claims her conviction is void because (1) the judgment fails to identify the date of her indictment, (2) the judgment lists a non-existent offense, (3) the judgment fails to list her release eligibility percentage, (4) the same aggravating circumstance was used during the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial, (5) the State violated statutory sentencing guidelines, and (6) the judgment rendered a non-existent sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Robert Page, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to serve thirty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on facilitation was reversible error. State v. Robert Page, No. W2003-01342-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 3352994, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 26, 2004). Upon further review, our Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals judgment concluding that the failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses in the Petitioner’s case did not constitute plain error. State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 226 (Tenn. 2006). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant-Appellant, Jimmie Royston, of two counts of prostitution near a school, a Class A misdemeanor. The two counts were merged into one judgment, and he received a sentence of nine months and a $1,000 fine. On appeal, Royston asserts that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for prostitution, and (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach Royston at trial with prior misdemeanor theft convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Greene County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeremy Curtis Workman, of five counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twentyfive years confinement for each rape of a child conviction and six years for each incest conviction and ordered that the rape of a child sentences run concurrently to each other but consecutively to each incest conviction, for a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statements; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever the offenses; (3) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the prosecutor’s failure to establish jurisdiction or proper venue of the trial court; (4) the trial court erred when it overruled his motion to exclude members of the clergy from testifying at trial; (5) there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings; (6) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial based on improper, prejudicial testimony from a DCS investigator; and (7) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial based on the prosecutor’s improper comments to the jury. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Timothy Christopher Pillow, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to declare a mistrial based upon a detective’s testimony that the Defendant had previously been incarcerated; and (3) the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude no error exists in the trial court’s judgment. The trial court’s judgment is,therefore, affirmed.

The appellant, Donald Smith, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), reserving the following certified question of law: “Whether the [appellant’s] detention at [the] scene of a traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged such that it violated . . . Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution and/or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Bryan Keith Good, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that the judgment against him is void because the State failed to include the name of the victim in the indictment and (2) that subsequent amendment of the indictment did not cure the alleged defect. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Jerry W. Dickerson, filed in the Johnson County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition.

The Petitioner, Erskine Leroy Johnson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his 1985 conviction for felony murder. He contends that newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. He also contends that the trial court improperly weighed the newly discovered evidence and failed to assess that evidence in the context of the evidentiary record as a whole in determining whether the result of the trial may have been different. We reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the Petitioner’s felony murder conviction, and remand the case for a new trial.

This case arises from charges that Diane Forrest (“the Defendant”) concealed from police certain items used to make methamphetamine that her son had been using when his mobile methamphetamine lab exploded. A jury convicted the Defendant of one count of tampering with evidence and one count of accessory after the fact. The trial court merged the accessory after the fact conviction into the tampering with evidence conviction. The Defendant was sentenced to three years, with forty-five days incarceration to be served prior to her release on probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) excluding extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement made by an eyewitness; (2) admitting testimony about a second two-liter bottle found at the scene of the methamphetamine lab; (3) failing to dismiss the tampering with evidence charge at the close of the State’s proof; (4) rendering a sentence that was disproportionately harsh; and (5) increasing the Defendant’s appeal bond to $18,000. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kenneth Spencer, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment. He raises the following four issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts; and (4) whether the trial court impermissibly commented upon the evidence by issuing an incomplete statement to the jury on the element of premeditation. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings. We further conclude, however, that the trial court committed reversible error by improperly commenting on the evidence and giving an incomplete statement of the law in its expanded premeditation instruction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant,Christine Caudle,pled guiltyto recklessendangerment with a deadly weapon and theft of merchandise over $500, Class E felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-103, 39-14-146 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years for each conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by failing to apply applicable mitigating factors and by failing to grant probation or an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I, however, would affirm the trial court on the merits of its sentencing decision.