APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendants, Rebecca and J. C. Draper, were each indicted for one count of manufacture of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §1 § 39-17-417(a)(1), - 425(a)(1). The Defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of a search of their manufactured home and backyard. The trial court denied the Defendants’ motion. The Defendants then entered into a plea agreement with the State and reserved a certified question of law for appellate review pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Defendant Rebecca Draper pled nolo contendere to one count of possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days on probation. Defendant J. C. Draper pled guilty to one count of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to three years on probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433. In this appeal, the Defendants contend that the trial court erred by denying their motion to suppress the evidence against them. Following our review, we reverse, vacate the judgments of the trial court, and dismiss the charges.

In 2004, the petitioner, Toney Jason Hale, pled guilty before the Bedford County Circuit Court to three counts of automobile burglary, a Class E felony. He received an effective sentence of three years as a Range I, standard offender, to be served consecutively to a previously imposed Marshall County sentence. Seven years later, in 2011, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that his convictions violated double jeopardy protections. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition after a hearing. The petitioner argues on appeal that the court erred in denying him relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Appellant, Edward L. Baird, entered guilty pleas without recommended sentences to three felony offenses involving distribution of controlled substances. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered appellant to serve an effective sentence of ten years in confinement. Appellant contests the manner of service of his sentence, arguing that the trial court should have ordered split confinement. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In February 2011, the Petitioner, Fred Ratliff, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, wherein he challenged his 1976 conviction for first degree murder. The Petitioner claimed that he had “compelling” new evidence of his innocence because the State failed to disclose a key prosecution witness’s juvenile record in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court first dismissed the petition as time-barred, finding that due process did not require tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. Then, addressing the merits of the Petitioner’s Brady claim, the coram nobis court concluded that the Petitioner had not shown that the new evidence may have resulted in a different judgment had it been presented at trial. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Scott County Circuit Court.

The defendant, Justin Parliment, appeals from his Hickman County Circuit Court jury conviction of possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution, see T.C.A. § 39-16201(b)(2) (2006), claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for the marijuana introduced into evidence, that the fine imposed bythe jury is excessive, and that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Randy Bray, appeals from the Grundy County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After trial, a jury convicted him of two counts of first degree premeditated murder. In this appeal, Bray argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to file motions to suppress (1) a shotgun, (2) his statement to police, and (3) a 911 call. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant,Antonio D.Alexander,was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of attempted aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, second degree murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon. The jury sentenced Alexander to life without the possibility of parole for the first degree felony murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced him to a consecutive ninety-year sentence for the remaining convictions. On appeal, Alexander argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the jury erred in unanimously finding the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the aggravating circumstance that “[t]he defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim murdered, during the act of murder”; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Dontrel D. Pittman, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s order revoking his 12-year community corrections sentence and ordering service of the sentence in the custody of the Department of Corrections. He argues that no substantial evidence supports the trial court’s order and that the sentence imposed is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Dickson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Horace Hollis, of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court merged the convictions of aggravated sexual battery into the convictions of rape of a child and imposed a sentence of 40 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Terry Maurice Thomas, appeals from the revocation of his community corrections sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Bruce S. Rishton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his attempted rape and incest convictions, arguing that (1) he was constructively denied counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings against him; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntary pleas; (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the post-conviction court denied him a full and fair hearing; and (5) the trial court denied him a speedy trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

On March 20, 2009, the defendant, Jonathan Wade Rosson, was convicted of solicitation of a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to two years, with 120 days to be served in confinement in the county jail and the remainder to be served in community corrections as a condition of probation. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence on numerous grounds, claiming that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) he was deprived of a fair trial by the State’s failure to preserve all of the videotape footage taken byall of the surveillance cameras located in the building where the incident occurred on the day in question; (3) the trial court erred by admitting copies of videotape footage preserved from two surveillance cameras into evidence; (4) the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied to him; and (5) a state law rendering him ineligible for work release programs while serving his sentence that was enacted after the commission of his offense violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution by virtue of retroactively increasing the punishment for his crime. After carefully reviewing the record, the relevant laws and precedent, and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Javoris Sparkman, of one count of first degree murder, two counts of felony murder,and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. For the first degree murder in count one, Sparkman received a sentence of life. The trial court merged the first degree felony murder in count two with the first degree murder in count one. For the first degree felony murder in count four, Sparkman received another life sentence, to be served consecutively to the sentence of life for the first degree murder in count one. For each attempted first degree murder, Sparkman received a sentence of fifteen years, to be served concurrently. In total, Sparkman received two sentences of life plus 15 years. On appeal, Sparkman argues the trial court erred in (1) failing to charge the jury with self-defense; (2) refusing to allow individual voir dire of prospective jurors; (3) refusing to excuse a juror with prior knowledge of the case; and (4) denying a motion for change of venue. Upon our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed, except for counts one and two which are vacated and the case is remanded for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of counts one and two.

The petitioner, Nichlous Maxwell, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to argue for a jury instruction on facilitation of a felony. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Ruby Graham, appeals from her White County Circuit Court jury conviction of the sale of morphine, see T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(3), claiming that the trial court erred by denying her request for a mistrial and by refusing her bid for judicial diversion. Because the defendant failed to prepare an adequate record for review of either issue, we must presume that the rulings of the trial court are correct, and we affirm.

The Defendant, Kevin Fritz Edwards, was indicted by the Unicoi County Grand Jury of one count of aggravated sexual battery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504(a)(4). Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated sexual battery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-504(a) (4). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the victim’s prior false accusation of sexual battery; (3) that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of other prior allegations of sexual abuse and sexual abuse counseling pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412; (4) that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing him to impeach the testimony of the victim’s mother; and (5) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant an alternative sentence because it considered a psychosexual evaluation which was based on “unreliable scientific tests.” Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss the judgment of the trial court. We will also address the remainder of the Defendant’s arguments so as not to pretermit his remaining issues. See State v. Parris, 236 S.W.3d 173, 189 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) (following a similar procedure).

The Defendant, Matthew Edwin Thompson, pled guilty to two counts of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103,-105 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to eight years’ confinement for each conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Mack Transou, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Ricardo Davidson, of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with intent to sell within a Drug Free School Zone, possession of over ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell within a Drug Free School Zone, conspiracy to possess over 300 grams of cocaine within a Drug Free School Zone, and conspiracy to possess and deliver over ten pounds of marijuana in a Drug Free School Zone. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence that he says was obtained pursuant to an invalid search warrant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Leroy Dowdy, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by recklessness, leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, and driving on a revoked license. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to five years and six months for the vehicular homicide conviction, two years for the leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death conviction, and six months for the driving on a revoked license conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court’s sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Nelson Keith Foster (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of driving on a revoked or suspended license and driving on a revoked or suspended license, second offense. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended upon serving thirty days’ incarceration. The Defendant  ppeals, asserting that: (1) the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during an illegal traffic stop; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s motions for  ithdrawal; and (4) the trial court erred in denying a motion to recuse. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

Petitioner, Charles Thompson, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his three separate petitions for post-conviction relief in case numbers P-24665, -22149, and -27258. Petitioner was convicted, following guilty pleas, of the first degree murder of Eddie Johnson and attempted first degree murder of Brenda Hampton. Following jury trials, he was convicted for the aggravated assault, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping of Paloy Finnie, see State v. Derrick M. Vernon, et al., No. W1998-00612-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 490718 at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed Apr. 25, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2001); and the first degree murder of Dedrick Taylor, see State v. Charles Thompson, No. W1998-00351-CCA-R10-CD, 2001 WL 912715 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed Aug. 9, 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 31, 2001). In his brief, Petitioner asserts that the indictments in the three cases above were defective. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

Nicholas Clower (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to two counts of sale and delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced to six years’ probation on each count, to be served concurrently. Upon the filing of a revocation warrant and subsequent amended warrants, the Defendant was taken into custody, and a probation revocation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant has appealed the trial court’s ruling, asserting that the trial court erred in determining that the Defendant possessed a weapon in violation of his probation and in requiring the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Polk County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Clayton Pike, Jr., of first degree premeditated murder and misdemeanor reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence because the search of his home was unlawful, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the murder conviction, and (3) the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that it could not consider the appellant’s prior bad acts as substantive evidence. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying the appellant’s motion to suppress but that the error was harmless. Therefore, the appellant’s convictions are affirmed.

The Defendant, Joseph Nathaniel Nance, was convicted of six counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an 18-year sentence for each rape of a child conviction and a 10- ear sentence for the aggravated sexual battery conviction. The court ordered consecutive service of several of the convictions, resulting in a total effective sentence of 64 years. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by excluding sexual entries from the victim’s MySpace page as irrelevant and inadmissible; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing evidence of the victim’s prior sexual history to be used only for impeachment purposes; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions; and (4) whether the Defendant’s effective 64-year sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.