APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Gary L. Graham, was convicted by a Fayette County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence (“DUI”), and the court found the defendant guilty of DUI third offense and violation of the implied consent law. The court merged the DUI convictions and sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to misdemeanor probation upon service of 145 days at 75% in the county jail, and suspended the defendant’s driver’s license for two years as a result of his violation of the implied consent law. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of DUI. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted LaShawn Johnson (“the Defendant”) of aggravated burglary and attempted theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. On appeal, he raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Defendant’s prior theft convictions would be admissible should he testify. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Larry C. Pittman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Jeremiah L. Woods, was convicted by a Madison County jury of one count of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. He contends that the evidence is insufficient only with regard to the element of premeditation. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence of premeditation in the record is overwhelming and, accordingly, affirm the conviction.

The defendant, James Drew Freeman, Jr., appeals from his White County Circuit Court jury conviction of second degree murder, claiming that the admission of the autopsy report via a witness who did not perform the autopsy violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, that the State engaged in improper and inflammatory closing argument, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Coffee County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant,Raleigh Kristopher Frye,of one count of third offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), and the trial court found the defendant guilty of violating the implied consent law. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained following the stop of his vehicle and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, claims that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the State to exercise four peremptory challenges and by permitting the indictment for the implied consent violation to be taken to the jury room, and contends that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial entitles him to a new trial. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Joseph S. Lucas, Jr., appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to rape of a child and resulting twenty-five year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) his guilty plea was not voluntarily and knowingly entered, (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to preserve a suppression issue for appeal, failing to address waiver of the Petitioner’s ex post facto rights during sentencing, and failing to prepare witnesses for the sentencing hearing, and (3) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to include transcripts of the suppression hearing and the guilty plea hearing in the record on direct appeal, failing to request a rehearing, and failing to argue that the Petitioner’s sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Robert Kenneth Dubose, appeals the decision of the Hardin County Circuit Court revoking his probationary sentence. The defendant pled guilty to rape, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of eight years. The sentence was to be suspended to supervised probation following the service of one year. Subsequently, a violation warrant was issued charging the defendant with multiple violations of the terms and conditions of his probation. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered the balance of the sentence be served in the Department of Correction. Following review, we conclude that the defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the revocation or in imposing a sentence of confinement. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Keesha P. Washington, was found guilty by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated arson, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-302 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to eighteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by not holding a hearing to ensure that she knowingly and voluntarily waived her right not to testify and that her sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Randell Murphy, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of burglary of an automobile; theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000; vandalism of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000; possession of burglary tools; and criminal impersonation. The defendant received an effective sentence of 21 and one-half years. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by rejecting his plea agreement with the State, by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and by imposing an excessive sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffrey Wade Osborne, appeals his Williamson County Circuit Court bench trial conviction of felony failure to appear, see T.C.A. § 39-16-609, arguing that his trial should not have occurred while competency proceedings were still pending and that the trial court erroneously denied a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s proof. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Gail Lynn Padgett, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), fourth offense, a Class E felony, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to one year of incarceration for felony DUI with 150 days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six months probation for driving on a revoked license, to be served concurrently with the DUI sentence. The trial court also revoked the Defendant’s license for five years, ordering the Defendant to attend DUI school. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for DUI, fourth offense; (2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for the State’s failure to preserve evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress evidence of her actions and statements to police due to the lack of probable cause to effectuate the arrest. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Thorne Peters, of one count of simple possession of marijuana, see T.C.A. § 39-17-418, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days’ incarceration in the local workhouse; with respect to the manner of service, the judgment said,“[T]ime served.” On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, the trial court’s granting the State’s motion to quash a subpoena of the former sheriff, and the trial court’s limitation of crossexamination of a witness. Discerning neither a paucity in the evidence nor reversible error committed by the trial court, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for clarification of pretrial jail credit.

The appellant, Charles Edward Durham, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of possession of not less than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana in a school zone with the intent to sell and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that he alleges was discovered after he was illegally detained and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his drug conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Keith Richard Gibson, was convicted after a jury trial for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and simple possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender and received eight years’ incarceration for the felony and eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration for the misdemeanor. He appeals the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress evidence, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to support the investigatory stop of the defendant as required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Upon review, although we reject a part of the trial court’s reasoning in its denial of the motions to suppress, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Nicholas Short, of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of second degree murder. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced Short to life imprisonment. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to establish his convictions given Short’s theory of self-defense. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kenneth Nathaniel Jones, pled guilty to facilitation of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to four years, to be served on probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant, alleging that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that he serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement and then return to probation for the remainder of his sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it revoked his probation because his violations were “technical” in nature. Further, he asserts the trial court erred when it imposed jail time because this was his first petition of revocation filed against him. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner appeals the Circuit Court for Lincoln County’s denial of post-conviction relief. He was convicted of forty-three counts, thirteen counts by a jury trial and thirty counts by guilty pleas. On the date of his scheduled sentencing hearing, petitioner agreed to sentences on the thirteen counts for which the jury convicted him and pled guilty to the remaining thirty counts. He accepted an effective sentence of twenty-five years at 100% for all forty-three counts. On appeal, petitioner alleges that trial counsel made numerous mistakes in preparing for and conducting the trial and did not adequately explain the consequences of his guilty pleas. He further alleges that the post-conviction court abused its discretion by refusing to grant his motion to remove post-conviction counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury convicted Randall Kelvin Madison (“the Defendant”) of twenty-two counts of rape, three counts of aggravated statutory rape, and one count of forgery. The trial court subsequently merged several of the offenses so as to leave in place twelve counts of rape and one count of forgery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of thirty-five years. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s ruling under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) that evidence of his uncharged bad acts was admissible; (2) the State’s election of offenses; (3) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (4) his sentence. We hold that (1) the Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial court’s Rule 404(b) ruling; (2) the Defendant has not demonstrated that the State’s election of offenses was fatally deficient; and (3) the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. We also affirm the trial court’s sentencing decisions. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The defendant, Carlos Cannon, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

James William Swafford, Jr. (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his multiple convictions for drug and other offenses which resulted in an effective sentence of thirty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and that his plea was constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 2002, the Defendant, Dale M. Rogers, pled guilty to two counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years, to be served at 100%, for each conviction and ordered that the sentences run concurrently. The trial court later amended the judgements to reflect that the Petitioner was sentenced to community supervision for life after the expiration of his sentence. In 2011, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he did not have notice that his sentences were amended until 2011 and asking the court to toll the applicable statute of limitations. He further alleged that the trial court’s amending of his judgments, adding the community supervision for life provision, rendered his guilty pleas unknowingly and involuntarily entered. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s post-conviction petition based upon its finding that the petition was untimely filed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post- conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. The State agrees with the Petitioner that the post-conviction court erred and asks this Court to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine when the Petitioner knew that his judgments had been amended. We agree with the parties, and we reverse the post-conviction court’s order and remand the case to the trial court for appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

The Madison County Grand Jury indicted the defendants, Brian Montrel Brawner, Randy Leon Miller, and Sam Edward Stevenson, with attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated arson for having assaulted, kidnapped, and set fire to the victim, Freddy Jones. At the conclusion of their joint trial, a Madison County jury convicted Defendants Brawner and Stevenson of aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and facilitation of attempted first degree murder. The jury convicted Defendant Miller of aggravated assault, aggravated arson, especially aggravated kidnapping, and attempted first degree murder. The trial court merged Defendant Brawner’s and Defendant Stevenson’s aggravated assault convictions into their convictions for facilitation of attempted first degree murder and sentenced them to effective terms of thirty and fifty-three years, respectively. The trial court merged Defendant Miller’s aggravated assault conviction into his conviction for attempted first degree murder and sentenced him to an effective term of forty years in the Department of Correction. Defendant Miller raises the following four issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated arson and especially aggravated kidnapping; (2) whether his dual convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated arson violate principles of double jeopardy; (3) whether the State should have been required to make an election of offenses for the aggravated assault charges; and (4) whether the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. Defendant Stevenson raises essentially two issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions for facilitation of attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping; and (2) whether the State should have been required to elect the offenses for his aggravated assault charges. Defendant Brawner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions for facilitation of attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, John Howard, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Christopher Earl Watts, of four counts of aggravated child abuse, two counts of aggravated child neglect, and one count of child neglect. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective sentence of seventy-five years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever the offenses; (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the appellant’s co-defendant was an accomplice; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (4) the trial court erred by failing to merge the appellant’s aggravated child neglect convictions; and (5) his effective sentence is excessive. The State concedes that the trial court erred by failing to merge the appellant’s aggravated child neglect convictions. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to grant the appellant’s motion to sever but that the error was harmless. We also conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support one of the appellant’s convictions for aggravated child abuse, one of his convictions for aggravated child neglect, and his conviction for child neglect. The appellant’s remaining convictions and effective seventy-five-year sentence are affirmed.