APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner, Charlton Garner, of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced him to an effective twenty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After an unsuccessful direct appeal to this court, he petitioned the Shelby County Criminal Court for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present a witness suggested by petitioner and failure to impeach a State’s witness with prior convictions. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error in the proceedings, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Joseph Wells (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to one count of possession of one-half ounce or more of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony. After a hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered the Defendant to serve thirty days of periodic confinement followed by two years of probation. The Defendant has appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion, erred in denying full probation, and erred in relying on hearsay statements in imposing sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court committed no reversible error. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jake L. Monroe, alias, appeals as of right from a jury conviction for possession with intent to sell and deliver a controlled substance within a drug-free school zone, a class B felony. The Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for correction of the judgment.

The Defendant, James Young, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 0-401. The trial court suspended the Defendant’s driver’s license for one year and sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration with all but thirty days to be served on probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI, first offense. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Joshua Beadle, and Co-Defendant, Lezuntra Knox, charging them with burglary of a building. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense and received a sentence of four years in the county workhouse. Defendant Knox was tried separately. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Lawrence County jury found appellant, JimmyEsters, guilty of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced appellant as a Range I, standard offender, to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument inappropriately shifted the burden of proof to appellant; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing him. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Van Buren County jury convicted Defendant, Ricky Dean Harvey, of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on a related charge of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and the trial court declared a mistrial as to that count. A fourth count of the indictment was resolved in a bench trial wherein the trial court found Defendant violated the implied consent law. The DUI charge was ultimately dismissed. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve eleven years for the cocaine conviction, concurrent with the sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the drug paraphernalia conviction. In his appeal, Defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver; (2) the stop and search of Defendant’s vehicle and the resulting arrest of Defendant violated Defendant’s constitutional rights and the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (3) the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive; and (4) Defendant “[l]acked the [m]ental [c]apacity for the [a]rrest and [t]rial [h]eld in this [m]atter.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Humphreys County jury convicted the Defendant, Tina M. Dixon, of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone and of possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress because the attachment order upon which she was arrested was unlawfully issued; (2) the trial court erred when it denied her motion to set aside her verdict because she was not properly charged with the crimes for which she was convicted; (3) she was denied due process of law because the presiding trial judge had previouslyprosecuted her for burglary and felony theft charges; (4) she was denied due process of law because the Assistant District Attorney General who prosecuted her case had previouslybeen her public defender when she was convicted of burglaryand felonytheft charges; and (5) the trial court erred when it enhanced her sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Pro se petitioner, Efrain Huerata Orduna, appeals the Circuit Court for Franklin County’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 31, 2007, petitioner pled guilty to first degree murder, aggravated rape, and aggravated kidnapping. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On April 4, 2011, almost four years after the judgments were entered, petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he did not understand the guilty plea proceedings and that other constitutional rights were violated. He failed to state any factual basis in the petition to explain its untimely filing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Daniel Ross McClellan, of rape of a child and incest. On remand for resentencing for the rape of a child following his first direct appeal, State v. Daniel Ross McClellan, No. E2009-00698-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2695657 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, July 8, 2010), the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. McClellan appeals the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a jury trial by relying on enhancement factors that were improperly submitted to the jury. The State concedes error but maintains that McClellan’s sentence is appropriate. Although we discern no reversible error, we remand to the trial court for correction of the judgment formsto reflect the date of the offense as shown in the indictment. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Nathan Cordell Burkeen,appeals the denialofhis petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, JeffreyB. Johnson, Jr., was tried on two counts of first degree (premeditated) murder,and after a jury trial was found guilty of two counts of voluntary manslaughter,Class C felonies. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years on each count, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of ten years. The defendant challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court, claiming error in the trial court’s application of certain enhancement factors, its failure to apply certain proffered mitigating factors, and its decision to order the defendant’s sentences to be served consecutively. Considering the State’s concession that the trial court’s application of two of the enhancement factors was error, the trial court’s failure to consider all of the evidence that was presented at trial during sentencing, and the state of the record before us, we conclude that this case should be remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

Rivera Peoples (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury conviction for first degree felony murder. In his appeal, he asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Doyle Everette Haney, was convicted of criminal responsibility for the facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class C felony, and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court merged the two convictions and imposed a sentence of thirty years as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the consistency of the verdicts, the jury instructions, and sentencing. All of his issues could be treated as waived for failure to comply with the requirements for appellate briefs. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). However, after a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jonathan W. Stephenson (“the Petitioner”) filed for habeas corpus relief, challenging his convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Following a hearing, the habeas corpus court dismissed the petition on the merits, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his judgment is facially void because his 1994 guilty plea rendered his 1990 jury conviction a nullity. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the Petitioner’s first degree murder conviction stems not from the 1994 guilty plea but from the 1990 jury verdict that was affirmed on direct appeal. Accordingly, the 2002 judgment sentencing the Petitioner to death on his underlying jury conviction for first degree murder was not facially void. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Tavaris Cantrell Brooks (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to one count of possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell and one count of possession of a firearm with intent to employ in the commission of a dangerous felony, and reserved a certified question regarding the legality of the search that led to his arrest. The State concedes that the trial court should have granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress and that his convictions must be reversed. We agree. Based on the illegality of the search leading to his arrest, and the necessary exclusion of the resulting evidence, we are constrained to reverse the Defendant’s convictions.

Lonnie Payne (“the Defendant”) was convicted of violating a protective order, aggravated assault, and aggravated criminal trespass. He received an effective sentence of five years plus eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse. The Defendant filed a petition seeking to suspend the remainder of his sentence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a suspended sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Eddie Wayne Shelton (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, one count of possession with the intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, and two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of ten years to be served in community corrections. Upon the filing of a revocation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and a probation revocation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s ruling. We affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The defendant, James Michael England, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. The trial court held a hearing on March 30, 2011, during which the defendant acknowledged his absence from his house during the home visits and his failure to report to the community corrections office. The court found the defendant in violation of his sentence to community corrections and ordered him to serve his remaining sentence in confinement. The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion because the defendant was in substantial compliance with the terms of his community corrections program. Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Crockett County Grand Jury indicted appellant, Jerry L. Crawford, Jr., for one count of statutory rape and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. A jury found him guilty of both counts, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of four years for statutory rape and eleven months, twenty-nine days for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the State’s evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim “knowing” that she was under the legal age of consent; and (2) whether appellant possessed knowledge of the victim’s age simultaneously with the intent to engage in intercourse with her. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant appeals the denial of his application for pretrial diversion, asserting that the prosecutor abused his discretion and that the trial court erred in affirming the prosecutor’s denial. The State concedes that the prosecutor failed to assign weight to the relevant factors in reaching the decision to denypretrial diversion. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

A jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Harvey Brian Cochran, of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to serve three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Cochran argues that the trial court erred at sentencing by allowing the State to introduce unreliable hearsay as proof of a prior conviction for enhancement purposes, by failing to consider the relevant mitigating factors, and by denying him an alternative sentence. Upon review we reverse the trial court’s denial of an alternative sentence and order Cochran to serve a sentence of split confinement, with ninety days to be served in periodic confinement at the county jail and the remainder of his three-year sentence to be served on supervised probation with the terms of his probation and periodic confinement to be determined by the trial court. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Robert Scribner,II, appeals the denialof his petition for post-conviction relief from his rape of a child conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for not hiring an independent expert to challenge DNA evidence that linked him to the crime. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner-Appellant, John R. Green, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his second petition for post-conviction relief, which the court treated as a motion to reopen his first petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner does not address any of the procedural issues for which the post-conviction court denied the second petition. He instead argues, as he did in his first petition for post-conviction relief, that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on a failure to communicate a plea offer and to present a defense at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Komoyangi Komoyangi, of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and he was sentenced to serve eleven months and twenty nine days in confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction given Komoyangi’s theory of self-defense. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.