APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Brandon Ackerman, of four counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor,see T.C.A. § 39-13-529(b)(1) (2006); two counts of child abuse, see id. § 39-15-401; and one count of rape of a child, see id. § 39-13-522, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 27 and one half years’ incarceration, 20 years of which was to be served at 100 percent by operation of law, see id. § 39-13-523(b). In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of his expert witness, by admitting into evidence a video recording of the victim’s forensic interview, by permitting three State’s witnesses to testify regarding the hearsay statements of the victim, and by denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statements to his ex-wife and to police. Because the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence the video recording of the forensic interview and the victim’s hearsay statements to three witnesses and because those errors cannot be classified as harmless, the judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.

The Defendant-Appellant, Nicholas Larsen, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. The transcript from the guilty plea hearing indicates that Larsen attempted to reserve a certified question of law on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. Although the judgment form references an attachment setting out Larsen’s certified question of law, no such attachment appears in the appellate record. Moreover, the record contains no corrective order filed prior to the filing of the notice of appeal in this case. Because Larsen failed to properly reserve a certified question, the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Jerome Sidney Barrett, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, for a 1975 homicide. See T.C.A. § 39-2403 (1975) (amended 1979, 1985) (renumbered at § 39-2-211) (repealed 1989). He was sentenced to forty-four years, to be served consecutively to a life sentence for a previous conviction. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the prosecution due to excessive pre-indictment delay; (4) the trial court erred in admitting evidence that the Defendant stated he “had killed before”; (5) the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask a defense witness whether he was arrested, suspended, and had resigned from the police force in 1978; (6) the trial court erred in allowing the forensic pathologist who performed the victim’s autopsy to testify as an expert in DNA analysis; (7) the trial court erred in permitting impeachment of a defense witness with evidence of a misdemeanor conviction; (8) the trial court erred in imposing a forty-four year sentence; and (9) the trial court erred in ordering the sentence to be served consecutively to the Defendant’s life sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Anthony Laren Tweedy, II (“the Defendant”) was convicted of initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, manufacture of methamphetamine, felony possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana. On appeal, the Defendant requests that this Court, under a plain error review, dismiss his conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine. He also asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions for initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, manufacture of methamphetamine, and felony possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant does not appeal his conviction for possession of marijuana. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine. We also reduce his conviction from felony to misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia and affirm as modified. However, we reverse and dismiss the Defendant’s conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine.

A Wayne County jury convicted Appellant, Wesley Trent Reaves, of theft of property worth more than $1,000 but less than $10,000. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eight years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State’s witnesses were mistaken or lied during their testimonyat trial and that the trial court erred in imposing an eight-year sentence because it failed to apply a mitigating factor. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the trier of fact is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses. We also determine that although the trial court erred in failing to apply the mitigating factor in question, Appellant’s criminal history more than supports the imposition of an eight-year sentence. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Leonard Miller, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000 and ordering the remainder of his ten-year sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Robert D.Conner, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissalof his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner attacks his convictions for second degree murder and aggravated assault following a jury trial in which he was charged with first degree murder and aggravated assault. The sole ground for relief argued on appeal is that Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to file a written motion pre-trial for the severance of offenses, since the charges involved two different victims and occurred on different days. After a thorough review of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Appellant, Charles Middlebrook, was indicted in two separate cases for one count of theft of property over $1,000, one count of theft of property over $500, and three counts of assault. After negotiation with the State, Appellant pled guilty to one count of theft of property over $1,000 and one count of simple assault. The remaining counts were dismissed. Appellant was sentenced to eight years as a Range III, persistent offender for the conviction for theft of property and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the conviction for assault. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly denied an alternative sentence. Because the record supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant had a lengthy prior record and repeated unwillingness to comply with a sentence involving release in the community, we affirm the trial court’s denial of an alternative sentence.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of rape, a Class B felony, and incest, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the defendant raises numerous challenges to his convictions and sentences. The defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. However, his argument is based on alleged inconsistencies in the evidence, and conflicts in the evidence provide no basis for reversing a defendant’s convictions. The defendant claims that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of a police officer concerning statements that the defendant made to his wife in the officer’s presence because these statements were protected by the martial privilege. However, we conclude that the statements were not privileged because the defendant had no reasonable expectation that they would remain confidential. The defendant claims that these same statements should also have been excluded because the officer did not give the defendant his Miranda warnings. However, this claim must fail because the defendant was neither in custody nor being interrogated by the police at the time the statements were made. The defendant claims that the trial court erred by admitting an exhibit containing a nurse’s handwritten notes repeating certain statements made by the victim concerning the cause of her injuries,because these statements were inadmissible under the hearsay rule. However, the trial court properly admitted the statements under the excited utterance exception to that rule. The defendant claims that the trial court erred by giving a pattern rape instruction that included references to “fellatio” and “cunnilingus” because there was no evidence presented at trial establishing that the defendant had committed either act. However, we conclude that the instruction at issue fully and accurately stated the law. The defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted certain exhibits because no chain of custody had been established, but this argument has been waived. The defendant challenges his ten-year effective sentence as excessive, but after thorough review we can discern no error in the defendant’s sentencing. Finally, the defendant claims that the 2005 Sentencing Act is unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 302 (2005), but we conclude that binding precedent firmly establishes that the 2005 Sentencing Act complies with Blakely. Consequently, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Appellant, Monroe James Dodson, Jr. and his co-defendants were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony. Appellant pled guilty to one count of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a weapon during a felony with prior convictions. The trial court held a separate sentencing hearing and sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eighty-two years. Appellant appeals both the length of his sentences and the imposition of consecutive sentences. After a review of the record on appeal, we have determined that the enhancement factors used by the trial court were supported by the record and that, therefore, the length of the sentences is affirmed. We also conclude that the record on appeal supports the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant is a dangerous offender and that consecutive sentences are warranted in his case. For these reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Shirea Barber, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with ten days’ confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant,JeffreyOsborne,was convicted by a Williamson County jury of burglary and theft of property valued up to $500. Appellant’s sole argument on appeal is that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of burglary because it failed to establish that Appellant lacked effective consent to enter the building that was the basis of the burglary charge. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, we find that a rational trier of fact could conclude that Appellant lacked effective consent. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Marty Joe Kelley, appeals after a lengthy jury trial during which a Rutherford County Jury convicted him of six counts of rape of a child, three counts of aggravated sexual battery, nine counts of rape without consent, twenty-five counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Appellant was sentenced to an effective thirty-nine year sentence, to be served at 100%. On appeal, Appellant argues: (1) the trial court improperly allowed the State to refer to the victim as “the victim” throughout the trial; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by referring to the victim as “the victim” throughout the trial; (3) the trial court improperly restricted defense counsel’s opening statement; (4) the trial court improperly allowed a State’s witness to remain unsequestered during trial; (5) the trial court erred by denying a mistrial; (6) the trial court improperly allowed the State’s witness to display and explain a speculum during testimony about the physical examination of the victim; (7) the trial court erred by “repeatedly” allowing the State to introduce hearsay; (8) the trial court improperly charged the jury regarding the offenses of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery; (9) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions;(10)the trial court improperly enhanced Appellant’s sentences; and (11) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough and complete review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude:
(1) Appellant waived any issue with regard to references to “the victim” during trial by failure to object; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Appellant from reading a letter written by the victim to Appellant during opening statements where there was some confusion as to whether the State received the letter during discovery; (3) Appellant failed to show that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct alleged affected the verdict to the prejudice of Appellant; (4) Appellant waived any issue with respect to Detective Duke’s remaining in the courtroom for failure to object, and, any error is harmless; (5) Appellant waived any review of whether the trial court should have granted a mistrial because he failed to seek a mistrial; (6) Appellant waived any complaint with respect to Hollye Gallion’s testimony at trial for failure to object to the use of the speculum as demonstrative evidence, and, in the alternative, the trial court did not abuse its discretion; (7) Appellant waived most of the hearsay issues for failure to object at trial; (8) the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of Mr. Perry that the victim never told him about the abuse; (9) Appellant’s sentences for rape of a child were improperly enhanced to twenty-three years because the trial court applied enhancement factors that were neither found by the jury nor admitted by Appellant; (10) the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentencing where Appellant was convicted of two of more offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor; (11) Appellant is not entitled to plain error review of the jury instructions; and (12) the State improperly elected facts for Count Five. Consequently, Appellant’s conviction in Count Five for rape of a child is reversed and remanded for a new trial. Appellant’s remaining sentences for rape of a child in Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and Six, are hereby modified to twenty years. Additionally, the trial court should enter a corrected judgment in Count Fifty and Fifty-eight to reflect Appellant’s conviction as soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified in part, and remanded.
 

The Petitioner, Mario Bateman, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Joshua A. Randolph, was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury in March of 2010 for aggravated assault and domestic assault after an altercation took place at the home occupied by his estranged wife and children. Appellant was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of assault. He was acquitted of domestic assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days of probation. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On appeal he insists that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense. After a review of the record, we conclude, as the State concedes, that the trial court did err in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense where the evidence fairly raised a contested issue of fact, i.e., whether Appellant was in the home with consent of the lawful resident when the altercation took place, and therefore entitled to raise self-defense because he claimed he was attacked. As a result, the jury instructions failed to inform the jury of the applicable law. Consequently, Appellant’s conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial.

The Defendant, Janice Gates, pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to a concurrent sentence of six years for each conviction and ordered her to serve eighteen months in confinement before being released on probation for the remainder of the sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying a sentence of full probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a Shelby County jury trial, the Defendant, DeWayne Collier, was convicted of aggravated statutory rape. At the time of the crime, the Defendant was forty-two years old and the victim was fourteen years old. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the fourteen-year-old victim was an accomplice and there was not sufficient corroborating evidence. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, we conclude that the victim is legally an accomplice regardless of the fact that she cannot be indicted for her own statutory rape. However, we also determine that there is additional evidence to adequately corroborate her testimony. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Willie Perry, Jr., pled guilty to two counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, each a Class D felony, and was sentenced to serve, in prison, two twelve-year sentences to run concurrently with each other. The petitioner brought this post-conviction petition, seeking relief on the basis that his trial counsel failed to investigate and advise him regarding the possibility that the property was valued at less than $1,000. The post-conviction trial court denied the claim, and the petitioner appeals the denial of relief and the trial court’s refusal to admit certain evidence regarding the property’s value. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. Indeed, I join in the majority opinion on all but one issue. I write separately to address the issue of the appropriate standard of review by this Court on hearsay evidentiary issues. The majority applies an abuse of discretion standard of review to the hearsay issue in this case.

The Petitioner, Quinton Albert Cage, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his convictions and sentences were illegal because the United States Constitution did not authorize the Tennessee Legislature to create criminal statutes. Upon motion by the State, the habeas court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his judgments were facially void and noting that nothing on the face of the judgments indicated that the underlying sentences were invalid. Following our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the summary dismissal by the habeas court.

The pro se petitioner, Terry Lewis, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis attacking his convictions for first degree murder and attempted robbery. Petitioner claims that a report indicating that authorities performed a fingerprint analysis on a shell casing found near petitioner’s apartment is new evidence. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.
 

The Defendant, Devonte Black, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to one year of incarceration followed by three years on probation after release from confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it imposed a sentence of split confinement, specifically when it: (1) denied full probation; and (2) denied judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Lake County jury convicted the Defendant, Demp Douglas, of one count of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial based upon the victim’s testimony that he met the Defendant shortly after the Defendant was released from prison. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Timothy L. Dulworth, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his convictions are void. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Terrance Antonio Cecil, of assault and false imprisonment, both Class A misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of six months incarceration, with all but sixty days on each suspended, followed by ten months on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it considered his prior arrest record in sentencing; and (3) the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of attempted false imprisonment and attempted assault. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.