APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Joshua Jermaine Whitehead (“the Defendant”) pled guilty in February 2004 to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery and one count of aggravated assault. The Defendant was sentenced in May 2004 as a Range I offender to an effective sentence of nine years, suspended after service of one year. Due to repeated probation violations, the Defendant eventually served his entire sentence in confinement. The Defendant was released on August 19, 2011. On October 5, 2011, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he was not informed of the lifetime community supervision consequence of his conviction for the sex offense. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Steven Linton Griffith, was convicted in Sullivan County of both the sale and delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone. See State v. Steve Griffith, No. E2008-01962-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1956713, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jul. 8, 2009), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2009). The trial court merged the convictions into a single judgment. Appellant appealed. Id. This Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court on appeal. Id. Appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. Appellant argues on appeal that the petition was improperly denied. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Anthony Troy Williams,was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for driving on a canceled, suspended or revoked license, second offense. Appellant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to six months in jail and a fine of $2,500. On appeal, Appellant, pro se, challenges the constitutionality of the State’s requirement that he have a license to drive in Tennessee. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant was properly convicted of driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, Louis W. Alford, was convicted of second degree murder in Coffee County in 1990. As a result, Appellant received a forty-year sentence. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant’s sentence and conviction. State v. Louis William Alford, No. 01C019110CC00300, 1992 WL 50968, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 19, 1992), perm. app. denied, concurring in results only (Tenn. Jun. 15, 1992). In a separate case, Appellant pled guilty to several charges and received a four-year sentence. This sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to the second degree murder sentence. On direct appeal from the burglary conviction, this Court remanded the matter for resentencing because the judgment form failed to reflect the range of punishment. State v. Louis William Alford, No. 01-C01-9007CR00170, 1991 WL 4951, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 24, 1991). On remand, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender. Appellant again initiated an appeal, arguing that his five prior felonies could not be used to enhance his sentence because they pre-dated the Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. This Court affirmed the sentence on appeal. State v. Louis William Alford, No. 01C01-9108CC00227, 1992 WL 50963, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 19, 1992), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jun. 8, 1992). Appellant filed a motion to correct his sentence in September of 2011, in which he complained about the miscalculation of his parole date and joinder of his sentences for burglary and second degree murder. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, a notice of appeal. The trial court issued a second order in which it determined that it had no authority to order the relief sought by Appellant. Appellant filed a notice of appeal. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that Appellant does not have an appeal as of right from the order under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Defendants, Oscar E. Ochoa and Beatriz Ochoa, were indicted by the Bradley County Grand Jury for possession of between 10 and 70 pounds of marijuana with intent to sell. Defendants filed applications for Rule 9 interlocutory appeal seeking our review of the trial court’s ruling that the State did not abuse its discretion when the Assistant District Attorney General denied Defendants’ applications for pretrial diversion. Defendants’ cases were consolidated on appeal. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly affirmed the State’s denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On January 18, 2011, Petitioner, Kevin DeWitt Ford, filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. He subsequently submitted two amended petitions, also pro se. Petitioner attacked seven convictions in the Davidson County Criminal Court for aggravated robbery. Petitioner pled guilty to the offenses but reserved for appeal a certified question of law. On appeal, this court affirmed the convictions. State of Tennessee v. Kevin DeWitt Ford and Clifford Sylvester Wright, No. M2003-00957-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 677280 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2005) perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2005). Petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition was denied by the trial court. This Court affirmed. Kevin DeWitt Ford v. State of Tennessee, No. M2007-01727-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 564226 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2009) perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2009). The coram nobis court dismissed the petition, as amended, without an evidentiary hearing, on two bases. First, the petition was filed outside the applicable statue of limitations. Second, even if the petition had been timely field, it did not state a cognizable claim for a writ of error coram nobis. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

On March 31, 1994, the petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and was sentenced as a Range I offender to fifteen years for each count. The plea agreement required the sentences to be served consecutively. The petitioner brought a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose consecutive sentences and that the judgments were consequently void. The trial court denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, and theft of property over $500, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 25 years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss his indictment or suppress testimony regarding destroyed evidence; (2) allowing the State to present certain photographs taken of the defendant, on grounds that they were not properly authenticated; and (3) ordering him to serve his sentence on the attempted aggravated burglary consecutively to his sentence for aggravated burglary because both crimes should have been considered part of the same criminal episode. We conclude that the defendant has waived the first claim by virtue of his failure to prepare an adequate brief and record and that the trial court did not err by allowing admitting the photographs and ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly.

The appellant, Devarick D. Nicks, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to two counts of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Larry Wade, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. Following a pretrial hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress, which the trial court took under advisement, Defendant entered a guilty plea to second degree murder on the same day as the suppression hearing. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied after two separate hearings. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court’s failure to rule on his motion to suppress prior to accepting his guilty plea violated his due process rights, and consequently, Defendant’s guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered, and Defendant asserts that it was a manifest injustice to deny Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, William Fisher, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. He contends that his sentence has expired. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Francisco Miquel Jose,appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that his 2004 guilty plea to misdemeanor theft of property was not knowingly made because he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, that the statute of limitations should be tolled because Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), announced a new rule of constitutional law that did not exist at the time of his plea, and that due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations due to the circumstances surrounding his guiltyplea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Calvin D. Norris, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 conviction for possession with intent to sell one-half gram or less of cocaine and his ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Willie Lewis, was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) excluding relevant testimony regarding the victim’s tattoo, (2) not permitting the Defendant to refer to the victim’s tattoo during closing argument, and (3) issuing a flight instruction that was not supported by the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Aldrick D. Lillard, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court committed reversible errors by (1) refusing to allow the Petitioner to amend his petition for postconviction relief during the evidentiary hearing; (2) finding that the post-conviction hearing testimony from the assistant district attorney regarding his discussions during trial with the Petitioner’s trial counsel was irrelevant; and (3) concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his trial attorneys were ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court merged the Petitioner’s two conspiracy convictions but found that the Petitioner failed to prove any additional allegations in his petition for relief. Following our review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s ruling prohibiting the Petitioner from amending his petition during the evidentiary hearing.We also conclude that the post-conviction court’s finding that the prosecutor’s testimony was irrelevant was in error, albeit harmless. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Leslie Jacquinte Fetters, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery and agreed to allow the trial court to determine his sentence. The plea agreement was based upon the Defendant being sentenced as a Range I offender to concurrent sentences. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven years, at 30%, for each conviction and ordered that the sentences run concurrently as contemplated by the plea agreement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Kenneth Edward Watts, of vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 and attempted theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for attempted theft of property. We determine that sufficient evidence exists to support the defendant’s conviction of attempted theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 and affirm that judgment. We conclude, however, that the trial court’s order concerning the vandalism count is inconsistent with the trial court’s ruling at the motion for new trial hearing. Therefore, we remand as to that count for entry of a corrected order properly effectuating the intent of the trial court.

The Defendant, Dennis Marshall, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of possession with intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a multiple offender to sixteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court committed plain error (2) by denying him an open and public trial; (3) by admitting hearsay statements into evidence; (4) by admitting evidence of other investigations; (5) by admitting evidence of the utility account holder at the home in which the drugs were found; (6) by admitting evidence about his having money but no job; (7) by admitting nonexpert testimony about the value of the cocaine found at the crime scene; (8) by admitting evidence about the recovery of a razor blade at the scene; and (9) by admitting evidence of his personal relationship with a minor female. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner,Antwain TapaigeSales,appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting forty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in determining that he failed to satisfy the threshold burden to warrant an additional hearing regarding whether the statute of limitations should have been tolled due to his mental incompetence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the following charges against the Defendant, Jimmy Joyner: driving under the influence ("DUI"), third offense; violation of the open container law; and failure to maintain a traffic lane. The trial court dismissed the charges finding that the State had not commenced prosecution before the expiration of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court improperly dismissed the charges because the Defendant waived his preliminary hearing and agreed to allow the case to be bound over to the grand jury before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for reinstatement of the indictments against the Defendant.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Mark Takashi, of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies. The trial court merged the convictions, and the appellant received a twenty-five-year sentence to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself at trial and that his sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the post-conviction court erred in failing to allow the Petitioner to amend his petition during the evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner sought to amend his petition to allege another ground for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the amendment would have raised the issue of trial counsel’s failure to assert the trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial in the Petitioner’s motion for new trial or on direct appeal. The motion for a mistrial related to the admission of impermissible character evidence regarding prior, uncharged bad acts during the prosecutor’s opening statement.

The Petitioner, Jason Clinard, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner, who was convicted of first degree murder, contends that his conviction was illegal because he was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, which he states contravenes statute. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
 

The petitioner, Ricardo Rodriguez, brings a post-conviction challenge to his 2004 guilty plea for sale of a controlled substance based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010), in which the Court concluded that trial counsel’s failure to advise a defendant that his guilty plea would result in deportation amounted to deficient representation. In this case, the post-conviction petition was not filed within the one-year limitations period specified by the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and it was dismissed by the post-conviction court based on the statute of limitations at Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-30-102(a). The petitioner contends that Padilla should be retroactively applied and that his claim falls into an exception to the statute of limitations for new constitutional rules with retrospective application. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102(b)(1) (2006). Alternatively, the petitioner claims that due process tolls the statute of limitations or that the rule is an old rule with retroactive application. The petitioner also challenges the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea and brings a habeas corpus challenge based on his incomplete knowledge of English. We conclude that, because Padilla does not warrant retroactive application and because due process does not require the statute of limitations to be tolled, the petition was time-barred. We further conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied relief on the petitioner’s remaining claims and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

On March 6, 2008, the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Seth Haley, was indicted in case number 199-2008 for violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender’s Act (MVHOA), evading arrest, possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conviction of two or more prior offenses of simple possession or casual exchange of a controlled substance thatcould be used to enhance his punishment for the third offense of simple possession of a controlled substance pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-418(e). On June 6, 2008, Haley was indicted in case number 4502008 for possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver. On March 30, 2009, he entered guiltypleas in case number 199-2008 to the offenses of violating the MVHOA and evading arrest, Class E felonies, and in case number 450-2008 to the offense of possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining charges in case number 199-2008. On June 10, 2010, Haley was indicted in case number 439-2010 for felony escape and two counts of felony failure to appear. On September 30, 2010, Haley entered a guilty plea in case number 439-2010 to one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining counts in that case number. On December 10, 2010, the trial court sentenced Haley as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of two years for violating the MVHOA conviction, two years for the evading arrest conviction, and ten years for the possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver conviction. The court also sentenced Haley as a Range II, multiple offender to a consecutive sentence of four years for the felony failure to appear conviction, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Haley contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider any mitigating factors before imposing his sentence and erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.