APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was indicted on one count of driving under the influence (DUI) and one alternative count of driving with a blood alcohol content of .08 or higher. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to  suppress certain evidence obtained by the police on the grounds that the defendant was arrested without probable cause. The trial judge granted this motion and ultimately dismissed both counts. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by determining that the arresting officer did not have probable cause. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the trial court committed no error and affirm its judgment accordingly.

A Jefferson County jury convicted appellant, Brandon Sean Sutton, of first degree murder, and he received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, appellant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted certain photographs; (3) emotional displays from the victim’s family violated his right to a fair trial; (4) the evidence did not support the sentence of life without parole; (5) the victim impact evidence was improper; and (6) the trial judge did not follow proper procedure when selecting the manner in which he removed alternate jurors. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jonathan Austin, was indicted by the Greene County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Harold Bernard Schaffer (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and (4) the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The capital Petitioner, William Glenn Rogers, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s order denying his initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his merged first degree murder conviction and death sentence for the killing of nine-year-old Jacqueline Beard, as well as his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and two counts of criminal impersonation. The Petitioner received an effective sentence of forty-eight (48) years’ imprisonment for his non-capital offenses. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in both the trial and appellate proceedings related to these convictions and sentences and because multiple other constitutional violations call into question the validity of these convictions and sentences. After a careful and laborious review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Kendell Edward Johnson, appeals from his jury conviction for second degree murder, for which he received a fifteen-year sentence. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by admitting the redacted recording of a conversation between the Defendant and his father made at the police station following the Defendant’s arrest on an unrelated charge, (2) that the trial court erred by permitting the irrelevant testimony of the victim’s brother, and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Roger Harper, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of evading arrest. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I, standard offender to three years and six months. The trial court set the sentence to run consecutivelyto a five-year diversion sentence imposed under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 that Appellant was serving from another case. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred because: (1) the jury failed to specify that it found the aggravating factors required to find Appellant guilty of a Class D felony and furthermore, the trial court sentenced Appellant as if the conviction was a Class D felony; (2) Appellant’s sentence is excessive due to the presence of mitigating factors that the trial court failed to find; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the trial court committed no error. However, the judgment form must be corrected to reflect that Appellant was convicted of the Class D felony. Therefore, we affirm Appellant’s conviction and sentence but remand for the trial court to enter a corrected judgment.

The defendant, Mauricio Morales, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of three counts of rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated burglary, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and that the 100-year effective sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Curtis Harper, was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony, employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, a Class C felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210(a)(1) (2010), 39-12-101(a) (2010), 39-17-1324 (Supp. 2008) (amended 2009), 39-13-102(a)(1)(A) (2006) (amended 2009, 2010, 2011). The trial court merged the aggravated assault convictions into the attempted second degree murder conviction, and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years’ confinement for attempted second degree murder and six years for employing a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for attempted second degree murder. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but we vacate the aggravated assault and attempted second degree murder judgments and remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the merger of the aggravated assault convictions into the conviction for attempted second degree murder.

The petitioner, Laura June Bowling, filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief challenging her guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder for which she received a sentence of 15 years’ incarceration. Following the appointment of counsel and the exhaustion of the one-year limitations period, the petitioner entered into an agreed order with the State withdrawing her petition. The post-conviction court then dismissed the petition with prejudice. The petitioner now appeals the dismissal order, alleging that her withdrawal of the petition was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Discerning no error in the postconviction court’s dismissal, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Carl Randle, of aggravated assault and attempted voluntary manslaughter. The trial court merged the convictions and ordered the Defendant to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it denied him an alternative sentence. Finding no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Travis Vaughn, appeals the decision of the Dyer County Circuit Court revoking his probationary sentence. The defendant pled guilty in the Dyer County Circuit Court to three counts of non-support of a minor child and received three consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days, all suspended to probation but for thirty days. Thereafter, a violation report was filed charging the defendant with multiple violations of the terms and conditions of his probation. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation as the case was not properly commenced; and (2) that the determination to revoke was error as it conflicts with public policy. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the revocation of probation.

A Campbell County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, James R. Troxell, of two counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 56 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and the trial court’s allowing witness testimony which, the defendant alleges, improperly bolstered the victim’s testimony. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Charged by the Knox County Criminal Court grand jury with the sale and delivery of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, the defendant, MarcusTerrell Johnson, pleaded guilty to the sale of cocaine and agreed to a 10-year suspended sentence. The trial court entered the judgment on April 7, 2011, but on May 6, 2011, the State obtained a probation revocation warrant that alleged that the defendant had not reported for probation, that his whereabouts were unknown, and, by a later-filed amendment, that he was arrested for theft and did not report the arrest. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. In his timely appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by revoking the probation and ordering him into confinement. Because the record supports the trial court’s order, we affirm.

A Scott County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Lawrence V. Kline, of one count of the sale of a schedule IV controlled substance (Xanax), and the trial court sentenced the defendant to two years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence the two Xanax pills. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

The Defendant, Mitchell Jarod Ford, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of arson and aggravated burglary, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-301, 39-14-403 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to two concurrent fifteen-year terms. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively to three previous sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by imposing fifteen years’ confinement for each conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Marshall County Grand Jury returned two indictments against Defendant, John Edward Lynch, charging him with violation of the Habitual Motor Offenders Act (count one), eleventh offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) (count two), and violation of the implied consent law (count three) in Case No. 08-CR-16 and felony failure to appear in Case No. 08-CR-98. Following two jury trials, Defendant was convicted of the offenses. He was sentenced to four years for violation of the Habitual Motor Offenders Act, three years for eleventh offense DUI, eleven months, twenty-nine days for violation of the implied consent law, and four years for felony failure to appear. The trial court ordered count three of case no. 08-CR-16 to run concurrently to count one,and the remaining counts in case nos. 08-CR-16 and 08-CR-98 were ordered to run consecutively with each other for an effective eleven-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on necessity; (3) that the trial court erred in denying his request for a continuance in case no. 08-CR-98; and (4) that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Denny James McAbee, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for the offenses of aggravated burglary, evading arrest, and criminal impersonation. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement,he pled guilty to aggravated burglary as a persistent offender with a range of punishment of not less than 12 years nor more than 15 years. According to the plea agreement, the exact length of the sentence and the manner of its service would be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. The other charges were dismissed. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 14 years, rejected Defendant’s request to receive the only alternative sentence legally available, which was community corrections, and thus ordered Defendant to serve the sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court should have ordered the sentence to be served in the community corrections program. Defendant does not contest the length of the sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, James Kenneth Womble, pled guilty to driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUI), first offense, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. He properly reserved a certified question of law for appeal. The question of the law is dispositive of the case. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Thanath Sayadeth, appeals from the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Chris Brown, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and being a felon in possession of a handgun, for which he is serving an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly made. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Davidson County Criminal Court denied the Petitioner, Christopher A. Davis, post-conviction relief from his convictions on two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, but granted relief from his sentence of death and ordered a new capital sentencing hearing. The Petitioner appeals the denial of a new trial and the State appeals the granting of a new sentencing hearing. Having discerned no error, we affirm the order of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Ophelia L. Lomax, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from her convictions for aggravated child abuse by causing serious bodily injury and aggravated child abuse by neglect or endangering a child. On appeal, she contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (1) meet with her or discuss with her the nature of the charges and her potential defenses, (2) call an expert witness at the trial to contest the issue of serious bodily injury, and (3) raise an issue of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Patrick Stout, was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. At the sentencing hearing for the felony murder conviction, the jury found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person; (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; and (3) the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any robbery or kidnapping. T.C.A. § 39-13-204(1)(2), (6) (Supp. 1995). The jury also found that the evidence of these aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed a sentence of death for the Petitioner’s felony murder conviction. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to forty years for each of his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, to be served consecutively to one another and consecutively to the death sentence. On direct appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. See State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689 (Tenn. 2001). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was later amended by appointed counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court entered an order in which it denied the Petitioner post-conviction relief from each of his three convictions and his sentences for the convictions of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. The post-conviction court’s order granted the Petitioner post-conviction relief from his sentence of death, ordering that the Petitioner have a new sentencing hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s order denying relief regarding the guilt phase of trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

Appellant, James Edward Church, Jr., pled guilty to eleven counts of theft of property valued at less than $500, three counts of burglary, one count of resisting arrest, four counts of auto burglary, and one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 in Bedford County. The trial court was to determine the manner and length of the sentences at a sentencing hearing. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of approximately twelve years and six months. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a review of the record and the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.