APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Jason Clinard, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner, who was convicted of first degree murder, contends that his conviction was illegal because he was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, which he states contravenes statute. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
 

The petitioner, Ricardo Rodriguez, brings a post-conviction challenge to his 2004 guilty plea for sale of a controlled substance based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010), in which the Court concluded that trial counsel’s failure to advise a defendant that his guilty plea would result in deportation amounted to deficient representation. In this case, the post-conviction petition was not filed within the one-year limitations period specified by the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and it was dismissed by the post-conviction court based on the statute of limitations at Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-30-102(a). The petitioner contends that Padilla should be retroactively applied and that his claim falls into an exception to the statute of limitations for new constitutional rules with retrospective application. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102(b)(1) (2006). Alternatively, the petitioner claims that due process tolls the statute of limitations or that the rule is an old rule with retroactive application. The petitioner also challenges the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea and brings a habeas corpus challenge based on his incomplete knowledge of English. We conclude that, because Padilla does not warrant retroactive application and because due process does not require the statute of limitations to be tolled, the petition was time-barred. We further conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied relief on the petitioner’s remaining claims and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

On March 6, 2008, the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Seth Haley, was indicted in case number 199-2008 for violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender’s Act (MVHOA), evading arrest, possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conviction of two or more prior offenses of simple possession or casual exchange of a controlled substance thatcould be used to enhance his punishment for the third offense of simple possession of a controlled substance pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-418(e). On June 6, 2008, Haley was indicted in case number 4502008 for possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver. On March 30, 2009, he entered guiltypleas in case number 199-2008 to the offenses of violating the MVHOA and evading arrest, Class E felonies, and in case number 450-2008 to the offense of possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining charges in case number 199-2008. On June 10, 2010, Haley was indicted in case number 439-2010 for felony escape and two counts of felony failure to appear. On September 30, 2010, Haley entered a guilty plea in case number 439-2010 to one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining counts in that case number. On December 10, 2010, the trial court sentenced Haley as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of two years for violating the MVHOA conviction, two years for the evading arrest conviction, and ten years for the possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver conviction. The court also sentenced Haley as a Range II, multiple offender to a consecutive sentence of four years for the felony failure to appear conviction, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Haley contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider any mitigating factors before imposing his sentence and erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Marc A. Crowder, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated assault and aggravated robbery and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of nine years in the Department of Correction. He raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether he was denied his constitutional right to a jury of his peers by the lack of a fair cross-representation of the community among the venire members; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Richard Hanke, Sr., entered a plea of guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to robbery (count one), aggravated burglary (count two), aggravated assault (count three), and two counts of kidnapping (counts four and five), all Class C felonies. He additionally pleaded guilty to retaliation for past action (count six) and possession of a weapon with intent to employ in offense (count seven), both Class E felonies. The trial court imposed a term of six years’ confinement for the robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and each kidnapping. It further imposed a sentence of two years for possession of a weapon with intent to employ in offense and retaliation for past action. The trial court ordered the concurrent term of six years’ confinement in counts one, two, and four to be served consecutively to the concurrent term of six years’ confinement imposed in counts three, five, and seven. Count six was ordered to be served consecutively to all other counts, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering partially consecutive sentencing. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Klein Adlei Rawlins, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole and twenty years. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred: (1) by concluding that he received the effective assistance of counsel; and (2) by denying his request for funds to assist post-conviction counsel in investigation of the post-conviction petition. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of relief.

The Petitioner, Carlos C. Beasley, pro se, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 1998 especially aggravated robbery conviction and resulting twenty-four-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him habeas corpus relief. He argues that his conviction and sentence are void because the indictment was defective. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Cortino Harris, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate and call at trial several eyewitnesses to the crime. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Christopher Wheeler, entered open guilty pleas to twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of aggravated statutory rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve sixteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court’s sentence is excessive and contrary to law and that concurrent sentencing on all counts would have been appropriate. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court did consider the purposes and principles of the sentencing act, that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the length of the Defendant’s sentence. Thus, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Nickalos Boyce, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Ian Michael Boone Parks, was charged by criminal information with one count of aggravated assault in Claiborne County. Appellant pled guilty, and the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a five-year sentence of confinement as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court was not supported by the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we have determined that Appellant failed to include both the transcript of the guilty plea and the presentence report. These documents are necessary for an adequate review of the issues presented. Because we do not have these documents, we must conclude that the trial court’s sentences are supported by the evidence. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Putnam County jury convicted the Defendant, Gerald Eugene White, of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and simple possession of oxycodone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed testimony in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (3) the State made an improper closing argument; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant as a career offender. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Clois Dean Asbury, of driving under the influence (DUI), seventh offense; leaving the scene of an accident involving injury; and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage greater than $400. In addition, the trial court found that he violated the implied consent law. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective sentence of two years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days to be served in confinement for the convictions. As a result of his violating the implied consent law, his driver’s license was suspended for one year. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecuting officer to testify as the State’s fourth witness, (2) the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment or give a special jury instruction when the State lost evidence, and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Robert Blake Ball, was convicted by a Greene County jury of attempted second degree murder and sentenced to eleven years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, Ball challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Randy Parham, of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. On remand for resentencing following Parham’s first appeal, State v. Randy Parham, No. W2009-02576-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 5271612 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2010), the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty-five years. In this appeal, Parham argues that the trial court erred by (1) ordering the sentences for attempted first degree murder and aggravated robbery to be served consecutively, (2) ordering the sentence for attempted first degree murder to be served at one hundred percent release eligibility as a “violent” offense, and (3) failing to state on the record which enhancement factors it applied to which offenses while at the same time applying a non-statutory enhancement factor. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in part and reverse them in part. We also note the need for entry of corrected judgments. The case is remanded for entry of judgments in accordance with this opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Robin Elizabeth Willis, was convicted by a Hawkins County jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender and ordered her to serve three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Willis argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; and (2) her sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted Defendant, Mario Jones, of possession of more than 50 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty years as a Range I standard offender. In his appeal, Defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) the stop of Defendant’s vehicle and the subsequent detention of Defendant violated his constitutional rights, and the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion tosuppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction; (3) the trial court improperly allowed Lieutenant Queen to testify concerning the calendar, notes, and pills found in Defendant’s vehicle; (4) the trialcourt erred in finding that chain of custody had been established; and (5) the trial court erred in rejecting Defendant’s proposed mitigating factor. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOSEPH M. TIPTON, P.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to convict the Defendant. I respectfully disagree, however, with its conclusions that the victim was particularly vulnerable and that the three-year sentence should be served in confinement

The defendant, Sherri Mathis, appeals her Warren County Circuit Court jury convictions of two counts of felony murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2006); two counts of aggravated child abuse of a child six years of age or less, see id. § 39-15-402(a)(1), (b); two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child six years of age or less, see id.; one count of child abuse of a child six years of age or less, see id. §39-15-401(a); and two counts of aggravated child abuse, see id. § 39-15-402(a)(1). At sentencing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus 32 years’ incarceration. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court erroneously denied her motion for continuance, (2) the trial court erroneously admitted photographs of the deceased victim, (3) the trial court erroneously denied her motion to dismiss the indictment based upon a fatal variance, (4) the trial court erroneously denied a motion for mistrial, (5) the trial court erroneously allowed the State to call the defendant’s civil attorney as a witness knowing that the attorney would claim privilege, (6) the trial court erroneously limited testimony of defendant’s expert witness,(7)the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during opening statements and closing arguments, and (8) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Additionally, the defendant contends that the trial court erroneously dismissed her petition for writ of error coram nobis and erroneously denied her the right to depose Doctor Bruce Levy concerning the claims contained in the coram nobis petition. We discern that the trial court failed to merge certain counts and failed to enter judgments as corrected at the hearing on the motion for new trial. We further conclude that the State failed to establish serious bodily injury with respect to the defendant’s convictions of aggravated child abuse in Counts Eight and Nine and direct the trial court on remand to enter judgments reflecting convictions of child abuse and three-year sentences. Accordingly,the case is remanded for the trial court to enter modified judgments in Counts Eight and Nine, judgments effectuating proper merger, and judgments reflecting modified sentences, and we affirm the judgments in all other respects.
 

The Defendant, Joshua Paul Lewis, was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape of a child and one count of attempted rape of a child. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years on each of the rape convictions and to ten years on the attempted rape conviction, all sentences to run concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal due to variances between the bill of particulars and the proof at trial; and (3) he was denied a fair trial due to cumulative error. After a review of the record and relevant authorities, we have determined that the Defendant’s issue are waived for failing to preserve them in a timely filed motion for new trial. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Appellant,Terrance Gabriel Carter,pled guilty in Marshall County to five counts of violating the sex offender registration act in two separate cases with the length and manner of service of sentence to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of five years. Appellant appeals his sentence, arguing that it is excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Elijah Truitt, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct his sentence, claiming that his sentence is illegal. The petitioner’s claim that the trial court erroneously imposed a day-for-day service requirement to his 11-year effective sentence is without merit. Thus, the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petitioner’s motion to correct his sentence is affirmed. The record suggests, however, that the trial court failed to grant him credit for time spent on community corrections as required by law. In consequence, we remand the case to afford the pro se petitioner the opportunity to amend his original pleading to a petition for writ of habeas corpus and for the trial court to determine whether the petitioner was given credit to which he is statutorily entitled.

The defendant, Kailyn Loren McKeown, entered a best interest plea to one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), see T.C.A. § 55-10-401, and reserved a certified question of law concerning the propriety of her detention and arrest. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b). Determining that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings as they relate to the scope of the certified question of law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge.

Following the defendant’s open guilty pleas to two counts of driving under the influence ("DUI") (fifth and sixth offenses), see T.C.A. § 55-10-401(2008); three counts of driving while his license was revoked ("DWLR") (one fourth and two fifth offenses),see id.§ 55-10504; one count of violating the implied consent law, see id. § 55-10-406; one count of violating the open container law, see id. § 55-10-416; and one count of reckless driving, see id. § 55-10-205, the Lincoln County Circuit Court imposed an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the length and alignment of the sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted appellant, James Allen Gooch, Jr., of one count of the sale of not less than one-half ounce of marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance, within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class D felony, and one count of attempted sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony. The trial court ordered appellant to serve consecutive sentences of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the Class D felony and fifteen years for the Class C felony. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever and in sentencing him as a persistent offender. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever the offenses and that the trial court properly sentenced appellant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.