APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury convicted appellant, James Allen Gooch, Jr., of one count of the sale of not less than one-half ounce of marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance, within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class D felony, and one count of attempted sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony. The trial court ordered appellant to serve consecutive sentences of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the Class D felony and fifteen years for the Class C felony. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever and in sentencing him as a persistent offender. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever the offenses and that the trial court properly sentenced appellant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Darryl Larkins, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated burglary. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court .

The Petitioner, Charles Montague, appeals from the Washington County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal, the Petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief because (1) he was deprived of pretrial jail credits; (2) his sentence is disproportionate to other sentences from the trial court; (3) an illegal fine was imposed; (4) he was ordered to serve his sentence in “installments”; and (5) the indictment was improperly amended without his consent. We conclude that the Petitioner has stated a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief with regard to his possible entitlement to pretrial jail credits. We remand for a hearing and the appointment of counsel on that issue alone. In all other respects, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

Much aggrieved by the Lincoln County Circuit Court’s sentencing decision following his plea to a community corrections violation warrant, the defendant, Clay Robertson, appeals the trial court’s imposition of an effective sentence of seven years’ incarceration for his guilty-pleaded convictions of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and facilitation of aggravated robbery. Discerning no error,we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In May 2010, the Defendant, John Tyler Gilley, pled guilty to aggravated burglary; as a condition of his plea, he was placed on probation for four years and agreed to pay restitution, with the amount of restitution to be determined at a later date. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $3,240, with the Defendant to make installment payments of $90 a month. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court’s imposed restitution was excessive. The Defendant also asserts that the restitution award reflected on the judgment, $9,370 (the victims’ pecuniary loss), is incorrect and contrary to law, requiring him to pay beyond the expiration of his sentence. After reviewing the record, we affirm the restitution amount but remand the case for correction of the judgment to reflect the proper award of $3,240.

The defendant, John Smith, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm  during the commission of a felony and was sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment plus six years. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his felony murder conviction; (3) the trial court erred in its instruction given on the defense of defense of others; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on the defense of ignorance or mistake of fact. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Benjamin E. Barlow, pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Hamblen County to Driving Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (DUI), 1st offense, properly reserving for appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). The certified question is “[d]id the officer have specific and objective facts on which to have reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged or had engaged in any criminal activity to warrant a traffic stop of defendant’s vehicle.” After a thorough review of the record and the briefs we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Montez James (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of five counts of aggravated robbery and four counts of aggravated assault upon nine separate victims. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant as a persistent offender to an effective sentence of seventy years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in the following evidentiary rulings: (1) allowing “cumulative” witnesses to testify; (2) allowing a witness to testify about the Defendant’s gang involvement; (3) admitting the recording of a co-defendant’s guilty plea; (4) admitting testimony about information previously redacted from a co-defendant’s statement to the police; and (5) refusing to admit a police report containing the Defendant’s statement. The Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we have determined that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on any of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Warren County Jury convicted Defendant, Laticia Gail Campbell, of reckless aggravated assault. She received a sentence of three years, with split confinement, to serve 364 days and the balance on probation, including twenty-four hours of public service work. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; and (2) that the trial court improperly sentenced her. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

A Hamblen County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Christopher Bryan Hancock, of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery, all based upon a theory of criminal responsibility. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to the lesser-included offense of accessory after the fact, and the trial court’s instruction regarding criminal responsibility. Upon review, we affirm the appellant’s convictions of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, but we must reverse his conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping and remand for a new trial for the trial court to instruct the jury as mandated by our supreme court in State v. White, 362 S.W.2d 559, 580-81 (Tenn. 2012).

The Petitioner, Quincy Londale Scott, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the circumstances surrounding his confession to the police and failing to hire a “handwriting expert” to testify about the waiver of rights form signed by the Petitioner. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Marshall County jury convicted appellant, Owen Presley, of two counts of aggravated kidnapping and six counts of rape. The trial court merged the two counts of aggravated kidnapping into one count and the six counts of rape into one count and ordered the appellant to serve concurrent sentences of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal,appellant argues thatthe evidence was insufficientto convicthim and that the trial court should have merged his conviction for aggravated kidnapping with his rape conviction. After reviewing the record, we conclude that appellant untimely filed his notice of appeal and that the interest of justice does not require this court to waive the timely filing requirement. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Raymond Buford, charging him with premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense and received a life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) that the trial court erred in llowing testimony of prior bad acts committed by Defendant against the victim. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jeremy Kyle Massey, pro se, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 1999 second degree murder conviction and resulting forty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him habeas corpus relief. He argues that his conviction and sentence are void because the first degree murder indictment was defective. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Deshaun Jantuan Lewis, of one count of
second degree murder, two counts of felony murder, four counts of aggravated rape,
especially aggravated robbery, and making a false report to law enforcement. The trial court
merged the two felony murder convictions and the second degree murder conviction into one
conviction for felony murder. The trial court also merged one of the aggravated rape
convictions, leaving three remaining aggravated rape convictions. The court then sentenced
the Defendant to an effective sentence of life plus forty-two years in the Tennessee
Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is
insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly allowed the State to
question the Defendant about his gang involvement; and (3) his sentence is excessive. After
a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, William Lynn Boling, Jr., filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Blount County requesting jail credits for time he spent on furlough. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, we conclude that this case is not properly before this court because no appeal as of right exists from the trial court’s denial of the motion. We dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Timothy A. Lowe, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original ten-year sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in placing his entire ten-year sentence into effect. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Bobby Joe Ladd, appeals the revocation of his probation, claiming that the
evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court. Discerning no error, we affirm
the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Alejandro Rivera, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because: (1) counsel failed to “formulate a defense and to present testimony from all essential witnesses;” and (2) counsel failed to file an appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. After a review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Timothy L. Morton, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his three petitions for writ of habeas corpus and its denial of his motion to reinstate these petitions, wherein he alleged that the trial court’s judgment revoking his probation and ordering his one-year sentence for DUI, fourth offense, and two-year sentence for driving in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act (MVHOA) into execution is void. Upon review, we affirm the judgments summarily dismissing the petitions for habeas corpus relief and denying the motion for reinstatement of the petitions for habeas corpus relief.

Petitioner, Roger Hathaway, Jr., pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated arson, attempted second degree murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and received a total effective sentence of 12 years to be served at 30 percent. Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not voluntarily and knowingly entered. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Billy Joe Smith, pled guilty to: (1) possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana, a Class E felony; (2) maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances were used or sold, a Class D felony; and (3) two separate counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Due to his prior criminal convictions, Defendant was designated as a Range II multiple offender for each felony conviction, and agreed to a sentence length of four years for each felony. The plea agreement provided for sentences of 11 months and 29 days for each misdemeanor conviction, and for all of the sentences to run concurrently with each other for an effective sentence of four years as a Range II offender. There was no  agreement as to the manner of service of the sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that Defendant would serve the sentence in the Department of Correction. Defendant has appealed and argues that the trial court should have granted him full probation or split confinement, or ordered the sentences to be served in the community corrections program. Following a thorough review we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tajay Vaughn (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Petitioner received an effective sentence of thirty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In his petition, he argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and that his plea was constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Jimmy L. Smith (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that counts one through four of the indictment underlying his convictions are defective, and, therefore, his judgments of conviction are void. The habeas corpus court denied relief without a hearing. The Petitioner then filed this appeal. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Rutherford County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Gregory Moore, of one
count of aggravated sexual battery, see T.C.A. § 39-13-504(a)(4) (2006), and three counts
of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, see id. § 39-13-529(b)(1), for offenses
committed against his seven-year-old step-daughter. The trial court imposed an effective
sentence of 13 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to support his conviction of aggravated sexual battery and the trial court’s
imposition of sentences. We discern an anomaly in the judgments for counts three and four
requiring correction on remand. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court, as
modified.