APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Madison County Circuit Court Jury found the appellant, Ameale Hudson, guilty of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a change of venue; (2) denying his motion to bar the State from referring to him by his nickname,“Pistol”; and (3) denying his motion to prohibit the admission of postmortem photographs of the victim. The appellant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Gibson County grand jury indicted appellant, Christopher Alexander Jones, for first degree murder. The jury found appellant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Specifically, he contends that the evidence did not show sufficient proof of premeditation and that his intoxication negated the required culpable mental state for this offense. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jeffery D. Allen (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief, challenging his convictions for first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, facilitation of attempted first degree murder, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. As his bases for relief, he alleged several grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel (1) failed to call two witnesses to testify at trial, (2) failed to adequately cross-examine a witness, and (3) failed to move to sever the Petitioner’s offenses prior to trial. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Matthew T. McGee, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2008). He was sentenced to an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with forty-five days’ confinement and the remainder on probation. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved two certified questions of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Bobby Lee Scales, Jr., filed a pro se etition for habeas corpus relief attacking two convictions of theft in Davidson County and one conviction of theft in Williamson County. The habeas corpus trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, and Petitioner appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus trial court.

Petitioner, Roger Brent Banks, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for six counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a minor. Petitioner pled guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual battery. The remaining counts were dismissed. As part of the plea agreement, Petitioner received an effective sentence of sixteen years at 100%, and was ordered to lifetime supervision after the service of the sentence. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis that his sentences were void and illegal. The petition was dismissed as untimely. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that the petition was properly dismissed as untimely as Petitioner failed to show any reason that the statute of limitations should be tolled. As a result, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
 

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Appellant, Andrew Helton, has appealed the Davidson County Criminal Court order dismissing his motion for new trial in which Appellant alleged that: (1) the trial court erred by denying Appellant the right to be present at his trial; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on all lesser included offenses; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to allow the jury to examine evidence during deliberation. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the motion for new trial as duplicitous and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Fletcher Gordon, pled guilty to second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and it awarded him no jail credit. The Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court failed to award him pretrial jail credit. He asserted that he was incarcerated pending arraignment and trial from December 20, 2004, to August 24, 2006. The State filed a motion to dismiss the Petitioner’s motion based upon the Petitioner’s failure to provide documentation supporting his claim. The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court improperly dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Derwin Thomas, filed in the Bledsoe County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the indictment charging him with especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and first degree murder was defective for failure to allege the theory of criminal responsibility. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to allege grounds upon which habeas corpus relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the habeas corpus court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Bethany Lorraine Kuykendall, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at more than $1000 but less than $10,000, for which she was granted judicial diversion with the requirements that she complete two years of probation and pay $150 per month toward restitution. On appeal, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the restitution amount. Because we lack jurisdiction to consider her appeal, we dismiss it.

Petitioner, Miqwon Deon Leach, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He challenges his 2001 conviction for felony murder, for which a jury sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He also challenges his conviction for conspiracy to commit second degree murder that arose from the same case. As grounds for habeas corpus relief, petitioner argues that: (1) conspiracy to commit second degree murder is not a cognizable offense under Tennessee law, rendering his conviction void; and (2) the evidence at trial did not establish his intent to commit felony murder. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and we affirm the judgment of the court.

Jay Garrity ("the Defendant") was convicted of three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a multiple offender to sixteen years on each count and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of forty-eight years. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred "in allowing the State to call a ‘surprise’ witness." He also claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Finally, the Defendant challenges the length and consecutive service of his sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions. We, however, are compelled to vacate the Defendant’s sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, James L. Dowell, III, of first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced him to a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it ruled that if the Defendant presented the testimony of his accomplice the State could cross-examine the accomplice about past criminal activities in which both the Defendant and the accomplice willingly participated; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Tracy L. Cope, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the postconviction court erred by concluding that all of his claims were previously determined. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Cedric Davis, appeals the summary denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Petitioner, Freddie L. Osborne, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of the pro se petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Petitioner. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus trial court.

Following a trial, a Davidson County jury found appellant, Steven Woodrow Johnson, guilty of felony murder, especially aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison for felony murder. The trial court also sentenced appellant to serve sentences of ten years for especially aggravated burglary (count two) and five years for aggravated burglary (count four) and then merged the two convictions. Appellant was sentenced to five years for aggravated assault and three years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Some sentences were consecutive to each other, but all were concurrent to the life sentence for felony murder. Thus, appellant received an effective life sentence. On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following review of the record, we conclude that the conviction of especially aggravated burglary should be modified to aggravated burglary. Because only one judgment of conviction should have been entered as to the merged counts, we vacate the judgments in count two and count four and remand to the trial court for entry of a single judgment of conviction consistent with this opinion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Petitioner, Timothy Lynn Denton, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. Timothy Lynn Denton, No. E2006-02557-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 933200 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 7, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2008). The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to convey to him plea offers and by failing to appeal the trial court’s ruling that he was competent to stand trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Appellant, Scot E. Vandergriff, pled guilty to soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means, a Class E felony, for which he received an agreed- upon sentence of two years. The trial court granted his request for probation but denied his application for judicial diversion. In this appeal, he claims that the trial court erred in denying his application for judicial diversion. Because the trial court failed to adequately state upon the record the basis for denying judicial diversion, we vacate the judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant, Timothy W. Ford, was convicted by a DeKalb County jury of the initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven years and six months. Appellant challenges his conviction and sentence for the following reasons: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude evidence of his prior conviction; and (3) the sentence was excessive because the trial court failed to give ample weight to the mitigation evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 1986, petitioner, Charles Borum, pled guilty to two offenses, a Dickson County charge of aggravated kidnapping and a Davidson County charge of aggravated rape, and received forty-year sentences on each offense. Davidson County agreed to run the aggravated rape conviction concurrently with the Dickson County aggravated kidnapping conviction. Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the Davidson County conviction is illegal, and thus void, because it did not award him pretrial jail credit as required by law. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Albert Franklin Thompkins, appeals as of right from the trial court’s revocation of his enhanced probation and reinstatement of his eight-year sentence for rape. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation because the State failed to prove that he had violated the terms of his probation in a substantial way in that he had not committed any new crimes nor was there any evidence that he had failed any drug screens. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s probation and order that the Defendant execute his original sentence in confinement.

The District Attorney General denied the request of the Defendant, Aref Al Yamani, for pretrial diversion. The Defendant appealed to the trial court, who found that the District Attorney General had abused its discretion when it denied the Defendant’s request for pretrial diversion because the District Attorney failed to consider all the relevant factors when it denied the Defendant’s request. Based upon this finding, the trial court ordered the District Attorney General to approve the Defendant’s application for pretrial diversion. The State appeals, contending that the proper remedy in this scenario is for the trial court to vacate the District Attorney General’s decision and remand the matter to the District Attorney General to further consider and weigh all the relevant factors, citing State v. Richardson, 357 S.W.3d 620 (Tenn. 2012). After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the trial court erred when it failed to remand the case to the District Attorney General to consider all the relevant factors. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand to the Shelby County Criminal Court with directions to remand to the Shelby County District Attorney General for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Larry Wayne Webb, of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range IV, career offender to twelve years. On appeal, the appellant contends, and the State concedes, that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we agree that the evidence is insufficient. Therefore, the conviction is reversed, and the charge is dismissed.
 

The Defendant, Fred Chad Clark, II, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of seven counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (Supp. 2005, 2006) (amended 2007, 2011) (rape of a child), -504 (2006) (aggravated sexual battery). He was sentenced as a Range I offender to seventeen years for each rape of a child conviction and to ten years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction, to be served at 100% as a child rapist. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing, for an effective thirty-four year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to establish the corpus delicti; (2) there was a material variance between the proof and the State’s election of offenses; (3) the trial court erred in admitting surreptitiously recorded conversations he had with his wife on January 18, 2007; (4) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s use of pornography; (5) the trial court erred in allowing a detective to offer opinion testimony about the Defendant’s truthfulness; (6) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the mental state of recklessness for the counts involving rape of a child; and (7) the trial court erred in sentencing by using an inapplicable enhancement factor and in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in Counts V, VI, VII, IX, and X. Due to deficiencies in the election of offenses relative to Counts I, II, III, and IV, we reverse those convictions and remand the case for a new trial for those counts.