APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Maury County jury convicted appellant, Antonio Jamarc Warfield, of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the conviction of especially aggravated robbery, modify the conviction of especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary, and remand for entry of a judgment on the aggravated burglary conviction consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Mark Joseph Graves, entered a best interest plea to attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, in exchange for a two-year and one-day sentence, as a Range I standard offender, at thirty percent. As part of the Defendant’s plea agreement, he reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether an affidavit in support of a search warrant must allege when the illegal activity occurred. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

The petitioner, Tony L. Pirtle, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, and facilitation of aggravated rape. The petitioner received an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction DNA testing, alleging that testing would exonerate his co-defendant and, thereby, exonerate the petitioner. The court denied the motion, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Joshua Jermaine Whitehead (“the Defendant”) pled guilty in February 2004 to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery and one count of aggravated assault. The Defendant was sentenced in May 2004 as a Range I offender to an effective sentence of nine years, suspended after service of one year. Due to repeated probation violations, the Defendant eventually served his entire sentence in confinement. The Defendant was released on August 19, 2011. On October 5, 2011, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he was not informed of the lifetime community supervision consequence of his conviction for the sex offense. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Steven Linton Griffith, was convicted in Sullivan County of both the sale and delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone. See State v. Steve Griffith, No. E2008-01962-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1956713, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jul. 8, 2009), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2009). The trial court merged the convictions into a single judgment. Appellant appealed. Id. This Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court on appeal. Id. Appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. Appellant argues on appeal that the petition was improperly denied. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Anthony Troy Williams,was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for driving on a canceled, suspended or revoked license, second offense. Appellant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to six months in jail and a fine of $2,500. On appeal, Appellant, pro se, challenges the constitutionality of the State’s requirement that he have a license to drive in Tennessee. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant was properly convicted of driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, Eddie Joe Whitaker, was indicted by the Campbell County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (DUI). Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to 11 months and 29 days to be served at 75 percent incarceration. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and asserts: 1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; and 2) his sentence was excessive. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendants, Oscar E. Ochoa and Beatriz Ochoa, were indicted by the Bradley County Grand Jury for possession of between 10 and 70 pounds of marijuana with intent to sell. Defendants filed applications for Rule 9 interlocutory appeal seeking our review of the trial court’s ruling that the State did not abuse its discretion when the Assistant District Attorney General denied Defendants’ applications for pretrial diversion. Defendants’ cases were consolidated on appeal. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly affirmed the State’s denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Louis W. Alford, was convicted of second degree murder in Coffee County in 1990. As a result, Appellant received a forty-year sentence. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant’s sentence and conviction. State v. Louis William Alford, No. 01C019110CC00300, 1992 WL 50968, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 19, 1992), perm. app. denied, concurring in results only (Tenn. Jun. 15, 1992). In a separate case, Appellant pled guilty to several charges and received a four-year sentence. This sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to the second degree murder sentence. On direct appeal from the burglary conviction, this Court remanded the matter for resentencing because the judgment form failed to reflect the range of punishment. State v. Louis William Alford, No. 01-C01-9007CR00170, 1991 WL 4951, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 24, 1991). On remand, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender. Appellant again initiated an appeal, arguing that his five prior felonies could not be used to enhance his sentence because they pre-dated the Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. This Court affirmed the sentence on appeal. State v. Louis William Alford, No. 01C01-9108CC00227, 1992 WL 50963, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 19, 1992), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jun. 8, 1992). Appellant filed a motion to correct his sentence in September of 2011, in which he complained about the miscalculation of his parole date and joinder of his sentences for burglary and second degree murder. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, a notice of appeal. The trial court issued a second order in which it determined that it had no authority to order the relief sought by Appellant. Appellant filed a notice of appeal. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that Appellant does not have an appeal as of right from the order under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

On January 18, 2011, Petitioner, Kevin DeWitt Ford, filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. He subsequently submitted two amended petitions, also pro se. Petitioner attacked seven convictions in the Davidson County Criminal Court for aggravated robbery. Petitioner pled guilty to the offenses but reserved for appeal a certified question of law. On appeal, this court affirmed the convictions. State of Tennessee v. Kevin DeWitt Ford and Clifford Sylvester Wright, No. M2003-00957-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 677280 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2005) perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2005). Petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition was denied by the trial court. This Court affirmed. Kevin DeWitt Ford v. State of Tennessee, No. M2007-01727-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 564226 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2009) perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2009). The coram nobis court dismissed the petition, as amended, without an evidentiary hearing, on two bases. First, the petition was filed outside the applicable statue of limitations. Second, even if the petition had been timely field, it did not state a cognizable claim for a writ of error coram nobis. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

On March 31, 1994, the petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and was sentenced as a Range I offender to fifteen years for each count. The plea agreement required the sentences to be served consecutively. The petitioner brought a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose consecutive sentences and that the judgments were consequently void. The trial court denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, and theft of property over $500, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 25 years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss his indictment or suppress testimony regarding destroyed evidence; (2) allowing the State to present certain photographs taken of the defendant, on grounds that they were not properly authenticated; and (3) ordering him to serve his sentence on the attempted aggravated burglary consecutively to his sentence for aggravated burglary because both crimes should have been considered part of the same criminal episode. We conclude that the defendant has waived the first claim by virtue of his failure to prepare an adequate brief and record and that the trial court did not err by allowing admitting the photographs and ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly.

The Petitioner, William Fisher, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. He contends that his sentence has expired. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Francisco Miquel Jose,appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that his 2004 guilty plea to misdemeanor theft of property was not knowingly made because he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, that the statute of limitations should be tolled because Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), announced a new rule of constitutional law that did not exist at the time of his plea, and that due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations due to the circumstances surrounding his guiltyplea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Calvin D. Norris, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 conviction for possession with intent to sell one-half gram or less of cocaine and his ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Devarick D. Nicks, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to two counts of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Larry Wade, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. Following a pretrial hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress, which the trial court took under advisement, Defendant entered a guilty plea to second degree murder on the same day as the suppression hearing. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied after two separate hearings. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court’s failure to rule on his motion to suppress prior to accepting his guilty plea violated his due process rights, and consequently, Defendant’s guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered, and Defendant asserts that it was a manifest injustice to deny Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Mark Takashi, of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies. The trial court merged the convictions, and the appellant received a twenty-five-year sentence to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself at trial and that his sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the post-conviction court erred in failing to allow the Petitioner to amend his petition during the evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner sought to amend his petition to allege another ground for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the amendment would have raised the issue of trial counsel’s failure to assert the trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial in the Petitioner’s motion for new trial or on direct appeal. The motion for a mistrial related to the admission of impermissible character evidence regarding prior, uncharged bad acts during the prosecutor’s opening statement.

The Petitioner, Jason Clinard, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner, who was convicted of first degree murder, contends that his conviction was illegal because he was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, which he states contravenes statute. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
 

The petitioner, Ricardo Rodriguez, brings a post-conviction challenge to his 2004 guilty plea for sale of a controlled substance based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010), in which the Court concluded that trial counsel’s failure to advise a defendant that his guilty plea would result in deportation amounted to deficient representation. In this case, the post-conviction petition was not filed within the one-year limitations period specified by the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and it was dismissed by the post-conviction court based on the statute of limitations at Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-30-102(a). The petitioner contends that Padilla should be retroactively applied and that his claim falls into an exception to the statute of limitations for new constitutional rules with retrospective application. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102(b)(1) (2006). Alternatively, the petitioner claims that due process tolls the statute of limitations or that the rule is an old rule with retroactive application. The petitioner also challenges the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea and brings a habeas corpus challenge based on his incomplete knowledge of English. We conclude that, because Padilla does not warrant retroactive application and because due process does not require the statute of limitations to be tolled, the petition was time-barred. We further conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied relief on the petitioner’s remaining claims and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

On March 6, 2008, the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Seth Haley, was indicted in case number 199-2008 for violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender’s Act (MVHOA), evading arrest, possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conviction of two or more prior offenses of simple possession or casual exchange of a controlled substance thatcould be used to enhance his punishment for the third offense of simple possession of a controlled substance pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-418(e). On June 6, 2008, Haley was indicted in case number 4502008 for possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver. On March 30, 2009, he entered guiltypleas in case number 199-2008 to the offenses of violating the MVHOA and evading arrest, Class E felonies, and in case number 450-2008 to the offense of possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining charges in case number 199-2008. On June 10, 2010, Haley was indicted in case number 439-2010 for felony escape and two counts of felony failure to appear. On September 30, 2010, Haley entered a guilty plea in case number 439-2010 to one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining counts in that case number. On December 10, 2010, the trial court sentenced Haley as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of two years for violating the MVHOA conviction, two years for the evading arrest conviction, and ten years for the possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver conviction. The court also sentenced Haley as a Range II, multiple offender to a consecutive sentence of four years for the felony failure to appear conviction, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Haley contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider any mitigating factors before imposing his sentence and erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Marc A. Crowder, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated assault and aggravated robbery and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of nine years in the Department of Correction. He raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether he was denied his constitutional right to a jury of his peers by the lack of a fair cross-representation of the community among the venire members; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Richard Hanke, Sr., entered a plea of guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to robbery (count one), aggravated burglary (count two), aggravated assault (count three), and two counts of kidnapping (counts four and five), all Class C felonies. He additionally pleaded guilty to retaliation for past action (count six) and possession of a weapon with intent to employ in offense (count seven), both Class E felonies. The trial court imposed a term of six years’ confinement for the robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and each kidnapping. It further imposed a sentence of two years for possession of a weapon with intent to employ in offense and retaliation for past action. The trial court ordered the concurrent term of six years’ confinement in counts one, two, and four to be served consecutively to the concurrent term of six years’ confinement imposed in counts three, five, and seven. Count six was ordered to be served consecutively to all other counts, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering partially consecutive sentencing. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Klein Adlei Rawlins, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole and twenty years. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred: (1) by concluding that he received the effective assistance of counsel; and (2) by denying his request for funds to assist post-conviction counsel in investigation of the post-conviction petition. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of relief.