APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Colby Terrell Black, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction. He argues that the trial court violated his right to due process by making insufficient findings at the revocation hearing, and the State agrees. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an appropriate written order that summarizes the evidence and clearly sets forth the reasons for the revocation of probation.

Jason Everett Nickell (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to three counts of misdemeanor stalking, with no agreement as to his sentences. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent on each count, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive because the trial court did not consider two mitigating factors. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Kristopher Colbert, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury in April of 2011 for driving under the influence, driving under the influence per se, reckless endangerment, vehicular assault,and aggravated assault. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of vehicular assault in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four years for each offense, to be served consecutively as a Range I, standard offender. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider and a motion to reduce sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 and/or Tennessee code Annotated section 40-35-212(d). After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions. Appellant initiated this appeal to determine whether the trial court improperly denied the motion to reduce the sentence. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Jody Lee Lindsey, pled guilty to one count of violating the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender (“HMVO”) law, one count of third offense driving on a revoked license, and one count of felony failure to appear. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court found the Defendant to be a Range III offender and merged the driving on a revoked license conviction with the HMVO conviction. It then sentenced the Defendant to five years for both the HMVO conviction and the felony failure to appear conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively based upon the Defendant’s extensive criminal history, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; (2) his convictions were based upon an unlawfully induced guilty plea; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the counsel representing him at the guilty plea hearing and sentencing hearing was ineffective. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Eric D. Wallace (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that (1) his indictment for attempted first degree murder is defective because it was amended improperly to include a factual basis for aggravated assault; (2) the judgment and sentence imposed for felony murder and attempted first degree murder are void; and (3) the felony murder conviction must be dismissed. The habeas corpus court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. We affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Petitioner, Odell Shelton, seeks relief via a writ of error coram nobis from his plea agreement that resulted in a conviction of aggravated assault and a sentence of ten years. He claims that the trial court improperly sentenced him as a multiple (Range II) offender and erroneously relied upon a presentence report in denying his request for a suspended sentence. Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s reliance on the presentence report is “newly discovered evidence.” The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition. Discerning no basis for coram nobis relief, we affirm.

The Defendant, Michael Eugene Rutherford, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and ordering his fiveyear sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to revoke his probation, (2) there is new evidence related to testimony relied upon by the trial court in revoking his probation, (3) the trial court erred by allowing the victim of the Defendant’s new theft charge to testify at the revocation hearing, and (4) the court erred by insufficiently weighing his good behavior. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William J. Ferris, Sr. (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Richard Tipton, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; driving on a revoked license, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the seatbelt law, a Class C misdemeanor; and failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10- 401(a)(2), 55-50-504, 55-9-603(a)(1), and 55-12-139. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve one year and six months in the county jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) that the trial court failed to consider the eight-year span of time in which the Defendant committed no crimes when determining his sentence, showing a lack of consideration of other sentencing factors. Following our review, we remand this case to the trial court for correction of the judgments because the Defendant was sentenced to the county jail instead of the Department of Corrections (DOC), as required by statute. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, James D. Ledford, II, appeals the Seqautchie County Circuit Court’s denial of his request for alternative sentencing. The defendant pled guilty to one count of vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, a Class C felony, and received a sentence of nine years, as a Range II offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the same time, the defendant also pled guilty to a violation of probation in a separate case with a sentence of two years, which the trial court revoked and ordered to be served concurrently with the homicide sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentence as imposed.

The defendant, Donald E. Fentress, appeals the sentencing decision of the Montgomery County Circuit Court. The defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and aggravated rape, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that his sentence for rape is excessive under the facts and circumstances of his case. Specifically, he faults the trial court for failing to apply mitigating factor (8), that the defendant was suffering from a mental condition which significantly reduced his culpability for the offense. See T.C.A. § 40-35-113(8) (2010). Following review of the record before us, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner, Motorius G. Herron, appeals from the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition following an evidentiary hearing. In his post-conviction proceeding, Petitioner challenged his conviction following a jury trial for identity theft. The sole issue for appeal is whether Petitioner’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to make a written request for the inclusion of the crime of fraudulent use of a credit or debit card as a lesser included offense of identity theft. Since the crime of fraudulent use of a credit or debit card is not a lesser included offense of identity theft, trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction trial court.

Petitioner, Willie Thomas, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. More specifically he contends that (1) trial counsel “scared” him into pleading guilty; and (2) he was not fully informed regarding the plea. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Patrick Lynn Crippen, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (DUI), violating the implied consent law, failing to provide proper evidence of financial responsibility, and violation of state registration law. Defendant waived his right to the appointment of counsel and subsequently filed motions to dismiss for want of prosecution and to suppress evidence of his performance on field sobriety tests, which were both denied by the trial court. Following a jury trial, at which Defendant represented himself, Defendant was convicted of DUI and found in violation of the implied consent law. The remaining charges were dismissed prior to trial. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court to 11 months and 29 days to be served at 75 percent. Defendant appeals his conviction pro se and asserts that: 1) he was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial; 2) the trial court erred by allowing the officer to testify about Defendant’s field sobriety tests; 3) the trial court improperly excluded evidence that the Knoxville Police Department unlawfully “stacked” charges against him; 4) that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 5) that the jury should have been instructed as to the availability of audio/visual equipment in the jury room; and 6) that Defendant was not properly informed of a hearing on his motion for new trial. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for one count of resisting arrest, for one count of vandalism over $1,000, and for one count of theft over $10,000. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of resisting arrest, one count of vandalism over $1,000, and the lesser included offense of theft over $1,000 but less than $10,000. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of vandalism over $1,000 and resisting arrest. In addition, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to declare a mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was ample evidence to support his convictions and that the trial court did not err in denying his motion to declare a mistrial.

Appellant, Marcus Pope, was indicted by a Shelby County grand jury for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court granted appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and a jury convicted him of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of ten years for aggravated robbery and six years for aggravated burglary. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of his sentences. Discerning no reversible error in the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, LaQuenton Monger, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and of aggravated child abuse. On direct appeal, the conviction for first degree murder was ultimately reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court failed to charge lesser included offenses. The petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder. The petitioner brought a pro se post-conviction petition asserting various errors, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition based on the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Bennie Osby, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted second degree murder, aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant Ward pled guilty to one count of initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and Defendant Want pled guilty to one count of initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant Ward was sentenced to eight years, and Defendant Want was sentenced to eight years for the initiation conviction and to a concurrent eleven months and twenty-nine days for the possession conviction, for a total effective sentence of eight years. Both defendants reserved a certified question of law concerning the legality of a search conducted by police. On appeal, both defendants claim that the trial court erred by failing to suppress items seized pursuant to the warrantless search of Defendant Ward’s premises. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the certified question as phrased is not dispositive of the case, and we dismiss the appeals accordingly.

Jasper Pugh (“the Defendant”) was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of theft of property of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to twelve years on each count. The trial court ordered each count to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for both counts and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Joseph Thomas Blakely, was charged with two counts of rape of a child. A jury found him guilty of the first count but was unable to reach a unanimous decision on the second count. The defendant was sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment with a release eligibility of one hundred percent. The defendant appeals, challenging only the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Robert Lee Yates, appeals the Warren County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery and sentenced to thirty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Lewis County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Michael E. Fischer, of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, see T.C.A. § 39-13-103; driving under the influence (“DUI”), fifth offense, see id. § 55-10-401; driving while his license was revoked (“DWLR”), fifth offense, see id. § 55-10-504; and violation of the open container law, see id. § 55-10-416. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of three years’ incarceration by the agreement of the parties. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of DUI, the defendant also argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Lynn Garry Fryer, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ronnie Ingram, of aggravated burglary, see T.C.A. § 39-14-403; theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, see id. § 39-14-103, 105(2); criminal exposure to human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”), see id. § 39-13-109; evading arrest, see id. § 39-16-603; and resisting arrest, see id. § 39-16-602. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 32 years plus 11 months and 29 days’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of criminal exposure to HIV. Because we determine that the State failed to establish an element of the offense, we reverse the defendant’s conviction of criminal exposure to HIV and dismiss that charge. In lieu thereof, we impose a conviction of attempt to expose one to HIV and remand for sentencing on this modified conviction. Because the defendant raises no challenge to his remaining convictions, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.