APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Luther Ray Mabe, Jr., appeals his Hawkins County Criminal Court jury
convictions of aggravated robbery and theft of property valued at more than $1,000, for
which he received an effective sentence of 10 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated robbery
conviction and argues that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial
court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the correct grade of theft for
which the defendant was convicted and merging the theft conviction into the aggravated
robbery conviction.

I fully concur with my respected colleagues’ reasoning and judgment as it relates to
the Defendant’s sentencing issue. Regarding the Defendant’s sufficiency challenge,
however, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s contention that the facts at trial do not
support the State’s theory on appeal regarding when the shotgun was taken. Specifically,
I believe that the facts at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
demonstrate that the Defendant had not completed the taking of the shotgun at the time that
the Defendant and the victim struggled over control of the rifle.

The Defendant, Danny Lynn Collier, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s
ordering him to serve a four-year sentence in confinement after revoking his probation,
arguing that the trial court should have elected to place him back on supervised probation.
Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Jefferson County jury convicted the defendant, William David Phillips, of four counts
of reckless homicide, one count of reckless endangerment, and one count of felony reckless
endangerment, for which he received an effective sentence of fourteen years, eleven
months, and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial
court erred in imposing an excessive sentence, denying probation, and imposing
consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we
affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for a corrected
judgment form in count three.

Following a bench trial, Shanynthia Gardner (“Defendant”) was convicted of four counts
each of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder in perpetration of
aggravated child abuse, first degree felony murder in perpetration of aggravated child
neglect, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect, for which she received an
effective sentence of life. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court
used an incorrect legal standard in determining that she failed to carry her burden of
establishing her insanity at the time of the offenses; (2) the evidence is insufficient to
support her convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it denied Defendant’s request to
make an offer of proof of the entirety of a witness’s audio recorded statement to police.
Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jamauri Ransom, of aggravated robbery
and first degree felony murder. The Petitioner appealed, claiming insufficient evidence,
and this court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. State v. Jamauri Ransom, No. W2019-
02319-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 1310877, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., April 8, 2021), perm.
app. denied (Tenn. July 12, 2021). The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition,
alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed
to move for a mistrial based upon alleged juror misconduct. After a hearing, the postconviction
court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s
judgment.

The Defendant, Donald Haynes, pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years to be served on probation. At a subsequent restitution hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to pay $42,000 in restitution to the victim in monthly installments of $500. On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence of pecuniary loss to support an order of restitution. After review, we reverse and remand the case for the trial court to determine the victim’s credibility, the victim’s pecuniary loss, if any, and to make adequate findings of fact, if any, to support the imposition of restitution based upon sufficient credible evidence of pecuniary loss.

Defendant, William Timothy Kirk, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence (DUI), first offense. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement, to be served at seventy-five percent. The trial court ordered the DUI sentence to be served consecutively to the life sentence for which Defendant was on parole at the time of the offense. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Roosevelt Morris, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner alleges he is entitled to relief because his sentence is unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), he did not receive timely pretrial notice of the State’s notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment, and because the habeas corpus court did not give him sufficient time to file a written reply to the State’s response to the habeas corpus petition. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Darren Marion Little, pleaded guilty to two counts of violating the Sex Offender Registry and one count of possessing a prohibited weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III offender to an effective sentence of ten years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred when it classified him as a Range III offender. After review, we agree with the parties. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for resentencing.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Defendant, Theodore Devon Wells, of sale of a Schedule II narcotic, cocaine, and delivery of a Schedule II narcotic, cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III offender to twenty-eight years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erroneously admitted certain items of evidence. He further contends that his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was violated. Finally, he contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Pro-se petitioner, Chris M. Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of
his “Rule 36 Plain Error Motion for New Trial.” Following our review of the entire record
and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Edgar Bailey Jr., appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony
murder, setting fire to personal property, and three counts of aggravated assault. The
Petitioner is serving an effective life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that: (1)
the post-conviction court erred when it denied relief under the Post-Conviction DNA
Analysis Act of 2001 (the DNA Act), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-301 to -
313 (2018), and (2) the Petitioner is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine.
We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Thakelyn J. Tate, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess more
than twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone.
See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(c) (2018) (subsequently amended) (possession of a controlled
substance) (2018), 39-17-432 (2018) (subsequently amended) (drug-free zone), 39-12-
103 (2018) (conspiracy). The jury likewise determined that the Defendant committed a
criminal gang offense, enhancing the felony classification of the conviction. See id. § 40-
35-121 (2019). The court imposed a fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the criminal gang enhancement. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Durrell James a/k/a/ James Durrell, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of
three counts of aggravated stalking (Counts 1 through 3) and one count of stalking (Count
4). The trial court imposed a four-year sentence for each count of aggravated stalking in
Counts 1 through 3, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for stalking in Count 4. The trial
court further ordered that the sentence in Count 2 be served consecutively to Count 1 and
concurrently with the sentences in Counts 3 and 4 for an effective eight-year sentence as a
Range II multiple offender to be served in a local workhouse. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review of the
entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but
remand for correction of a clerical error on the judgment form for Count 2 to reflect that it
is to be served consecutively to Count 1 and concurrently with Counts 3 and 4.

The Defendant, Jermaine R. Carpenter, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his
second motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 36.1. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant
to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Petitioner, James William Mabe, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Cededrick Ivory, was indicted by a Shelby County Grand Jury
for first-degree premeditated murder in the shooting death of Anthony Travis (count one),
the attempted first-degree murder of Malik Muhammad (count two), and unlawful
employment of a firearm during the commission of first-degree murder (count three). Prior
to trial, the State dismissed counts two and three. The Appellant was convicted as charged
by a Shelby County jury of first-degree premediated murder (count one) and sentenced to
life in prison. In this appeal as of right, he raises the following issues for our review: (1)
whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction of first-degree premeditated
murder; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the prosecutor to correct the
testimony of a state witness; and (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding the dates of
prior charged offenses during the cross-examination of two state witnesses. Upon our
review, we must remand this case for entry of separate judgment forms reflecting a
dismissal of counts two and three. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

The Defendant, Iesha Jones, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of
first degree felony murder; voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony; especially
aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. See
T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony murder),
39-13-211 (2018) (voluntary manslaughter), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated
robbery), 39-13-103 (2018 (subsequently amended) (reckless endangerment). The trial
court merged the first degree felony murder and voluntary manslaughter convictions and
imposed a life sentence. The court also imposed sentences of twenty years for especially
aggravated robbery and two years for reckless endangerment. The court ordered
concurrent service of the sentences, for an effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions for first degree
felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, (2) the trial court erred in admitting
hearsay evidence, (3) the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and (4) the court
erred in denying her requested jury instructions regarding self-defense and defense of
others. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Kathy Delores Horton (prospectively D/B/A A-Team Bail Bond Company, LLC), appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition to operate a new bail bond company.  The appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying her petition because she had the requisite two years of experience working as a qualified agent.  The appellant also raises a challenge regarding the en banc panel, the denial of a claim concerning ex parte communications, and an equal protection claim.  Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s petition, as well as her other claims.

Petitioner, Robert Wayne Garner, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his second petition for habeas corpus relief, in which he challenged the sufficiency of the felony murder indictment under which he was convicted. Petitioner argues on appeal that the habeas corpus court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Randall Murphy, appeals his convictions by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, reckless aggravated assault, aggravated assault, criminal impersonation of law enforcement, and domestic assault. The Defendant argues: (1) the trial court committed reversible error when it misstated the law and provided its personal opinion on the determinate element of the kidnapping offense; (2) the trial court expressed its personal opinion regarding the testimony of one of the State’s key eyewitnesses; (3) the trial court improperly excluded evidence that the victim had consumed alcohol with her prescription medications at the time of the alleged offenses; (4) the trial court failed to give any weight to the applicable mitigating factors before imposing the maximum sentence for the aggravated kidnapping conviction; and (5) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors entitles him to a new trial on all counts. 1 After review, we reverse and remand this case for a new trial on the aggravated kidnapping charge in Count 1 and affirm the remaining counts.

Petitioner, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s order summarily dismissing his ninth petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Petitioner argues the habeas corpus court’s order failed to include adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law, the State’s answer to the habeas corpus petition was insufficient, and the Warden of Petitioner’s penitentiary was not served with process. After review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Marterrius Hite, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of
two counts of first degree felony murder, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child
neglect and received an effective sentence of life plus eighty years in confinement. On
appeal, the Defendant claims that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions,
(2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce his belt into evidence without
establishing a proper chain of custody, (3) the trial court committed plain error by ruling
he “opened the door” to a police officer testifying that he was arrested on prior warrants,
(4) the trial court committed plain error by commenting on his expert witness’s PowerPoint
presentation, (5) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to deliberate late at night, and (6)
his effective sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Tony Thomas, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of
post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in
denying relief. Finding that the issues presented for our review are without merit, waived,
previously determined, or a combination thereof, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction
court.