APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Williamson county jury convicted the Petitioner, Joe M. Gilbert, of aggravated child abuse in 2006, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to fifteen years in prison. In 2012, the Petitioner filed a writ of error coram nobis, which the trial court dismissed without a hearing after finding that coram nobis relief was not applicable to the Petitioner’s claim. The Petitioner appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

James John Lewis ("the Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court erred in not investigating the medications the Petitioner was taking when he entered his guilty plea and accordingly erred in accepting the Petitioner’s guilty plea. The habeas corpus court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

On December 19, 2012, Appellant, Antonio Freeman, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 2.01, filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal as of right. The petition sought an appeal of the trial court’s order denying his motion to have the trial judge recused. The Appellant asks this Court to review the trial judge’s order denying his motion to recuse. See　Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, Sec. 1. Appellant presents the following issues for our review on appeal: (1) whether a person of ordinary prudence in the trial court’s position, knowing all the facts known to the trial court, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the trial court’s impartiality in the present case; and (2) whether Rule 10B requires specific language as to why the motion for recusal is not presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. After a thorough de novo review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion for recusal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Michael Terrell, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 28, 2009, the Petitioner pled guilty to attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery, and he received an agreed sentence of seventeen years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea and the performance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant, Gene Earl Stanley, of one count of burglary, two counts of theft of property, felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence of an intoxicant, and driving on a canceled, revoked, or suspended license. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Career Offender to an effective sentence of forty-eight years. Three months after the jury’s verdict and one month after sentencing, the Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court ultimately denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that he was denied due process when the State failed to provide him "potentially exculpatory evidence" that was in the State’s possession. The State counters that the Defendant’s motion for new trial was untimely filed. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Ricco R. Williams, of five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been previously convicted of a felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 72 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and also contends that the jury was exposed to prejudicial information during voir dire and that the imposition of partially consecutive sentences violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. Because the trial court committed plain error by failing to require the State to elect a predicate felony for the defendant’s conviction under Code section 39-17-1324 and because 39-17-1324(c) precludes the defendant’s conviction when the underlying dangerous felony is aggravated kidnapping or especially aggravated kidnapping as charged in this case, the defendant’s convictions in counts seven and ten are reversed, and those charges are remanded for a new trial on the offense of employing a firearm during the commission of an aggravated burglary. Because principles of double jeopardy preclude dual convictions for the aggravated robberies of Mr. and Ms. Currie, the defendant’s conviction of the aggravated robbery of Ms. Currie is reversed and modified to a conviction of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, that conviction is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. The defendant’s convictions of and sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and the aggravated robbery of Mr. Currie are affirmed.

The defendant, James D. Morgan, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Hamilton County Criminal Court conviction of vandalism. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Barry C. Melton, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus in which he challenged the legality of the sentences imposed for his Sevier County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated sexual battery. We reverse the habeas corpus court’s rejection of all forms of habeas corpus relief and hold that the petitioner is entitled to have his illegal sentences corrected. The habeas corpus court, however, correctly ruled that the petitioner failed to establish a basis for withdrawing his guilty pleas. We do not reach the issue whether the 2009 amendments to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101 violate Article I, section 15, and/or Article II, section 2, of the Tennessee Constitution. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is reversed in part and affirmed in part.

The Petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Eric Thomas, appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas James Heffner, appeals the revocation of the community corrections sentence imposed for his Hamilton County Criminal Court conviction of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Tom Perry Bell, appeals the summary dismissal of his petitions for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his 1983 conviction of petit larceny and his 1978 conviction of receiving stolen property. Because the petitions are time-barred and because the petitioner failed to establish grounds for tolling the statute of limitations for filing a petition for post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Ryan James Howard, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210, -211 (2010). He was sentenced to consecutive terms of twenty years for second degree murder and five years for voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in (2) allowing hearsay testimony into evidence; (3) allowing unauthenticated recordings of telephone calls into evidence; and (4) sentencing him to an effective twenty-five years’ confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Octavis Arnold, pro se, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2006 convictions for robbery and his resulting effective eight-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his habeas corpus claim that he was denied pretrial jail credit. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Terrance Rose, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to properly communicate with him and to prepare him to testify at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Stephanie Rena Holt, after pleading guilty to various offenses, was granted probation and placed into the Williamson County Drug Court program, with a condition of probation being that she complete the program. While serving an initial seventy-day period of incarceration, she received write-ups for infractions of several jail rules, resulting in her termination from the drug court program. Following a revocation hearing, her probation was revoked because she had not completed the drug court program. On appeal, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation and requiring that she be incarcerated for the remainder of her sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted appellant for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. A jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts of first degree murder, the lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which the trial court sentenced appellant to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Appellant challenges his convictions, claiming that his confession was the product of an illegal arrest and was involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Nicholas Larsen, entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. Larsen’s guilty plea hearing indicated that he attempted to reserve a certified question of law on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 at the time he entered his guilty plea. Following the dismissal of his appeal on the basis that the appellate record contained no attachment or corrective order setting out a certified question of law, Larsen filed a petition to rehear, arguing that the attachment containing the certified question referenced on the judgment form “became detached from the judgment sheet before the record was prepared and transmitted.” This Court subsequently granted Larsen’s petition to rehear and motion to supplement the appellate record with this attachment and vacated its previous order dismissing the appeal. Larsen timely supplemented the appellate record with the missing attachment, which stated the following certified question of law: “[W]hether the Court erred in denying the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss based on the fact that his pre-trial detention was not for a valid remedial purpose but rather was punitive.” Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of burglary and theft, both Class D felonies. The defendant was sentenced to two concurrent seven-year terms in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the defendant’s participation in an additional burglary and by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Michael Wayne Davis, of attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the appellant to nineteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his attempted second degree murder conviction, the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance based upon an unavailable witness, the trial court’s admission of an alleged hearsay statement by a witness, and the trial court’s admission of his statement that was not timely disclosed during discovery. Upon review, we conclude that there is no error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The pro se petitioner, Mario Morris, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The Defendant, Lavon Douglas Robertson, was convicted by a jury of one count of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years of supervised probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized during a search of a one-room "dwelling" used by the Defendant and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Respectfully, I would not engage in an analysis of standing relative to the dirt road leading from the public road to the defendant’s building.

The Petitioner, Shavon Page, pled guilty to five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary, in exchange for an effective sentence of thirty years, to be served at 100%. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the Petitioner contends first that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his request, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 615, to have his trial counsel excluded from the courtroom during the post-conviction hearing. He next contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his case, which rendered the Petitioner’s guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Jose Rodriguez, brings a post-conviction challenge to his guilty plea, asserting that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner claims that, under Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010), his counsel was deficient in failing to advise him regarding the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. The petition was filed more than one year after the guilty plea, and the post-conviction court denied relief based on the statute of limitations pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). We conclude that a post-conviction action does not lie when the petitioner’s record has been expunged and no conviction exists. In addition, the trial court was correct in concluding the petition was time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal.