APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

On October 5, 2005, a Davidson County jury convicted petitioner of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and theft over $500 but less than $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Robert Lamont Moss, Jr., No. M2006-00890-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4245082, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 4, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 7, 2008). Subsequently, petitioner filed petitions for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the post-conviction petition on the merits and the coram nobis petition as time-barred. On appeal, petitioner argues that (1) trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; (2) his right to due process was denied by the trial court’s denial of funds for the defense to hire experts in eyewitness reliability and shoe print identification; and (3) he is entitled to a writ of error coram nobis. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Kristin M. Myers, was convicted by a Loudon County jury of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statements made to authorities because she did not execute a knowing, voluntary wavier of her Miranda rights. The Defendant also contends that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support her conviction. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress her statements and that the evidence produced at trial is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Burress, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his two convictions for facilitation of aggravated robbery and ordering him to serve his effective six-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search of his person, (2) finding that he violated his probation by resisting arrest, (3) revoking his probation, and (4) ordering him to serve the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Billy Ray Irick, filed a motion to reopen his error coram nobis proceedings or, in the alternative, a second petition for writ of error coram nobis. In his pleading, he reasserted the grounds underlying his first petition for the writ and added claims of judicial misconduct pertaining to the judge in his first coram nobis proceedings. The coram nobis court in the instant case denied relief, and this appeal follows. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Gary K. Thomas, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his January 2005 conviction for simple assault. The Petitioner’s August 2012 petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his plea was not voluntary, was dismissed as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal after he requested such action. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant was found guilty after a trial by jury of aggravated arson, a Class A felony, aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, theft of property over $1000.00, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to twenty years for aggravated arson, six years for aggravated burglary, and four years for theft over $1,000.00, with all sentences to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that one of the State’s witnesses was an accomplice as a matter of law. Upon review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions and that the trial court properly instructed the jury with respect to the legal status of the State’s witness. The judgments from the trial court are affirmed.

Daniel Humphrey ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary and, pursuant to his plea agreement, was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years on community corrections. Upon the subsequent filing of a violation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence and ordered him to serve the remainder of his original sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Sue Ann Christopher, was convicted by a Hancock County Criminal Court jury of first offense driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, DUI accompanied by a child under the age of eighteen, a Class A misdemeanor, unlawful possession of prescription drugs, a Class C misdemeanor, and violating the implied consent law. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401, 53-10-105, 55-10-406(3) (2012). The trial court merged the DUI conviction with the DUI accompanied by a child under the age of eighteen conviction. The court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 120 days to be served in confinement for the DUI conviction and thirty days’ confinement for the drug-related conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that her sentence for the DUI accompanied by a child conviction is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Williamson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Timothy W. Sparrow, of two counts of second degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. After merging the second degree murder convictions, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to suppress a suggestive pretrial identification of the appellant as the perpetrator; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred by not upholding the appellant’s Batson challenge after the State peremptorily challenged a black juror; (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting a statement made by a State’s witness; (5) whether the trial court erred by admitting a photograph of the murder victim that was taken while he was alive; (6) whether the trial court erred by admitting a black t-shirt that was alleged to belong to the appellant; (7) whether the trial court erred in its communications with jurors; (8) whether the trial court erred in sentencing; and (9) whether the principles of double jeopardy were violated. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case has been remanded by the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration of sentencing in light of State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273 (Tenn. 2012). On direct appeal, this court concluded that the Defendant waived review of his sentence by failing to include a transcript of the guilty plea hearing. In light of Caudle, we conclude that the record, which contains transcripts of the motion to suppress hearing and the sentencing hearing, exhibits from each hearing, and the presentence report, is sufficient to determine whether the trial court recited a proper basis for the sentence. 388 S.W.3d 273. The Defendant, Brett Joseph Price, pleaded guilty to robbery, a Class C felony, and conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401, 39-12-103 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years for robbery and to three years for conspiracy, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements and by admitting his statement at the sentencing hearing; (2) denying judicial diversion; (3) imposing excessive sentences; and (4) denying probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

James Richardson Reece, the defendant, was arrested for an aggravated assault which occurred in a workshop underneath his apartment. Immediately after his arrest, the defendant began to challenge the actions of the Sumner County court system, filing numerous documents with this Court and the Tennessee Supreme Court and suing various persons and entities in federal court. The lower courts appointed four separate attorneys to represent the defendant, but each moved to withdraw. At the defendant’s urging, the trial court allowed the defendant to waive his right to counsel. When the defendant subsequently requested counsel on the eve of trial, the trial court refused to appoint an attorney. A jury convicted the defendant of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. On appeal, the defendant asserts he was denied the right to counsel and challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Although the evidence supported the conviction, we conclude that the defendant did not waive or forfeit his right to counsel and reverse and remand for a new trial.

The Defendant, Brandon Lee Laferty, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revoking his probation for solicitation of aggravated sexual battery, a Class D felony, and ordering his ten-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Rashii Brisbon, was charged with aggravated child abuse and first degree (felony) murder after the death of a toddler in his care. A jury convicted him of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, but was unable to reach a verdict on the felony murder charge. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve twenty years in prison. The defendant appeals, asserting that the State did not present evidence sufficient to support the verdict, particularly the mens rea element, and that the trial court relied on inapplicable enhancement factors during sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Christopher Scott Chapman, was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, charged to the jury as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder, and the second count of the indictment was dismissed by the trial court. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and asserts: 1) that the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to the offense of aggravated assault as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder; 2) that the trial court erred by not recusing itself; 3) that the trial court erred by sentencing Defendant to the maximum sentence within the range; and 4) that the trial court erred by ordering Defendant’s sentence to run consecutively to a prior sentence for aggravated assault for which Defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense in this case. After a careful review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael Love, of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm with intent to commit a felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-four1 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to suppress a photographic lineup of the Defendant, which he asserts was unnecessarily suggestive; and (2) the trial court erred when it enhanced the Defendant’s sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentence. Having noticed, however, that there are clerical errors in the judgments of conviction for the aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm with intent to commit a felony convictions, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments.

Petitioner, Marcus Norwood, entered an Alford plea to second degree murder in Shelby County in October of 2010, with an agreed sentence of twenty-five years. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel which adversely affected his decision to enter a guilty plea. The post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a review of the evidence, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient or that the voluntariness of the guilty plea was affected by the actions of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Jereco Tynes (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree felony murder; one count of attempted aggravated robbery; one count of aggravated robbery; and one count of theft of property between $10,000 and $60,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the murder and, after a hearing, to a consecutive term of five years for the attempted aggravated robbery; a consecutive term of eight years for the aggravated robbery; and a concurrent term of four years for the theft, for an effective sentence of life plus thirteen years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) admitting into evidence proof that the Defendant had been in a homosexual relationship; (2) prohibiting defense counsel from cross-examining two co-defendants about their sentence exposure; (3) instructing the jury that evidence of a confession had been admitted; (4) failing to instruct the jury as to certain lesser-included offenses; and (5) imposing consecutive sentences. The Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to all of his convictions. We have determined that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense of theft of property over $10,000. Accordingly, we must reverse the Defendant’s conviction of theft over $10,000 and remand that charge for a new trial. As to the Defendant’s remaining issues, we find no reversible error. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgments are otherwise affirmed.

Petitioner, Donald Mickens, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. Petitioner was convicted of multiple drug offenses. As a result of the convictions, Petitioner was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See State v. Donald Mickens, No. W2009-00586-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2697164 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jul. 8, 2010). Petitioner sought pro se post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner initiated this appeal. After a review, we determine the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the post-conviction court. Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that the performance of counsel was prejudicial. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Adrain Keith Washington, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to serve twelve years in prison. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied. On appeal, he claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to argue the "rule of cancellation" and by failing to object to certain prejudicial testimony. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Adrian Chaney, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in September of 2009 for one count of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the offenses as charged in the indictment. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for the conviction for aggravated robbery, and as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years for attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-two years. Appellant did not file a motion for new trial. On appeal, he contends: (1) that the evidence was insufficient; (2) the trial court made several errors with regard to the admission of evidence; and (3) that his sentence is illegal and excessive. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant waived the consideration of any issues with exception of sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing by failing to file a motion for new trial or show plain error on the part of the trial court. Additionally, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crimes and Appellant failed to provide this Court with an adequate record to review the trial court’s determination of his status as a Range II, Multiple Offender with regard to the conviction in Count II. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Appellant, Ronald McKnight, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated burglary. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to fifteen years as a career offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

The State appeals the post-conviction court’s grant of relief to the Petitioner, Kenneth Bartley, contending that (1) the court erred in admitting the affidavit of Dr. James Murray; (2) the Petitioner failed to establish that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (3) the Petitioner is entitled to no relief on his previously determined claim that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Robert L. Conley, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2006 convictions for sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, possession with the intent to sell or deliver one-half gram of cocaine, and possession with the intent to use drug paraphernalia and his effective fourteen-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by finding that his petition was barred by the statute of limitations and by dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Joseph R. Bledsoe, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order declaring him a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender, claiming that the convictions used to support the designation were not valid. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Byron Becton (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of six counts of aggravated rape. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged each alternative count, entering three judgments of conviction for aggravated rape by use of force or coercion while armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be a weapon. The trial court also imposed an effective sentence of sixty-five years. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions and that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.