APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Charles Rice, appeals from the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and felony murder and imposed a sentence of death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal. See State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. 2006). On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the effectiveness of his counsel’s representation in both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. We hold that the post-conviction court properly found that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Derrick Lemon Goode, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of one count of the sale of .5 grams of cocaine and one count of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. State v. Derrick Lemon Goode, No. M2009-02259-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4674298, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 17, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2011). After the merger of the convictions, Petitioner was sentenced to twelve years. He was unsuccessful on appeal. Id. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. After conducting a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial; failed to adequately prepare, interview and call witnesses for trial; and failed to properly investigate his addiction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has not proven either that trial counsel’s representation was deficient, or that Petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel’s representation. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant-Appellant, Taiwan S. Hoosier, entered a guilty plea to three counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to five years each on two counts and six years on the third. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Hoosier claims the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellee, Jermaine Johnson, was indicted for one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone. The trial court granted in part and denied in part Johnson’s motion to suppress evidence. Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we granted the State’s interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s suppression of 14.5 grams of cocaine found near Johnson, and we granted Johnson’s cross-appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress 1.43 grams of cocaine found on him. Upon review, we affirm the partial denial of Johnson’s motion, reverse the court’s decision to suppress evidence, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Much aggrieved by his conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, the petitioner, Huedel Sparkman, sought post-conviction relief in the Marshall County Circuit Court, alleging that, among other things, he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner contends that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to file two motions to suppress. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Gretchen Rochowiak, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of judicial diversion for her convictions of conspiracy to introduce contraband into a penal institution and introduction of buprenorphine into a penal institution. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dakota Cisneros, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions upon guilty pleas for aggravated sexual battery and three counts of aggravated robbery and his effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by finding that his guilty pleas were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hardeman County jury convicted appellant, Jason Allen Cobb, of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting improper character evidence; (2) a witness’s false testimony violated his right to a fair trial; (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (5) the trial court erred in ordering him to serve his sentence in this case consecutively to his sentence in another case. Upon review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Cheatham County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Eugene M. Hogbin, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 20 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges both the length and the alignment of the trial court’s sentencing determination. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Lance Vogel, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession of over half a gram of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance, and habitual traffic offender, for which he received an effective forty-year sentence. In this appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Elgene Porter ("the Petitioner") was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated rape, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range I, violent offender to an effective sentence of forty-two years’ incarceration at 100%. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Shelton Hall, appeals the revocation of his Rutherford County Circuit Court community corrections sentence. Following his revocation hearing, Hall was ordered to serve consecutive sentences of eight years for his two convictions for the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and twelve years for his convictions for the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Hall argues that (1) his probation officer wrongfully violated his community corrections sentence without just cause, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in declining to appoint counsel, in determining that he had waived his issues, and in failing to consider his "Motion for Reconsideration of Judgment Orders" and "Motion for Modification of Judgment Orders." Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jose L. Hidalgo, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of four counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, one count of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect. Thereafter, the aggravated child neglect conviction was merged with the aggravated child abuse conviction. The Defendant received sentences of four years for each count of sexual battery by an authority figure, twenty years for the aggravated rape conviction, and ten years for the aggravated child abuse conviction. The trial court ordered each of the four-year sentences to run concurrently with one another but consecutive to the remaining sentences of twenty and ten years, which were likewise to be served consecutively, resulting in a total effective sentence of thirty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to testify in rebuttal as to when the victim reported the sexual abuse to her; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his aggravated child neglect conviction; and (3) whether partial consecutive sentences were appropriate. Following our review, we affirm the jury’s verdicts of guilt for each offense and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. However, we remand for entry of corrected judgment of conviction forms to properly reflect the counts as numbered in the amended indictment and the merger of the aggravated child neglect conviction into the aggravated child abuse conviction. The judgments are affirmed in part and vacated in part, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

A Madison County grand jury indicted appellant, Timothy Baxter, for one count of aggravated assault. A jury found him guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years as a persistent offender. Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault based on serious bodily injury. Specifically, he alleges that evidence of extreme physical pain did not support the determination of serious bodily injury by the jury. See Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-11-106(a)(34) (2010). He also contends that the statutory definition of serious bodily injury is unconstitutional because it is vague and thus violates due process. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Erica Harris, appeals her Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of the sale and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and evidence of poor quality in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 and that admission of a map violated her constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her. Discerning no error, we affirm.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and carrying a handgun as a felon, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years for the aggravated assault and to a consecutive term of six years as a career offender for carrying the handgun as a felon. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. She was sentenced to twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping and to a concurrent ten years for the aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping and that the trial court erred by failing to sentence her to the minimum sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Ricky Lee Nelson a/k/a Russell Wellington, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. Upon review, we conclude that petitioner has failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing an appeal of the denial of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition. Accordingly, this court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Timmy Charles McDaniel, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his convictions are void because (1) his indictment failed to state that the Grand Jurors issuing the indictment were from the county in which the offenses occurred, (2) his convictions violate the principles of double jeopardy, and (3) his dual convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated burglary violate Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d) (2010). Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Juan D. Hall, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession with intent to sell cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and coercion of a witness, for which he received an effective sentence of thirteen years. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in determining that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Justin Ellis, was convicted by a Knox County jury of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery. The aggravated assault conviction was merged with the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court imposed an effective nineteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the successor judge erroneously determined that he was qualified to act as thirteenth juror in this case. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the successor trial judge could not act as the thirteenth juror and reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion by the majority that the successor trial judge abused his discretion by finding that witness credibility was not an overriding issue in this case, and approving the jury verdicts as thirteenth juror. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial because witness credibility was “the sole issue at trial” and the original trial judge did not approve the verdict as the thirteenth juror before being replaced by a successor judge. The majority vacates the Defendant’s convictions, concluding that witness credibility was “an overriding issue and that a new trial is therefore required.”

The Petitioner, Robert Guerrero, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his indictment was so defective as to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction because it was not signed by the grand jury foreperson and was not endorsed “A True Bill.” He also alleges that the habeas corpus court erred by failing to appoint him counsel. Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Cornelius Mull, contends (1) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his jury convictions for possession with intent to sell and possession with intent to deliver over twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and (2) that his sentence of twenty years was excessive. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury convictions and that the Defendant’s sentence was not excessive.

The Defendant-Appellant, Antoine Perrier, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for attempted second degree murder in count 1, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in count 2, and aggravated assault in counts 3 through 8. He was subsequently convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter in count 1, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony in count 2, aggravated assault in counts 3 through 7, and the lesser included offense of assault in count 8. The trial court merged count three into count one before sentencing Perrier as a Range I, standard offender to four years in counts 1, five years in counts 4 through 7, and eleven months and twenty-nine days in count eight. The court also sentenced Perrier as a Range I, violent offender to a mandatory consecutive sentence of six years in count 2. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(e)(1), (h)(i) (2006). The court ordered counts 1 through 7 to be served consecutively to one another and ordered count 8 to be served concurrently with the other counts for an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, Perrier argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (2) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case solely for the purpose of correcting a clerical error on the judgment for count 4.