APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion by the majority that the successor trial judge abused his discretion by finding that witness credibility was not an overriding issue in this case, and approving the jury verdicts as thirteenth juror. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial because witness credibility was “the sole issue at trial” and the original trial judge did not approve the verdict as the thirteenth juror before being replaced by a successor judge. The majority vacates the Defendant’s convictions, concluding that witness credibility was “an overriding issue and that a new trial is therefore required.”

The Petitioner, Robert Guerrero, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his indictment was so defective as to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction because it was not signed by the grand jury foreperson and was not endorsed “A True Bill.” He also alleges that the habeas corpus court erred by failing to appoint him counsel. Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Anthony Dodson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that (1) the post-conviction court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance for the purpose of having a witness testify at the post-conviction hearing, and (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call the aforementioned witness to testify at trial for the purpose of impeaching the victim’s testimony. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, William Walker, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of possession of cocaine over 0.5 grams with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417; 39-17-425. Appellant received a sentence of 12 years for possession of cocaine for sale and 11 months, 29 days for possession of drug paraphernalia, to be served concurrently. On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm appellant’s convictions and the court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jodie Williams Henson, was indicted by a Lake County Grand Jury for vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an accident involving death. Pursuant to her plea agreement, Henson entered an open guilty plea to vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, in exchange for a sentence of ten years as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-13-213(a)(2). The charge for leaving the scene of an accident was dismissed upon entry of Henson’s guilty plea. The trial court subsequently ordered Henson to serve her sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Henson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her a probationary sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a post-conviction appeal of the trial court’s order denying appellant relief from his jury convictions of felony murder (two counts); second degree murder (two counts); aggravated burglary; and reckless endangerment. The trial court, which heard the post-conviction petition, sentenced appellant to two consecutive life sentences plus thirteen years. We affirm the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Jonathan Adams, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following his direct appeal, the Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief challenging the performance of trial counsel. Although the issue of timeliness was raised by the parties, the post-conviction court addressed the petition on the merits and denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition was timely filed, alleging two alternative dates as supplying the requisite final action of this court for purposes of the post-conviction one-year statute of limitations: (1) the date the corrected judgments were filed in accordance with this court’s order on remand; or (2) the date this court’s mandate was filed. Having reviewed the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we hold that the final action of this court was the filing date of its opinion on direct appeal, and therefore, the post-conviction petition was filed outside of the applicable one-year limitations period. The appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant, Edward William Crandall, challenges his conviction for aggravated rape of a child, a Class A felony, alleging (1) that the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient to prove penetration of the victim and to identify him as the perpetrator and (2) that the trial court erred when denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of the State’s case-in-chief because the State had failed to prove the victim’s age. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. The case is remanded to the Loudon County Criminal Court for correction of the judgments to reflect that service of Count 3 is consecutive to Count 1 and that service of Count 2 is concurrent to Count 1.

The petitioner, Phillip Douglas Seals, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two first degree murder convictions. On appeal, he argues that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) the postconviction court erred in denying his request for transcripts of the opening and closing statements so he could determine whether the original prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Appellant, Mary Faye Morrow, entered a guilty plea without a complete agreement as to a recommended sentence to one count of theft of property valued at more than $60,000. Prior to sentencing, the parties reached an agreement as to the length of the eight-year sentence but requested a sentencing hearing on the issue of whether appellant should receive an alternative sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered appellant to serve her eight-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. It is from this judgment that she now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Union County grand jury indicted appellant, Margaret Lynn McCoy, for driving under the influence, first offense; possession of a Schedule II controlled substance; and possession of drug paraphernalia, all Class A misdemeanors. The State dismissed 1 the possession of a controlled substance charge  and a jury convicted her of driving under the influence, first offense, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve concurrent terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days for each offense, with the first sixty days to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Gregory Robinson, appeals from the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. Petitioner was sentenced to death for first degree murder and twenty-five years for especially aggravated kidnapping to be served consecutively. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469 (Tenn. 2004). In this appeal of the denial of post-conviction relief, petitioner contends that (1) the State failed to disclose a statement of a witness in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the State elicited and failed to correct false testimony of a witness at trial; (3) counsel were ineffective in both phases of the trial and on appeal; and (4) the death penalty is unconstitutional. We conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied post-conviction relief. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I join Judge Page’s opinion in full. I write separately solely to express my conclusion that trial counsel cannot be found to render ineffective assistance of counsel when the record of the post-conviction proceedings reflects that trial counsel would not have had the time and/or the resources to provide the investigation performed by post-conviction counsel after the trial.

The appellant, William Carter King, appeals the Fentress County Criminal Court’s revoking the alternative sentences he received for guilty pleas to possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution, a Class C felony; burglary, a Class D felony; and theft of property valued more than five hundred dollars but less than one thousand dollars, a Class E felony. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, John Doe, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to challenge his guilty-pleaded, 1995 attempted aggravated sexual battery conviction arising in that same court. Specifically, the petitioner, whose three-year sentence was suspended, challenged his conviction based upon sanctions imposed upon him by 2004 and 2007 changes to the sexual offender registration law. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. We affirm the order of the habeas corpus court.

Appellant, Larry Lee Robertson, pled guilty to selling oxycodone in Sumner County in October of 2010. He received a sentence of six years on probation. In May of 2012, a probation violation warrant was filed alleging that Appellant violated the terms of his probation by using intoxicants to excess and pleading guilty to a public intoxication charge. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation as there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Jonathan Kyle Hulse, w as found guilty by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; and unauthorized use of a vehicle, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13- 502 (2010) (aggravated rape), 39-13-305 (2010) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-14-106 (2010) (unauthorized use of a vehicle). He was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-nine years for each of the Class A felonies and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor. The trial court ordered that the felony convictions be served consecutively, for an effective fifty-eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, (2) his dual convictions for aggravated rape and especially aggravated kidnapping violate due process principles, and (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the deceased victim’s statements about the crimes as excited utterances. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

On October 5, 2005, a Davidson County jury convicted petitioner of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and theft over $500 but less than $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Robert Lamont Moss, Jr., No. M2006-00890-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4245082, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 4, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 7, 2008). Subsequently, petitioner filed petitions for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the post-conviction petition on the merits and the coram nobis petition as time-barred. On appeal, petitioner argues that (1) trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; (2) his right to due process was denied by the trial court’s denial of funds for the defense to hire experts in eyewitness reliability and shoe print identification; and (3) he is entitled to a writ of error coram nobis. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Kristin M. Myers, was convicted by a Loudon County jury of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her statements made to authorities because she did not execute a knowing, voluntary wavier of her Miranda rights. The Defendant also contends that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support her conviction. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress her statements and that the evidence produced at trial is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Burress, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his two convictions for facilitation of aggravated robbery and ordering him to serve his effective six-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search of his person, (2) finding that he violated his probation by resisting arrest, (3) revoking his probation, and (4) ordering him to serve the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Billy Ray Irick, filed a motion to reopen his error coram nobis proceedings or, in the alternative, a second petition for writ of error coram nobis. In his pleading, he reasserted the grounds underlying his first petition for the writ and added claims of judicial misconduct pertaining to the judge in his first coram nobis proceedings. The coram nobis court in the instant case denied relief, and this appeal follows. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Gary K. Thomas, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his January 2005 conviction for simple assault. The Petitioner’s August 2012 petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his plea was not voluntary, was dismissed as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal after he requested such action. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant was found guilty after a trial by jury of aggravated arson, a Class A felony, aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, theft of property over $1000.00, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to twenty years for aggravated arson, six years for aggravated burglary, and four years for theft over $1,000.00, with all sentences to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that one of the State’s witnesses was an accomplice as a matter of law. Upon review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions and that the trial court properly instructed the jury with respect to the legal status of the State’s witness. The judgments from the trial court are affirmed.

Daniel Humphrey ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary and, pursuant to his plea agreement, was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years on community corrections. Upon the subsequent filing of a violation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence and ordered him to serve the remainder of his original sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.