APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Alexander Fuller, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revoking his probation for theft of property valued one thousand dollars or more but less than ten thousand dollars and ordering that he serve his eight-year sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Edgar Bailey, Jr., appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief because of alleged defects in the felony murder count of his indictment and because the trial court dismissed the felony murder count after remand by this court on direct appeal. We conclude that there is no error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court and affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Lamar Kashief Allen, entered guilty pleas to possession of cocaine with intent to sell an amount less than one-half gram and tampering with evidence, Class C felonies, and received an effective six-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the court. After a sentencing hearing, the court ordered confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Allen’s request for alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Victor Trezevant, appeals as of right his conviction for first degree murder committed during the perpetration of an attempted aggravated robbery, for which he received a life sentence. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction of felony murder. Specifically, Trezevant contends that the State failed to corroborate the testimony of his accomplices. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Charlie M. Gardner, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for coram nobis relief. In 1999, the Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and two counts of reckless aggravated assault for which he received an effective sentence of life without parole plus eight years. Eleven years later, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging due process requires tolling the statute of limitations based upon an undisclosed "third party confession" and an "inconclusive T.B.I. report on ballistic evidence." Upon review, we affirm dismissal of the petition.

The appellant, Jeremy Bailey, pled nolo contendere in the Hickman County Circuit Court to two counts of statutory rape, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant agreed to be sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender and received consecutive four-year sentences with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve the sentences as eleven months, twenty-nine days in jail "day for day" prior to his being released on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his requests for judicial diversion and full probation and by ordering that he serve his sentence of confinement day for day. The State concedes that the trial court erred by imposing day-for-day confinement. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion and full probation but remand for correction of the judgments to reflect that the appellant is entitled to earn good conduct credits while serving eleven months and twenty-nine days of his felony sentences in jail.

On appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s dismissal of the Defendant’s indictment due to pre-indictment delay. The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment because it misapplied the law in reaching its determination that the delay caused the Defendant actual prejudice. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

A Montgomery County jury convicted appellant, Frank Huber Sumner, of robbery. The trial court sentenced him to nine and one-half years of confinement as a multiple offender. Appellant challenges his sentence, arguing that the length of his sentence is excessive and that he should have received an alternative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Khaleefa Lambert, of first degree premeditated murder; first degree felony murder; especially aggravated kidnapping by the use of a weapon; and especially aggravated kidnapping by the infliction of serious bodily injury. The trial court merged the murder convictions and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction with the possibility of parole. The trial court also merged the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions and sentenced the appellant to eighteen years to be served consecutively to the murder conviction. On appeal, the appellant argues (1) that counts one, two, and three of the indictment should have been dismissed for failure to state an offense; (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to order the State to reveal grand jury testimony; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his murder convictions; and (4) that the trial court erred in sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the convictions and sentences. However, we vacate the judgments and remand the case to the trial court for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of the murder convictions and a single judgment reflecting the merger of the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions.

Appellant, John Robert Q. Jackson, challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court after he was revoked from community corrections. He argues that the trial court erred by considering his pending criminal allegations when ordering that he serve some of his sentences consecutively with each other. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that his record of criminal activity was extensive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Brys Andrew Hensley (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of reckless aggravated assault and was placed on judicial diversion with a probationary period of two years. The State subsequently alleged that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s judicial diversion, entered a judgment of conviction, and sentenced the Defendant. After a second hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to reconsider its previous ruling, and this appeal followed. We hold that, in revoking the Defendant’s diversion and probation, the trial court failed to exercise its statutory discretion and thereby committed reversible error. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Kiara Tashawn King, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property with a value of $500 or more, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to an effective five-year sentence, to be served on probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court failed to follow the correct sentencing procedure, imposed an excessive sentence, and erred by denying judicial diversion. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an effective sentence of five years of probation and that its decision to deny judicial diversion did not wholly depart from the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court accordingly.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Deeric McAfee, of second degree murder and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder, the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s criminal history, the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce on cross-examination a letter written by the appellant, the trial court erred by giving an instruction regarding flight, and the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Anthony Barnes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. The plea agreement provided for an effective eight year sentence and, further, that the petitioner could apply for a suspended sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in incarceration. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that the State complied with an agreement to recommend probation to the trial court. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

The petitioner, Jameel Childress, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In January, 1999, the petitioner pled guilty, in seven separate cases, to two counts of robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and one count of theft of property over $1000. Because all sentences imposed in the case were ordered to be served concurrently, the petitioner received an effective sentence of nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition because the sentences imposed are illegal, as they were statutorily required to be served consecutively because the petitioner was on bond when the offenses were committed. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for relief.

The defendant, Thomas Ray Ward, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probationary sentence. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to three counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, Class E felonies, and was given consecutive two-year sentences for each offense. However, the defendant was placed on probation for a period of eight years. A violation warrant was subsequently issued, and, at the hearing, the defendant acknowledged that he had committed the technical violations of his agreement. The trial court found the defendant to be in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation and ordered that the balance of the reinstated six-year sentence be served in incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contends that the decision to revoke was error because it was based upon the fact that the defendant had prior violations of his probation rather than on the technical violations which were established at the hearing. Following review of the record, we affirm the revocation of probation.

The Defendant-Appellant, Baleke Kromah, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for five counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. He was subsequently convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of count three and was acquitted of the remaining counts. Kromah was sentenced to ninety days of imprisonment followed by four years of probation. On appeal, Kromah argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to order the State to make an election of offenses at the close of the State’s proof. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jamey Ray Christy, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of aggravated child neglect, a Class B felony; voluntary manslaughter, vehicular homicide, and aggravated assault, all class C felonies; and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon involved, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the voluntary manslaughter and vehicular homicide convictions and imposed concurrent terms of eight years’ confinement for the vehicular homicide and aggravated assault and three years’ confinement for the reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed a consecutive term of ten years’ confinement for the aggravated child neglect conviction, for an effective sentence of eighteen years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of aggravated child neglect. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael L. Snodgrass, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking his judicial diversion for a charge of theft of property valued at less than $500 and imposing a split confinement sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with ten days to be served in jail. On appeal, he contends that the court erred in sentencing him to split confinement and imposing a requirement that he serve 75% of his sentence before eligibility for work release, furlough, trusty status and related rehabilitative programs. We affirm the denial of full probation but reverse the judgment and remand for entry of a judgment that deletes the special condition that the Defendant to serve ten days “flat” and specifies the percentage of his sentence he must serve before eligibility for rehabilitation programs.

The defendant, William Ray Boatwright, was convicted by a Knox County jury of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court merged the aggravated assault counts into the especially aggravated robbery conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to twenty-five years at 100 percent for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, twelve years at thirty percent for the aggravated robbery conviction, and twelve years at thirty percent for the aggravated burglary conviction. The court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of  forty-nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his identity as a perpetrator and argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on accomplice testimony and by enhancing his sentences within his range and ordering consecutive sentencing. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity, that the defendant has waived the issue regarding the jury instruction, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentences within his range and ordering that they be served consecutively. However, we note under plain error review that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-404 d) prohibits the defendant’s dual convictions for both especially aggravated burglary and especially aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we modify the defendant’s Class B especially aggravated burglary conviction to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and his sentence to ten years as a Range II, multiple offender for this offense. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jackie D. Seymore, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court convictions of rape of a child, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Edward Pavwoski, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein he challenged his 2009 Maury County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of two counts of rape and six counts of incest. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief, we affirm.

Tirrone Akillia Simpkins ("the Petitioner") pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II offender to an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served at 100%. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that his plea was constitutionally invalid and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with the plea submission hearing. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Shundell Lynn Dickerson, appealed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief, and this court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court. Shundell Lynn Dickerson v. State of Tennessee, No. M2011-00644-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 2564376 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, filed July 3, 2012). In that opinion, Petitioner raised the issue of whether his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on direct appeal. We acknowledged that pursuant to our supreme court’s decision in State v. Parker, 350 S.W.3d 883 (Tenn. 2011), appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence must be undertaken with respect to the offense for which a defendant was convicted rather than the greater offense with which he or she was charged. We were precluded, however, from fully considering the issue because the summary of the facts contained in our opinion in the direct appeal was not adequate to allow for review of the issue, and, through no fault of Petitioner, the appellate record in the direct appeal was destroyed in the historic Nashville flood in May, 2010. Therefore, this court could not determine from the record whether Petitioner suffered prejudice by appellate counsel’s deficient performance in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on appeal. Since the filing of that opinion, this court has granted Petitioner’s petition to rehear the issue of the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, and Petitioner has supplemented the record with copies of the trial transcript. Both parties have filed supplemental briefs. After a review of the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant pled guilty to eleven counts of observation without consent, Class A misdemeanors, two counts of stalking, Class A misdemeanors, one count of phone harassment, a Class A misdemeanor, one count of theft of property worth less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and ten counts of criminal trespass, Class C misdemeanors. The defendant was sentenced to the maximum sentence on all counts—eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of the Class A misdemeanors and thirty days on each of the Class C misdemeanors. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve all sentences consecutively, for a total effective sentence of almost sixteen years. In addition, the trial court placed a special condition on each judgment that "further ordered that the defendant shall not receive good time credit or work release" on any of his sentences. On appeal, the defendant claims the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences and ordering that he not receive "good time" credit. After careful review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the defendant to serve all of his sentences consecutively. However, the trial court was without authority to order the denial of the defendant’s statutory "good time" credit. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgments with respect to the special condition directing that the defendant be denied "good time" credit and remand the case for entry of judgments deleting this special condition. We otherwise affirm the judgments.