APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Isaiah Harris, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary sentence
for four counts of attempted second-degree murder and two counts of felony reckless
endangerment and ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement.
Following our de novo review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Clint Earl Sims, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s order denying him post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, three counts of domestic assault, three counts of vandalism less than $1,000, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of violating an order of protection. Petitioner also argues counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we conclude Petitioner’s appeal is untimely, the interest of justice does not favor waiver of the untimely notice, and therefore, this appeal is dismissed.

In 2020, the Defendant, Riki Kale Moss, was indicted for violation of the implied consent law, driving under the influence (“DUI”) by impairment, and DUI, per se. The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop of his vehicle. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion, and the State filed a motion to reconsider on the grounds that law enforcement had probable cause to stop the Defendant’s vehicle. The trial court issued a revised order denying the motion to suppress, and a jury convicted the Defendant of DUI by impairment and DUI per se. The Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Christopher David Pace, entered a partially open plea in which the length of his
sentence was agreed upon. The trial court would determine the manner of service at a
separate sentencing hearing. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred because
it relied only upon a “Specific Data Report” in sentencing Defendant. Alternatively,
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s request
for alternative sentencing. The State concedes that it was reversible error for the trial court
to sentence Defendant without a presentence report. We find that the trial court erred in
failing to consider the validated risk and needs assessment as required by Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-35-210(b)(8). However, we conclude that the issue is waived. We
further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s
request for alternative sentencing. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jessie Lee Short, was convicted by a Hardin County Circuit Court jury of
two counts of false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor, and three counts of assault, a
Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-302(a) (2018) (subsequently amended) (false
imprisonment); 39-13-101(a)(2) (2018) (assault). The trial court imposed concurrent
sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement at 75% service. On appeal,
the Defendant contends that he was deprived of his right to equal protection under the law
when the State exercised a peremptory challenge against a black prospective juror without
articulating a valid race-neutral reason. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Mark Anthony Clemmons, appeals as of right from the Wilson County Criminal
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his guiltypleaded
convictions for possession with intent to sell not less than one-half ounce nor more
than ten pounds of marijuana; possession with intent to sell a Schedule III controlled
substance (dihydrocodeinone); and two counts of sale of not less than one-half ounce nor
more than ten pounds of marijuana, for which the trial court imposed an effective twentyseven-
year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to explain the consequences of entering an
open plea. Following our review, we affirm.

In this case of first impression, the State appeals the trial court’s sentencing hearing order
that the Defendant’s two life sentences be served concurrently after he was determined to
be ineligible for the death penalty due to intellectual disability pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-13-203(g) (Supp. 2021) (subsequently amended). The State argues
that the consecutive alignment of the Defendant’s original sentences remained final and
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider manner of service. The Defendant
responds that the trial court had jurisdiction to sentence him, including determining the
manner of service of his sentences, and did not abuse its discretion in imposing concurrent
life sentences. After considering the arguments of the parties, the rules of statutory
construction, and other applicable legal authority, we conclude that the trial court properly
acted within its discretion in conducting a hearing to determine the manner of service of
the Defendant’s life sentences. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed

The Defendant, Sarah N. Eakes, pleaded guilty to one count of child neglect, and the trial court sentenced her to serve eighteen months in confinement and denied her request for both an alternative sentence and judicial diversion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her requests for an alternative sentence and judicial diversion, and she asks this court to enter an order granting both. The State concedes that the trial court failed to consider or weigh the relevant factors in its denial, but it asks this court to remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. After review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and grant judicial diversion. The matter is remanded to the trial court for the imposition of the conditions, and term of judicial diversion, with the term not to exceed eighteen months.

The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion of the defendant, Mark David Bond, to suppress evidence seized during the search of his vehicle after a drug detection canine indicated the presence of narcotics during a sweep around the perimeter of the vehicle. The State challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the canine’s reaction was unreliable due to the canine’s inability to distinguish between the odor of illegal marijuana and the odor of legal hemp. After review, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress, reinstate the indictment against the defendant, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

I have the privilege to join the majority’s well-reasoned opinion in significant part.
The majority concludes that the evidence is sufficient to uphold the Defendant’s conviction
for DUI. I agree. The standard of review controls the analysis, and it requires us to view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to discard all countervailing evidence.
State v. Weems, 619 S.W.3d 208, 221 (Tenn. 2021). Using this standard, I agree that a
rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.

The Defendant, Demarcus Taiwan Russell, Jr., was convicted by a Greene County Criminal
Court jury of driving under the influence (“DUI”), simple possession of marijuana, driving
on a suspended license, and speeding. He was sentenced by the trial court to an effective
term of 11 months, 29 days, suspended to supervised probation after service of two days in
the county jail. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his DUI
conviction and argues that the State made an improper closing argument. Based on our
review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Deshaun Ward, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s revocation of the probation that he had received for his negotiated plea to reckless vehicular homicide and two counts of vehicular assault. On appeal the Defendant contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Carl Paige, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder and agreed to an eight-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to a term of eight years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request to suspend his sentence to probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Chester County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Jerry Ray Mullins, for the first-degree
murder of the victim, Samantha Melendez. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the
lesser-included offense of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a twenty-twoyear
sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues
that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he acted in self-defense
when he shot the victim twice in the head. Following our review of the entire record and
the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Benjamin Spencer Brown, appeals the trial court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences for his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of
criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Sean Longmire, of one count of first degree
murder and three counts of attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the Defendant asserts
that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review, we
affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, James Stephen Carder, was indicted by the Marshall County Grand Jury for 36 counts of theft of property in amounts ranging from less than $1,000 to $60,000 and two counts of aggregate theft in an amount greater than $60,000 but less than $250,000. Five of the theft counts were dismissed after the close of the State’s proof, and a petit jury convicted Defendant of 24 theft counts and both aggregate theft counts. The trial court merged those individual theft convictions involving the same victim and also merged the two counts of aggregate theft, and the court sentenced Defendant as a Range II offender to an effective 20 years’ incarceration and ordered him to pay $134,990 in restitution. In this appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that law enforcement improperly investigated the case and interfered with his contracts. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand this case to the trial court for entry of amended judgment forms to reflect the merger of the 24 individual theft convictions into count 37, the one aggregate theft conviction.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant, Rodney Paul Beech, pled guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”) and DUI per se and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to probation after service of forty-eight hours in jail. As a condition of his plea, the defendant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress based on lack of reasonable suspicion for the stop of his vehicle. Upon our review, we conclude the defendant failed to properly certify the question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2). Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, Erick Bailey, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for
fingerprint analysis under the Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act of 2021. After
review, we conclude the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in summarily
dismissing the petition and affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Mack Mandrell Loyde, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Glenard Cortez Thorne, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis by the Davidson County Criminal Court, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because newly discovered evidence exists in his case. After our review, we conclude the petition is untimely and does not present a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The pro se Defendant, Marquette Benson, aka Marquette Mukes, appeals the summary
denial of his September 6, 2022 Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to
correct an illegal sentence. Because it is clear that the Defendant’s September 6, 2022
filing is merely a request for the trial court to reconsider its denial of the Defendant’s first
Rule 36.1 motion, which was summarily denied on October 4, 2021 for failure to state a
colorable claim, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant, Derrick Johnson, of
conspiracy to possess with the intent to sell 150 grams or more of heroin in Count 1 and
conspiracy to possess with the intent to deliver 150 grams or more of heroin in Count 2,
and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, the
Defendant argues (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial
court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present evidence of the November 19,
2017 phone conversations on redirect examination; (3) the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to replay the October 25, 2017 phone recordings for the jury; (4) the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor, during its
rebuttal closing argument, improperly commented on the Defendant’s constitutional right
to remain silent; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an effective
eighteen-year sentence. After review, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment
forms in Counts 1 and 2 as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of
the trial court are affirmed.

Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the defendant, Casey DeWayne
Hodge, appeals one certified question of law related to the trial court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss in which he alleged a speedy trial violation and two certified questions of law
related to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress in which he challenged the
constitutionality of a traffic stop. Discerning no error, we affirm. We remand for entry of
judgments on Counts 2 and 3 reflecting that the charges were dismissed in accordance with
the plea agreement.

Defendant, Hilton Lee Chatman, was charged in an eleven-count indictment on drugrelated offenses. A jury convicted him of possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in Count 1; possession with intent to sell heroin in Count 3; possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony drug offense in Count 10; and possession of drug paraphernalia in Count 11. Defendant was found not guilty of the remaining seven counts of the indictment. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-four years and six months. On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, his sentence is excessive, his motion for new trial was erroneously denied, and the trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure when it rejected his guilty plea. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and applicable authority, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.