APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner pled guilty in Smith County to one count of aggravated statutory rape and one count of criminal exposure to HIV and received an effective sentence of twenty years. The petitioner’s guilty pleas were entered with the condition that he reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the search and seizure of certain evidence. The Court dismissed the appeal based on a lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner brought this post-conviction petition asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective in reserving the certified question and bringing the appeal. The post-conviction court dismissed the claim without a hearing or the appointment of counsel, finding that the issues had been previously determined on direct appeal. See T.C.A. § 40-30-106(h) (2010). The petitioner appeals, asserting that this Court on direct appeal concluded it was without jurisdiction and did not rule on the merits of his claims. After a thorough examination of the facts and law, we conclude that the petitioner has stated a colorable claim; and we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Appellant, James A. Lambert, was indicted by the McNairy County Grand Jury for rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, attempted aggravated sexual battery, and incest. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of rape of a child, incest, and aggravated sexual battery. One count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery were later dismissed. As a result of the convictions, Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-five years at 100 percent. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Jeremy J. Edick (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of solicitation of rape of a child, and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fifty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his conviction for rape of a child. He also argues that the trial court erred in ordering partial consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I write separately to address the current split of authority on the standard to be applied to appellate review of consecutive sentencing.

The defendant, Mikel C. Hamrick, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for reinstatement of his probationary sentence. Because the trial court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the defendant’s probation, we affirm.

The petitioner, Leon Morris, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Jiovani Castillo Galeana, petitioned the Davidson County Criminal Court for post-conviction relief from his 2011 guilty-pleaded conviction of possession with intent to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine. The conviction resulted in a Range I sentence of 18 years to serve in the Department of Correction. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and following our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

Don Mask Brown, Jr., (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of fifty-five years’ incarceration. The Petitioner, pro se, subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant-Appellant, Donta Henry Ivory, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. Ivory entered a guilty plea to statutory rape, and he received a suspended sentence of two years. In a separate case, he later entered a best interest plea to an amended charge of aggravated assault and received a five-year suspended sentence concurrent with the previous two-year sentence. On appeal, Ivory argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Scotty Dale Staggs, was indicted by an Overton County Grand Jury for aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000, theft of property valued at $500 or less, and evading arrest. Prior to trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi on the charge of theft of property valued at $500 or less. Staggs was subsequently convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000, a Class E felony; and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to concurrent sentences of fifteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction and six years for the theft conviction and sentenced him to a concurrent sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor evading arrest conviction, for an effective sentence of fifteen years in confinement. On appeal, Staggs argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000, and evading arrest; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever the evading arrest charge from the aggravated burglary and theft charges; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the victims’ surveillance videotape into evidence; (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight; (5) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its opening statement; and (6) his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Stephen Miguel Hernandez, and co-defendant, Justin Dexter Brummett, were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in October of 2010 for first degree murder and aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of felony murder and the lesser included offense of facilitation of aggravated robbery. As a result of the convictions, Appellant was sentenced to life in prison for the felony murder conviction and five years for the facilitation of aggravated robbery conviction, to be served concurrently with the life sentence. After the denial of a timely motion for new trial, Appellant appealed. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly the credibility of his accomplice’s testimony. After a thorough review of the record and authorities, we determine that the testimony of co-defendant Brummett was sufficiency corroborated by other State witnesses. Further, the jury assessed the credibility of the witnesses and determined that the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for felony murder and facilitation of aggravated robbery, a task within their province. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, James Wallie Robertson, appeals the Lawrence County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1995 guilty pleas to first degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, automobile burglary, two counts of forgery, and passing a forged check and his effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-five years. He contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Williamson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Robert Jason Burdick, of rape, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions, and the trial court’s jury instructions regarding the kidnapping offense in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Tony Dixon, of attempted aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I, standard offender to three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s admission of hearsay evidence indicating that the victim did not consent to the appellant’s entering the apartment, and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that an accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Corey D. Gilbert, of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a mandatory life sentence for the felony murder conviction and a three-year sentence for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the evidence supporting his conviction for attempted aggravated robbery as the underlying offense for the felony murder conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Petitioner, Orlando M. Ladd, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for possession with intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone, evading arrest, possession of drug paraphernalia, and two counts of felony simple possession of a controlled substance. He entered a negotiated plea to possession with intent to sell or deliver, evading arrest and one count of simple possession. He received an effective sentence of twelve years to serve at forty-five percent incarceration to be served concurrently to a twelve-year sentence he was already serving at the time of sentencing. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he entered his guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily. The post-conviction court held a hearing and denied the petition. Petitioner appeals that denial to this Court. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petition was properly denied, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Wesley Dawone Coleman, was indicted by the Obion County Grand Jury for aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at over $500, and evading arrest. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of theft of property valued at over $500, aggravated burglary, and evading arrest. As a result of the convictions, Appellant received an effective sentence of ten years. Appellant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for the theft and aggravated burglary convictions as well as his sentence. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years in incarceration.

This direct appeal presents a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, the Defendant, Michael D. Boone, entered a guilty plea in the Davidson County Criminal Court to possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, a Class B felony, and possession with intent to sell or deliver not less than one-half ounce or more than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. The trial court ordered the agreed sentence of twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Boone properly reserved the following certified question of law: “Does the affidavit of probable cause in the warrant . . . contain sufficient information to establish a nexus between the residence to be searched and criminal activity; and, if so, does the affidavit further contain reliable information of ongoing criminal activity so as to establish probable cause . . . ?” After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined the affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to support the search warrant. As such, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and we affirm the Defendant’s judgments of conviction.

Appellant, Lee Weaver, Jr., was indicted by the Hardin County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault based upon an altercation with his wife which resulted in her broken arm; one count of felony evading arrest; one count of reckless endangerment; and one count of resisting arrest. He entered a negotiated plea to the charges which resulted in an effective sentence of three years. Appellant requested alternative sentencing. After a hearing, the trial court denied his request. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to serve his sentence in Community Corrections or in the alternative to some form of probation. After a review of the record, we conclude: (1) that Appellant is not eligible for Community Corrections because he committed aggravated assault which is an offense against a person; and (2) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying probation because it was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Because of the great deference afforded to a magistrate judge when making a probable cause determination, I concur with the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. I write separately, however, to express my reluctance in affirming the Defendant’s convictions. As an initial matter, there are several concerns with the affidavit. It contained a single introductory statement that the detective “received information that illegal narcotics were at the premises of 1409 Jackson Street.” However, it failed to provide the source of this information, the point in time when this information was received by the detective, or any specific details regarding the target residence or the illegal narcotics activity. Nothing in the affidavit established that the confidential informant knew that “John” was engaged in the sale of illegal narcotics from the target residence, that the target residence had been under police surveillance, or that any surveillance had uncovered illegal narcotics activity at or around the target residence. There is simply nothing in the affidavit connecting the confidential informant to the Defendant or the target residence. Finally, the affidavit failed to show any effort by law enforcement to identify the Defendant or establish that the target residence was, in fact, the Defendant’s home.
 

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the denial of a motion to recuse the trial court judge from presiding over a civil action in which one of the Defendants served on a non-profit board with the trial court judge. Having reviewed the Plaintiff’s petition for recusal appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, we affirm the Trial Court’s denial of the motion to recuse.

Defendant, Marcus Terrell Church, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. His first trial ended in a mistrial. At a subsequent trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years as a Range II offender for aggravated robbery and twenty-five years as a Range I offender for especially aggravated kidnapping. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress identification evidence; (2) the trial court improperly admitted evidence that Defendant committed an unrelated purse-snatching during the kidnapping in this case; (3) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony concerning Defendant’s nickname; and (4) the trial court improperly sentenced Defendant. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I do not believe, however, that this court’s standard of review of hearsay in State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008), was "repudiated" or rejected by our supreme court in Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 871 n.26 (Tenn. 2008). In fact, the supreme court noted that the trial court’s ruling was error under either standard of review. Id. This is certainly not a rejection of Gilley.

I write separately to express my belief that in Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 871 n.26 (Tenn. 2008), the Tennessee Supreme Court indeed "repudiated" or rejected the de novo standard for review of hearsay issues adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 759-60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). The word "repudiate" means "to reject as having no authority or binding force." Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1636 (2nd ed. 1996). When I first joined Judge Witt’s decision in Gilley, I believed that we were setting forth a new and correct standard of review for hearsay issues and that we were providing a clear first step for any such analysis in the trial court. I still have nothing but respect for both Judge Witt’s reasoning and his conclusion in that case.

The appellant, Charles Clevenger, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of felony evading arrest, three counts of misdemeanor simple possession, three counts of felony simple possession, possession of a legend drug, failure to obey a traffic control device, and violation of the financial responsibility law. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective forty year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the aggravated robbery convictions, that the trial court erred by ruling he could be impeached with prior convictions if he decided to testify, and that some of his convictions violate double jeopardy protections. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s conviction for aggravated robbery by violence and that the conviction must be reversed. Moreover, we conclude that his convictions for misdemeanor simple possession of oxycodone, felony simple possession of oxycodone, and possession of a legend drug are multiplicitous with his remaining aggravated robbery conviction. Therefore, those three convictions are vacated and the charges are dismissed. The appellant’s remaining convictions and resulting effective forty-year sentence are affirmed.