APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Timothy P. Guilfoy (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape of a child, four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of assault. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty years for each of the rapes, ten years for each of the aggravated sexual batteries, and six months for the assault. The trial court ordered partial consecutive service, resulting in an effective sentence of seventy years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends as follows: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask leading questions of one of the victims; (2) the trial court erred in admitting two expert opinions; (3) the trial court erred in admitting recordings of phone calls between the Defendant and the victims’ mother; (4) the trial court erred in admitting the videotaped forensic interviews of the victims as substantive evidence; (5) the State’s election of offenses was ineffective; (6) the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; (7) cumulative errors entitle him to a new trial; and (8) his sentence is excessive. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we merge the Defendant’s two convictions of aggravated sexual battery entered on Counts One and Two into a single conviction of aggravated sexual battery. We also merge the Defendant’s two convictions of rape of a child into a single conviction of rape of a child. Finally, we merge the Defendant’s conviction of assault into his conviction of aggravated sexual battery entered on Count Three. In light of our holdings, we remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing. The Defendant’s convictions are otherwise affirmed.
 

The Petitioner, Gregory Justice, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his jury convictions for possession with the intent to sell or deliver one-half gram or more of a controlled substance, facilitation of the sale of less than one-half gram of a controlled substance, and felonious possession of marijuana, and his concurrent sentences of fourteen years, five years, and three years, respectively. The Petitioner contends that the convictions should be set aside and that he should be granted a new trial because (1) the count charging possession with the intent to sell or deliver more than one-half gram of a controlled substance was duplicitous, (2) he was denied his constitutional right to a trial by a jury and jury unanimity, and (3) trial counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, Jonathan Fortener, appeals the Monroe County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of one count of second degree murder and sentenced to a term of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying the petition because trial counsel was ineffective in that he had reason to know of mitigating factors, failed to investigate those mitigating factors, and failed to hire an expert to present evidence of the mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing. The petitioner also faults the post-conviction court for failing to allow testimony at the post-conviction hearing regarding traumatic brain injuries. Following our review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.

The defendant, Demeko Gerard Duckworth, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during a dangerous offense, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever offenses, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by imposing partially consecutive sentences. Because we discern no reversible error, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

A jury convicted appellants, Deangelo M. Moody and Martez D. Matthews, of first degree murder. The trial court imposed life sentences. On appeal, both appellants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. In addition, appellant Matthews argues that the trial court erred in the following rulings: (1) admitting a hearsay statement pertaining to motive that was attributed to a severed co-defendant; (2) allowing certain statements, including “gang lingo”; (3) permitting testimony regarding witnesses’ gang involvement for impeachment purposes; (4) admitting evidence of the personal history between two witnesses; (5) allowing the State to introduce a crime scene photograph that depicted a pool of blood; and (6) permitting the State to introduce proof of his conviction for possession of a handgun. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand this cause for entry of judgment forms reflecting dismissal of appellant Matthews’s indictment for employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony and appellant Moody’s acquittal of the same charge.

The Defendant, Ray Neil Thompson, entered an “open” plea to two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of evading arrest. The trial court determined that the Defendant was a Range III, persistent offender and imposed sentences of twenty-three years at 100% for each of the aggravated robbery convictions and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction. The trial court further ordered that those sentences were to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to a prior twenty-seven-year sentence at 100% for aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant argues that trial court erred by ordering 100% release eligibility for his aggravated robbery convictions pursuant to the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(k)(2) and in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Marcus Pearson, challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. He contends, and the State concedes, (1) that the date the trial court used to determine the timeliness of the petition was incorrect and (2) that an evidentiary hearing is necessary. We agree. Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of the post-conviction petition is reversed, and the case is remanded for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.
 

The defendant, Thomas G. McConnell, appeals a certified question of law from the Williamson County Circuit Court, where he pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”). The reserved certified question challenges on constitutional grounds a police officer’s basis for stopping his vehicle. The State concedes that the stop of the defendant’s vehicle violated his constitutional protection from unreasonable seizure and advocates reversal of the defendant’s conviction. Because we agree with the parties that the stop of the defendant’s vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge against the defendant.
 

In this delayed appeal, the defendant, James William Axford, II, contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering that he serve in confinement the originally imposed sentence of three years for his convictions of fraudulently obtaining a controlled substance, evading arrest, identity theft, and aggravated assault. Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

The Petitioner, Mario Ramirez Rodriguez, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus relief. On appeal, the Petitioner claims his allegations regarding the age of the victim, his incorrect release eligibility noted on the judgment form for Count 2, and the failure of the trial court to impose the required statutory fines, could be proven upon an evidentiary hearing and should not have been deemed merely clerical errors. We conclude that there is no reversible error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court and affirm.
 

The Defendant, Terrance Megel Jordan, was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; rape, a Class B felony; aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony; and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-502 (2010) (aggravated rape), 39-13-503 (2010) (rape), 39-13-506 (2010) (amended 2012) (aggravated statutory rape), 39-16-603 (2010) (evading arrest). The rape and aggravated statutory rape convictions were merged with the aggravated rape conviction, although the trial court later vacated the aggravated statutory rape count. For aggravated rape, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-five years, to be served at 100%. For evading arrest, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. The sentences were imposed concurrrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of aggravated rape and rape; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the victim’s statements to a social worker; and (3) the assistant district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct during the opening statement. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions, but we vacate the rape and aggravated rape judgments and remand the case for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of these convictions

The petitioner, Adrian Deangelo Todd, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the post-conviction court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance of the post-conviction hearing and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Appellant, Somer M. Bullard, was convicted of six counts of aggravated robbery representing two alternate theories of three separate offenses. The trial court merged the two convictions for each offense and sentenced appellant to concurrent sentences of eleven years for each of the three convictions, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant raises the following issues in this direct appeal: (1) whether the trial court violated her right to a speedy trial; and (2) whether the trial court erred in sentencing her to an eleven-year effective sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case is the consolidated appeal of two defendants, Franscisco I. Bustamonte and Scott Carroll, Jr., who were convicted for the initiation of a process intended to result in methamphetamine, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant Carroll as a Career Offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court sentenced Defendant Bustamonte as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Carroll contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of the residence. Additionally, both Defendants assert that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to amend the indictment to change the date of the offense; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction; (3) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the charges of manufacture of methamphetamine, promotion of methamphetamine, and unlawful drug paraphernalia; (4) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the State’s inventory list of the ingredients found during a search of the residence and photographs taken during the search; and (5) the trial court erred when it sentenced them. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgments.
 

Titus Miller (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for possession of marijuana and evading arrest. In his petition, he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that his counsel at trial was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se petitioner, Louis Tyrone Robinson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the “suppressed” transcript of his trial sentencing hearing constitutes newly discovered evidence of his innocence. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted appellant, Marie Delaluz Urbano-Uriostegui, for one count of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child neglect, both Class A felonies. A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated child abuse and not guilty of aggravated child neglect. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve sixteen years at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant caused the victim’s injuries; (2) whether the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments constituted reversible error; (3) whether the trial court erred by improperly admitting an expert in child maltreatment; (4) whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to obtain a medical expert to testify on appellant’s behalf; and (5) whether newly discovered evidence justifies a new trial. Discerning no error in the proceedings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2003, a Putnam County jury convicted the Petitioner, Earl Vantrease, Jr., of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to serve sixteen years, at 35%. In 2006, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that his judgment was void. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and this Court originally affirmed. Earl Vantrease, Jr. v. Wayne Brandon, Warden, No. M2006-02414-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 2917783, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 9, 2007), petition rehearing granted, Dec. 14, 2007. The Petitioner filed a motion for a rehearing, provided additional documentation, and this Court reversed itself and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. Id. at *6. After an evidentiary hearing, the habeas corpus court again dismissed the Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner did not appeal, but, instead, he filed a second petition for habeas corpus relief. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s second petition for habeas corpus relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his second petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus.

The Defendant, Antonious Jamal Brown, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his jury conviction for first degree murder. Specifically, he contends that there was insufficient evidence presented to prove that he shot the victim and that he did so with premeditation. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Sampson Joseph McCoy, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and received an eight-year sentence. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve his entire sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, James Hayes, pled guilty in the White County Criminal Court to driving under the influence (DUI) and reserved a certified question of law concerning whether the police had reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. Upon review, we conclude that the appellant failed to properly certify his question of law. Therefore, we are compelled to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Petitioner, James Paul Kinard, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for three counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective sentence of seventy-five years in confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Dane Sayles, alias Bradley Harper (“the Defendant”), was convicted by a jury of possession with the intent to sell or deliver three hundred grams or more of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to forty years to be served consecutively to previous sentences the Defendant received in Pennsylvania. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the stop and search of his vehicle, as well as the seizure of cell phone text messages. The Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in “permitting the State to continue adding witnesses in the middle of trial whose names were not provided in discovery.” Finally, the Defendant challenges the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Campbell County jury found petitioner, Crystal Miranda Kirby, guilty of first degree premeditated murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced her to an effective life sentence. On direct appeal, this court ordered the merger of the two murder convictions but denied relief in all other respects. Petitioner then filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, claiming that the State violated her due process rights under Brady v. Maryland by withholding two video-taped statements that were allegedly exculpatory in nature. After thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Cayetano Ramirez, of attempted rape of a child. The trial court imposed a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges (1) the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress his statement to police, (2) an alleged Brady violation, (3) the admission of a prior act in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (4) the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.