APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Kenneth Gaines, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in September of 2009 with two counts of aggravated assault and one count of reckless endangerment. Appellant pled guilty to all three charges. Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Appellant was placed on judicial diversion for three years under the supervision of the department of probation. The State filed a petition for revocation of Appellant’s probation in March of 2011 after Appellant was charged with rape, failed to report the arrest, failed to pay court costs, and failed to pay probation fees. After a jury trial on the rape charge, Appellant was convicted of the lesser included offense of assault. The trial court approved the jury verdict, terminated Appellant’s judicial diversion, and set both matters for a sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six years for each aggravated assault conviction and two years for the reckless endangerment conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the six-month sentence Appellant received for the assault conviction, for a total effective sentence of six years and six months. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, he challenges the termination of judicial diversion without a formal hearing and insists that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s rights to due process were not violated when the trial court made the determination that Appellant violated the terms of his judicial diversion contemporaneously with his trial on subsequent charges. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to an effective sentence of six years and six months. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Delmonta Hill, entered a best interest plea to reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-101 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by failing to classify him as an especially mitigated offender and (2) by denying him judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Tarence Nelson, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that: 1) the State failed to prove that Defendant did not act in self-defense; 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a revolver found during the search of Defendant’s residence that was not the murder weapon; 3) the prosecutor misquoted Defendant during closing argument in an inflammatory manner; and 4) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Carlos Ponce DeLeon, entered best interest guilty pleas to theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, two counts of automobile burglary, Class E felonies, theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000, a Class E felony, and two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less, Class A misdemeanors. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-402, 39-14-103, 39-14-105 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to six years for the theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000 conviction, four years for each automobile burglary conviction, three years for the theft of property value at more than $500 but less than $1000 conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each theft of property valued at $500 or less conviction. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing for an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his effective sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Defendant, Steven O. Hughes-Mabry, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone, introduction of contraband into a penal institution, and driving on a suspended license. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of fifteen years, three years, and six months, respectively. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that the possession offense occurred within 1000 feet of a school zone; and (3) the trial court’s refusal to impose sanctions against the State for failing to preserve the identity of a witness. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Ernest Dodd, was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury in 2010 along with three other defendants for initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine and promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine. Appellant was convicted by a jury of initiating a process to manufacture methamphetamine and attempt to promote the manufacture of methamphetamine. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of nineteen years at thirty-five percent. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, he presents the following issues: (1) whether the trial court improperly denied Appellant’s motion in limine to exclude photographs of precursors to manufacturing methamphetamine; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (4) whether the convictions should be reversed for cumulative error. After a review of the record, we determine: (1) that the trial court properly admitted photographs of the precursors to manufacturing methamphetamine where the actual evidence was destroyed as hazardous material; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; and (3) the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
 

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dean Heath, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the murder convictions and imposed a total sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the murder conviction and a concurrent twenty-five-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of felony murder. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Ashley Mai Cook, was convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, for which she received consecutive sentences of life in prison and twenty years, respectively. In this petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner alleges that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise her with regard to whether to testify at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

This appeal arises from the second jury trial in this matter. At his first trial, a Davidson County jury convicted appellant, Willie Earl Brown, Jr., of eleven counts of rape of a child, and he received a sentence of seventy-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this court reversed his convictions based on the improper admission of evidence relating to uncharged sexual conduct and remanded for a new trial. See State v. Willie Earl Brown, Jr., No. M2009-00505-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4396490, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2010). Following the remand, the parties amended the indictment to charge eight counts of rape of a child. At his second trial, the jury convicted him as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of eighty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, appellant argues that (1) the State’s election of offenses failed to distinguish count seven from counts one and four; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s forensic interview; (3) the trial court erred by imposing a harsher sentence after appellant’s second trial; and (4) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
 

The Defendant, Scotty Wayne Poarch, challenges (1) the length of his sentence imposed by the trial court as a result of his guilty pleas and (2) the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we discern no error in the trial court’s determinations and affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, Omar Theron Davis, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2006 Montgomery County Circuit Court convictions of aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft of property valued over $500, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the Circuit Court.
 

Defendant, Daniel David Colby, was charged in a presentment returned by the Dickson County Grand Jury with two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. He subsequently was allowed to plead guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, in lieu of the greater offense of rape of a child. Defendant submitted to the trial court’s determination the length and manner of service of the sentences following a hearing. The trial court imposed the minimum sentence of eight (8) years for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. In Defendant’s only issue on appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review, we affirm the sentences and the imposition of consecutive sentencing, but remand to the trial court for entry of appropriate amended judgments which set forth all pretrial jail credits to which Defendant may be entitled, and for correction to show the convictions are in Dickson County rather than Anderson County.
 

The defendant was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to twenty-five years for the kidnapping conviction and to a consecutive ten years for the aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, the defendant claims that: 1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; 2) the trial court erred by failing to apply a mitigating factor at sentencing; and 3) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. After a careful review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Rodney McAlister, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 conviction for vandalism of more than $1000 but less than $10,000 and his five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Kimar Rashad Peebles, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when sentencing him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

The appellant, Toni S. Davis, entered a plea of guilty to six counts of the sale and delivery of Suboxone, a Schedule III controlled substance used for treatment of opioid addiction. The trial court denied her request for judicial diversion, instead imposing concurrent two-year suspended sentences. The appellant challenges the denial of judicial diversion and also the imposition of a special condition of her probation that she must petition the trial court if she wishes to remain in her Suboxone treatment program for opiate addiction past six months. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Vincent Clifton (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, and one count of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, with no agreement as to his sentences. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-five years. The trial court also ordered the Defendant to serve his thirty-five-year sentence consecutively to a previous sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. We remand the case solely for correction of a clerical error on one of the judgment orders.

The appellant, William, Henry Smith, Jr., appeals his Bedford County jury conviction for Driving while Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. He also states that his six year sentence in the Department of Correction was excessive. Finding the evidence sufficient and the sentence proper, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Defendant, Marlo Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder and reckless homicide. Subsequently, the trial court merged the reckless homicide into the second degree murder conviction and imposed a sentence of forty years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions; (2) the mutually exclusive nature of the verdicts and whether the offenses were properly merged; (3) the admission of prior inconsistent statements by a witness, who had no memory of making those statements at the time of trial, as substantive evidence; (4) the imposition of the maximum forty-year sentence in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James G. Coons, II ("the petitioner") filed for post-conviction relief from his open plea of guilty to the lesser included offense of Second Degree Murder and received a maximum Range II sentence of 40 years in the Department of Correction. Specifically, he asserts that counsel did not investigate or prepare for trial properly or advise him properly as to the possibilities of sentencing. The petition was denied and this appeal followed. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court

The Appellant, Jerrico D. Graves, appeals as of right from the trial court’s revocation of his probation for Aggravated Assault. Although admitting to the violation, the appellant argues that ordering the original sentence of six years to be served in the Department of Correction was not ‘the right thing to do” because of his mental health issues. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of probation and the appellant's sentence to the Department of Correction.
 

The petitioner, Kenneth Miller, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine, delivery of 300 grams or more of cocaine, and possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

The Petitioner, Gerald Branden Fitzpatrick, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eleven years in confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal when the minor victim placed the date of the crime outside the dates alleged in the indictment; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify through anatomical drawings rather than verbal testimony, which permitted the State to lead the victim; and (4) the trial court erred by allowing two State witnesses to give hearsay testimony. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Defendant, Gabriella M. Dorado, pled guilty to attempted possession with intent to sell a Schedule I controlled substance, simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective six-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, claiming that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which constituted a “manifest injustice.” After a hearing, the trial court denied her motion. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial, claiming the trial court erred when it found that she had not proved that Counsel’s representation prejudiced her. After a thorough review of the applicable law and the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Timothy Clinger, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion for this court to affirm pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Having reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.