APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Daniel E. Pottebaum, Sr., contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his retrial and cites the following bases in support of that contention: (1) trial counsel’s failure to object to the Petitioner’s testimony from his first trial being read into the record at his second trial where he chose not to testify; (2) trial counsel’s failure to move for a severance of the domestic assault offense from the unrelated sexual abuse offenses; and (3) trial counsel’s failure to object to the jury instruction on flight. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Antonio Grandberry (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of especially aggravated robbery. Pursuant to an agreement between the Defendant and the State, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eighteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Additionally, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the offense of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of especially aggravated robbery or any of the lesser-included offenses pertaining to robbery but is sufficient as to the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Accordingly, we modify the Defendant’s especially aggravated robbery conviction to aggravated assault and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing.

I concur in results only. My primary disagreement with the majority’s opinion is the reliance therein upon State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) and State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) for the proposition that “Appellate review of hearsay issues is guided by the de novo standard of review.” Judge Witt wrote both of these scholarly opinions, and quite candidly, I am unable to conclude that the conclusion reached therein on the issue in question is not the most appropriate legal conclusion. Nevertheless, our supreme court cited Gilley in a footnote in Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 871 n.26 (Tenn. 2008) and declined to adopt the de novo standard of review. After noting that Judge Witt “advocates for review of . . . rulings on whether the proffered testimony was hearsay under a de novo standard of review” in his dissent in this court in Pylant v. State, No. M2005-02721-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 1890178, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2007) (Witt, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), the supreme court, in effect, declined to accept what Judge Witt advocated as the definitive standard of review and concluded the footnote by stating,

Although this Court continues to believe that questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, we note that in this instance, the post-conviction court committed error under either standard of review.

Pylant, 263 S.W.3d at 871 n.26 (emphasis added)

The defendant, Herman McKinley, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder, attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and unlawful possession of a handgun as a convicted felony. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to an effective term of one hundred thirty-one years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Following review of the record, we affirm the convictions and sentences as imposed.

The petitioner, Sidney Porterfield, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Porterfield, 746 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1988). After his petition for post-conviction relief was denied, the petitioner filed a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, maintaining that he was intellectually disabled and thus ineligible to be sentenced to death. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petitioner relief, and the petitioner appealed. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Larry D. Rothwell, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-one years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant has presented the following issues for our review on appeal: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by excusing a juror; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow introduction of portions of a witness’s pretrial interview; (3) whether the trial court improperly excluded evidence about how the fight between Appellant and the victim started, determining that evidence from Betty Lewis was collateral; (4) whether the trial court improperly refused to enforce a subpoena for Betty Lewis on behalf of Appellant; (5) whether the trial court improperly denied Appellant the opportunity to impeach Brandy Smith; (6) whether the trial court improperly allowed hearsay testimony; (7) whether the trial court improperly excluded Randy Rothwell’s testimony about the description of a knife removed from the victim’s body; (8) whether the trial court improperly declared Randy Rothwell a hostile witness; (9) whether the trial court improperly excluded evidence of Brandy Smith’s prior felony conviction; (10) whether the trial court improperly denied the motion to suppress; (10) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (11) whether cumulative errors of the trial court require reversal of the conviction; and (12) whether the sentence was excessive. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence did not preponderate against the denial of the motion to suppress where the evidence supported a finding of exigent circumstances; the trial court did not err in excusing a juror; the trial court properly excluded impeachment of Brandy Smith by prior inconsistent statement where she admitted to an inconsistency in one prior statement and the other statement was not inconsistent; the trial court properly determined that the testimony of Betty Lewis was excluded by the collateral fact rule; the trial court properly admitted the statements of Randy Rothwell; the trial court properly excluded the testimony of Leo Andy about the knife on the victim’s person as hearsay; the trial court properly determined that Randy Rothwell was a hostile witness; the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the admission of Brandy Smith’s prior conviction was more prejudicial than probative; the evidence was sufficient to support the lesser included offense of second degree murder; and the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this State appeal, the Defendant, Michael T. Shelby, was indicted for promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming the search warrant lacked probable cause. After a suppression hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the search warrant was legally defective, and suppressed the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. The State appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress because the informant provided sufficiently reliable information upon which the warrant could be properly issued. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant, Karen Jo Williams, entered guilty pleas to forgery, two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less, and violation of an order of protection. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court imposed an effective four-year sentence to be served in community corrections and ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to a probationary sentence from Kentucky that she was serving at the time. Subsequently, the trial court held a revocation hearing, after which it revoked appellant’s community corrections sentence and ordered execution of her four-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appealing the trial court’s judgment, appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether a community corrections revocation warrant alleging violation of a direct order was valid when appellant’s Tennessee sentence had not yet begun; (2) whether an amended warrant alleging a new criminal conviction was invalid; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her unserved community corrections sentence and ordering execution of her full sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Justin E. Stinnett, appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. Stinnett previously entered a guilty plea to robbery and received a ten-year suspended sentence after service of one year “day for day.” On appeal, Stinnett argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Terry Michael Allen, was indicted by a Hickman County Grand Jury for delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010). Pursuant to his plea agreement, Allen entered an open guilty plea to the charged offense in exchange for a sentence of two years as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. The trial court subsequently ordered Allen to serve his sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Allen argues that the trial court erred in denying him a sentence of full probation or an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James Gibbs (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court erred in not giving him his proper community corrections credit. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing, stating that the Petitioner failed to allege a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief and that he failed to establish that his sentence had expired. The Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his sentence has expired. Accordingly, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment denying relief.

The Defendant, Brandon L. Kirk, contends (1) that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his jury conviction for attempted second degree murder and (2) that the effective twenty-two year sentence imposed by the trial court is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing because the trial court failed to state the facts it considered in mitigation and to make the requisite findings to impose consecutive sentencing. After our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Lesergio D. Wilson, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court convictions of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress both the statement he made to police and the evidence seized in his traffic stop, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive service of his sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Chauncey Moore, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of attempting to commit premeditated murder and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He entered a guilty plea to the lesser included offense of attempt to commit manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to two years at thirty percent for the attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter conviction and six years at 100 percent for the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and that he entered his guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to prove any of his allegations that counsel’s representation was ineffective and that his plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

Appellant, Paul Robert Carrier, Jr., who was a police officer, was indicted by the Gibson County Grand Jury for one count of reckless homicide for a shooting death that occurred while he was on duty. Following a change of venue, he was tried by a jury in Montgomery County. The jury convicted him as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to two years incarceration and denied his request for judicial diversion. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony at trial and in denying his request for judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Casey Colbert (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder; attempted aggravated robbery; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; two counts of bribing a witness; and two counts of coercing a witness. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the murder conviction. After a hearing, the trial court merged the two convictions for coercing a witness into a single conviction and sentenced the Defendant to six years for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction; six years for the firearm conviction; six years for each of the bribery convictions; and four years for the coercion conviction. The trial court ordered partial consecutive service for an effective sentence of life plus twenty-two years, all to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is not sufficient to support his murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred in consolidating the offenses against the witness with the other offenses; (3) the prosecutor engaged in improper argument; (4) cumulative errors entitle him to a new trial; and (5) his sentence is excessive. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the trial court committed error in consolidating the indictments. As to the Defendant’s convictions of first degree murder and attempted aggravated robbery, we hold that the trial court’s error was harmless. As to the Defendant’s convictions for bribing and coercing a witness, we hold that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions of bribing and coercing a witness and remand those charges for further proceedings. Because the Defendant did not employ a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony,” as that term is defined by statute, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction of that offense. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, and we remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing on those offenses.

The petitioner, Tony Arness Degraffreed, appeals from the denial of his petition for post conviction relief, wherein he challenged his Tipton County Circuit Court jury conviction of rape of a child. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Quincy D. Moutry, alias, was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses arising from a carjacking in March of 2008. He received an effective twenty-seven-year sentence for those convictions. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to amend the date of the offenses alleged in the presentment after the jury had been sworn. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, the judgments are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Patrick Devin Camp, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to the terms of a negotiated plea agreement, the Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping and received an effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea and the performance of trial counsel. Specifically, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, leading to an involuntary plea, because trial counsel (1) failed to adequately communicate with him; (2) failed to inform him of State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997), due process issues; (3) failed to inform him of the factors involved in a consecutive sentencing determination; (4) failed to properly investigate the case; (5) failed to assess his mental status; (6) “abandoned” the Petitioner’s request to withdraw the plea; and (7) “never intended to fully represent [the Petitioner].” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Mitchell Darnell Eads, filed in the Claiborne County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the admission of certain evidence at trial and by erroneously stipulating at the sentencing hearing that the petitioner was a career offender. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner currently appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Thomas W. Farr, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his effective thirtyeight-year sentence is void. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Joseph Floyd, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of driving under the influence (DUI), Class A misdemeanors, and reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401, 55-10-205 (2012). The trial court merged the DUI convictions. The Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction and seven days for the reckless driving conviction, all suspended but seven days. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner pled guilty in Smith County to one count of aggravated statutory rape and one count of criminal exposure to HIV and received an effective sentence of twenty years. The petitioner’s guilty pleas were entered with the condition that he reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the search and seizure of certain evidence. The Court dismissed the appeal based on a lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner brought this post-conviction petition asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective in reserving the certified question and bringing the appeal. The post-conviction court dismissed the claim without a hearing or the appointment of counsel, finding that the issues had been previously determined on direct appeal. See T.C.A. § 40-30-106(h) (2010). The petitioner appeals, asserting that this Court on direct appeal concluded it was without jurisdiction and did not rule on the merits of his claims. After a thorough examination of the facts and law, we conclude that the petitioner has stated a colorable claim; and we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Appellant, James A. Lambert, was indicted by the McNairy County Grand Jury for rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, attempted aggravated sexual battery, and incest. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of rape of a child, incest, and aggravated sexual battery. One count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery were later dismissed. As a result of the convictions, Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-five years at 100 percent. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Appellant, Joseph L. Lands, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication in McNairy County. Lands, 377 S.W.3d 678, 679 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012). Because of a procedural error, Appellant’s appeal to this Court was dismissed and his appeal bond was revoked. Id. at 684. The trial court subsequently granted Appellant’s request for bond while appealing to the Tennessee Supreme Court. The State filed an application pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure for an extraordinary appeal arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant the request. We granted the Rule 10 application. On appeal, we conclude that Rule 8(c) specifically states that this Court has jurisdiction to determine questions regarding appeal bonds when an appellant appeals this Court’s determination to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Therefore, we remand this case for proceedings to revoke his appeal bond in the trial court.