APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Fred Mogan, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. He pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery in 2008 and was sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In September 2012, the petitioner filed what appears to be his second petition for post-conviction relief in this case. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the court should have considered his petition because due process requires tolling the statute of limitation. Following review of the somewhat scant record before us, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for relief.

The appellant, Dickie Ray Bain, pled guilty in the DeKalb County Circuit Court to theft of property valued $1,000 or more, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to twelve years to be served at sixty percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by referring to the wrong offense during the sentencing hearing and that his sentence constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.” Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ladarius Devonte Maxwell, challenges his jury convictions for two counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentencing. After a thorough examination of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kwane Morris, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of facilitation of first degree murder and received a twenty-two-year sentence for that conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police that was involuntary and coerced; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a State’s witness for possible bias; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on accomplice testimony. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Daylon Demetric Roberts, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus regarding his convictions for first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the convictions into one judgment and sentenced petitioner to life imprisonment. State v. Daylon Demetric Roberts, No. 03C01-9403-CR-00117, 1994 WL 540555, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 1994), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 6, 1995). Petitioner argues that the judgment of the trial court was void due to a defective indictment. The State filed a motion to dismiss asserting that petitioner’s indictment was legally sufficient. The habeas corpus court granted the State’s motion and dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In this consolidated appeal, the pro se petitioner, Tyrone E. Montgomery, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court and the Morgan County Circuit Court’s orders denying his petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In case number E2011- 2629-CCA-R3-HC, the State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court. Because the petitions raise identical claims, we also affirm the judgment of the Morgan County Circuit Court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

Pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State appeals the manner of service of the sentence ordered by the Criminal Court for McMinn County. As a Range I, standard offender, the Defendant, Jeremy Mulkey, entered a plea of guilty to vandalism of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, vandalism of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, consistent with the plea agreement, to concurrent terms of four years for Class D felony vandalism; four years for Class C felony vandalism and two years for reckless endangerment. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the community corrections program. In doing so, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion because the Defendant pleaded guilty to reckless endangerment, a crime against the person, and therefore, failed to meet the minimum statutory requirements to be sentenced under the Community Corrections Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106 (2012). Upon review, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

The Defendant, George Andrew Stanhope, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder, three counts of first degree felony murder, theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, aggravated burglary, and aggravated rape. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -13-502, -14-103, -14-105(a)(3), -14-403. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, and aggravated burglary. The jury acquitted the Defendant of the charge of aggravated rape and one count of first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the two first degree felony murder convictions with the first degree premeditated murder conviction. The jury imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the first degree premeditated murder conviction. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on the remaining convictions and imposed a sentence of six years for the aggravated burglary conviction and a sentence of four years for the theft conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutive to each other and to the sentence for the first degree premeditated murder conviction, for an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus ten years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to the police; (2) that the trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to review the personnel file of a former police detective; (3) that the in-court security around the Defendant was excessive and gave the jury the impression that he was in custody; (4) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions; (5) that the trial court erred by not merging the Defendant’s convictions for theft and aggravated burglary; (6) that the statutory aggravating circumstance of the victim’s age was unconstitutional; (7) that a new trial was warranted because one of the jurors failed to disclose her relationship with the court clerk during voir dire; and (8) that the Defendant was entitled to a new trial due to cumulative error. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dusty Ross Binkley, pled guilty to manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of a weapon in the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an eight-year sentence to be served on community corrections. The Petitioner’s community corrections officer filed a violation warrant, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Petitioner’s community corrections sentence, finding that he had violated the terms of his sentence, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement, to run consecutively with his sentence in another county on an unrelated charge. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.
 

The Defendant, Robert Glenn Hasaflook, was indicted for one count of promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, and filed a pretrial motion to suppress all his statements made to the police. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and the Defendant pleaded guilty to the indicted offense reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) about whether the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle by law enforcement was lawful. After review, we conclude that the Defendant has failed to comply with the strict requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Cornelius Richmond, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2003 convictions for robbery and three counts of forgery and resulting thirty-three-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that (1) his three forgery convictions are void because they should have been merged into a single conviction and (2) his multiple sentences violate principles of double jeopardy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Brandon Rollen, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion for correction of clerical errors in four aggravated robbery judgments. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion. We reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the motion and remand the case to the trial court for consideration on the merits pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.

Petitioner, Cantrell Lashone Winters, stands convicted of possession of 50 grams or more of hydromorphone in a school zone with intent to sell, a Class A felony, and Class E felony evading arrest. See State v. Cantrell Lashone Winters, M2009-01164-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1085101, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. March 24, 2011), no perm. app. filed. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and petitioner now appeals. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Marquon L. Green, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to ten years to be served at 85%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William Henry Preston (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Pursuant to a plea agreement and his pleas of guilty to six counts of aggravated rape, the Petitioner received a total effective sentence of forty years as a Range I standard offender. In his petition, he alleges that his sentences are illegal because the trial court and his counsel failed to advise him that he would be subject to community supervision for life as a result of his convictions. In addition, the Petitioner asserts that his total effective sentence of forty years has expired due to the accumulation of sentence reduction credits. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Stephen Mark Addleburg (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of failure to provide proof of financial responsibility; possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana; possession of a weapon by a convicted felon; and possession of a handgun while under the influence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We remand the case solely for correction of clerical errors contained in the two misdemeanor judgments.

The petitioner, Stephen A. Pugh, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to recognize a defective indictment and by allowing the petitioner to plead guilty under that indictment, which did not charge a crime recognized under the law of Tennessee. The petitioner is currently serving an effective seventeen-year sentence in the Department of Correction following his guilty plea to two counts of attempted first degree murder. Following review, we affirm the denial of relief.

The defendant, Tony Thomas, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Marques D. Wheeler, entered a guilty plea to aggravated burglary and received a four-year suspended sentence to be served in community corrections. Following several violations, the trial court revoked appellant from community corrections and resentenced him to six years. Appellant contends that the trial court’s resentencing was improper because the trial court failed to follow the statutory procedure of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tiwon Antwan Harvell, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of facilitation of aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-11-403, 39-13-402, 39-16-603. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of ten years for facilitation of aggravated robbery and four years for evading arrest. On appeal, he contends that his interview with the police should have been suppressed and that a transcript of the interview should not have been introduced with the video recording. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pro se petitioner, Jack Layne Benson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his second petition for post-conviction relief, which the court treated as a motion to reopen his first petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the first post-conviction petition, which prevented him from seeking permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. He also asserts that the post-conviction court improperly dismissed his petition without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing in violation of his due process rights. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a handgun after having been previously convicted of a felony drug offense. The defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-five years for the homicide, six years for the aggravated assault, and four years for the weapons possession. The trial court elected to impose the aggravated assault conviction consecutively to the homicide conviction for an aggregate sentence of forty-one years. The defendant appeals, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of the mens rea element of second degree murder; that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of prior felony drug convictions to be introduced as impeachment; and that the trial court improperly imposed a consecutive sentence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Eric Dates, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, all suspended but 48 hours. See T.C.A. 55-10-401 (2012). On appeal, he contends that (1) the traffic stop was an unconstitutional search and seizure, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction, and (3) the verdicts were inconsistent. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Correl Marcellus Baker, was convicted by a Coffee County jury of aggravated robbery and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced him to eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction and merged the reckless endangerment conviction into the aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting that the reckless endangerment conviction was merged into the aggravated robbery conviction.

A Wayne County Jury convicted Defendant, Brent Rowden, of second-degree murder (County One), tampering with evidence (Count Two), and attempted initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine (Count Three). He received concurrent sentences of thirty-seven years as a Range II multiple offender for second-degree murder, thirteen years as a persistent offender for tampering with evidence, and thirteen years as a persistent offender for attempted initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine. The trial court ordered Defendant’s effective thirty-seven-year sentence to be served consecutively to an eight-year sentence in Lawrence County. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statements to police. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment in Count One to reflect Defendant’s offender status as Multiple rather than Career.