APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Aubrey Tremaine Eisom (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment for each felony murder conviction and to forty years’ incarceration for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, all to run consecutively. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the Petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, one count of delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, one count of maintaining a dwelling for purposes of selling controlled substances, a Class D felony, and one count of casual exchange of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. After accepting the defendant’s plea, the trial court merged the defendant’s convictions concerning the sale and the delivery of cocaine. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years for the sale of cocaine, three years for maintaining a dwelling for purposes of selling a controlled substance, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for his casual exchange. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve these sentences concurrently, resulting in a total effective sentence of five years. The defendant moved the court for alternative sentencing, but the trial court denied this motion following a hearing and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for alternative sentencing. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. The judgments denying alternative sentencing are affirmed.

Appellant, Chris Nachampasak, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for one count of first degree murder, one count of felony murder, four counts of aggravated assault, and one count of reckless endangerment after a drive-by shooting at a graduation party that resulted in the death of a fourteen-year-old child.  Appellant subsequently pled guilty to a single count of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault in return for the dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment.  In exchange for the guilty pleas, Appellant received an effective sentence of thirty-five years in incarceration.  Subsequently, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.  Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.  After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas where Appellant failed to show a manifest injustice.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

 Petitioner, Tommy Lee Page, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of sale of a controlled substance in a Drug Free School Zone.  He entered a guilty plea to the reduced charge of the sale of a controlled substance weighing less than .5 grams.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years as a Range II, multiple offender.  Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and that he entered his guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily.  After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to prove any of his allegations that counsel’s representation was ineffective and we conclude that his plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.  Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Roy Len Rogers, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of first degree premeditated murder, second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. Subsequently, the trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction and imposed a mandatory life sentence for that conviction and a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his home; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the verdicts were inconsistent; (3) that the trial court erred by refusing to allow the Defendant to play a 911 tape; (4) that the trial court improperly admitted irrelevant photographs of tires of the Defendant’s vehicle; (5) that the State withheld Brady material, specifically the statement of a potential suspect; and (6) that a juror evidenced bias by her actions and body language prior to deliberations. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we determine that there is no reversible error in the judgments of the trial court and affirm.

Pro se petitioner, Johnny L. McGowan, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the statute of limitations should be tolled because his claim is based on a constitutional right that did not exist at the time of his plea, and further contends that the post-conviction court erred in failing to appoint counsel prior to dismissal.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Lee Shaw, of  possession of more than twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class B felony; evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, a Class E felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.  Shaw received an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence supporting Shaw’s drug-related convictions was sufficient to establish constructive possession.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a bench trial, the Williamson County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Pierrette L. Wessels, of driving under the influence (DUI), DUI per se, and failing to obey a traffic control device.  The trial court merged the DUI per se conviction into the DUI conviction and sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as forty-eight hours in jail and the remainder on supervised probation.  For failing to obey a traffic control device, the trial court sentenced the appellant to thirty days on probation to be served concurrently with the DUI sentence.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant her motion to suppress evidence.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Ginger Ilene Hudson Stump, was indicted by a Bedford County Grand Jury for twenty-six counts of forgery.  See T.C.A. § 39-14-114 (Supp. 2011).  Pursuant to her plea agreement, Stump entered guilty pleas to six Class E felonies (counts 3, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19) involving more than $500 but less than $1,000 and one Class D felony (count 25) involving $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences.  As a part of this agreement, the State dismissed the remaining nineteen forgery counts.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Stump as a career offender to twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, Stump argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her an alternative sentence and in denying her a community corrections sentence.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Charles Nash (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appealed, claiming that he is entitled to relief because his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to a motion to suppress, in failing to object to the State’s closing arguments, and in failing to present a defense of duress. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Michael Alan Burleson, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated burglary of a vehicle and was sentenced to a total of five years to be served on community corrections. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the sentences and ordered the appellant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Charles Edward Graham aka Charles Edward Stevenson, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence concerning the judicial misconduct of a trial judge affected the outcome of his 2005 jury trial and 2010 post-conviction evidentiary hearing. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant, Joshua Lynn Pitts, of driving under the influence (“DUI”).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days of probation after serving forty-eight hours in jail.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal stop of his vehicle.  After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle.  As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Taft Arkey Murphy, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.  Petitioner was convicted of possession with intent to sell three hundred or more grams of cocaine in a school zone,  possession with intent to sell twenty-six or more grams of cocaine in a school zone, the sale of twenty-six or more grams of cocaine in a school zone, two counts of the sale of twenty-six or more grams of cocaine, and possession of a handgun by a felon.  He received an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying the petition because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective (1) by failing to adequately communicate and meet with him to prepare for the case and failing to properly investigate the facts of the case; (2) by failing to discuss with Petitioner whether he should testify on his own behalf at trial; and (3) by failing to object to testimony regarding Petitioner’s prior voluntary manslaughter conviction. Following our review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.

The petitioner, Junior Aldridge, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, he raises three allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Alex Porter, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying the petition because both trial counsel and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. More specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective at trial by (1) failing to adequately investigate, develop, or present a theory of self-defense; (2) allowing a witness to improperly assert Fifth Amendment protection after a prior admonition from the trial court; (3) failing to properly advise the petitioner of his right to testify on his own behalf and failing to preserve Petitioner’s right to appeal Momon defects in the trial court proceedings; (4) announcing to the jury that Petitioner was incarcerated at the time of trial; and (5) failing to challenge the expert witness testimony of the State’s firearms examiner or presenting rebuttal evidence to her testimony. Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective on appeal by failing to adequately communicate with him during the appellate process. Petitioner further contends that he was denied due process during the post-conviction proceedings. Following our review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.

The pro se petitioner, David Lawrence Holt, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal on the grounds that the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief.

Donald West Allen, Jr. (“the Defendant”) was charged with three counts of rape of a child, and a jury convicted the Defendant of three counts of aggravated sexual battery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years on each count, with the sentences for counts one and two to run consecutively and the sentence for count three to run concurrently, for an effective term of eighteen years’ incarceration, to be served at 100%. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises four issues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to reference uncharged conduct during its opening statement and then to adduce testimony about the uncharged conduct during trial; (2) the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred in singling out a juror for questioning after the close of proof; and (4) his sentence is excessive. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we discern no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Dawn Alish Black, entered a nolo contendere plea to driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2012). She was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, all suspended but 48 hours. On appeal, she presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to her arrest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Curtis Lee Majors, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of tampering with evidence and simple possession and resulting effective fifteen-year sentence.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Brian Patrick Pierce, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery.  The trial court sentenced the appellant to concurrent sentences of ten years for each offense.  On appeal, the appellant challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Johnny Lynn, appeals the Perry County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective sentence of fifty-four years to be served at 100%.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to advise him of his right to waive ex post facto protections and be sentenced pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the Tennessee Sentencing Reform Act of 1989.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Demetrius D. Walton, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to one count of reckless aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court and the trial court’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence. Upon review, we affirm the length of the sentence imposed. However, we must remand to the trial court for a correction of the judgment to reflect that the appellant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender who was to serve a minimum of thirty-five percent of his sentence in confinement before being eligible for release.

The Petitioner, David G. Housler, Jr., filed petitions for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, seeking relief from his convictions for four counts of felony murder and resulting consecutive sentences of life in confinement. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court granted the petitions. On appeal, the State contends that the court erred by finding that the Petitioner was entitled to any relief. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s granting the petition for post-conviction relief but conclude that the court erred by granting the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Nevertheless, because the Petitioner has shown that he is entitled to post-conviction relief based upon his receiving the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, David Allen Lackey, appeals the determination of the post-conviction court that due process did not mandate a waiver of the statute of limitations. The petitioner is currently serving a life sentence in the Department of Correction following his conviction for first degree murder and theft of property valued under $500. Following a direct appeal, the petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief. After the petition was denied by the post-conviction court, this court remanded the case for a determination of whether the petitioner’s due process rights required that the statute of limitations be tolled. After a hearing, the post-conviction court determined that the petitioner had failed to carry his burden of establishing his right to a tolling of the statute of limitations and dismissed the petition. The petitioner contends that the court’s determination was error. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition as untimely.