APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Jimi L. Greene (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving on a revoked licence, and violating the financial responsibility law. He was sentenced as a career offender to a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement, with the remainder of his sentence to be suspended to community corrections with several specific conditions. Subsequently, a community corrections violation warrant was filed. The Defendant admitted to the violations alleged in the warrant, and a hearing was held as to disposition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Rokisha Alderson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her 2008 convictions for two counts of felony murder and one count of attempted first degree murder and her effective sentence of life plus fifteen years.  The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by finding her petition was barred by the statute of limitations and by dismissing her petition.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Rutherford, was convicted by a jury of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, a Class E felony. The trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and imposed a two-year sentence, with 160 days’ confinement as “shock incarceration” and the balance on probation. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the denial of judicial diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Carl P.E. Munsey, challenges his sentences for three 1978 convictions for armed robbery. The petitioner’s claim is primarily based on an assertion that the sentencing provisions of the statute he was sentenced under had been repealed by the legislature and his sentences are therefore illegal. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without a hearing. We conclude that the sentences are not illegal, and we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, James Michael Flinn, was convicted by an Anderson County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. See T.C.A. § 39-13-202 (2010). On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from a warrantless search of his backyard and car, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from his warrantless detention, (4) he was denied the right to counsel at a pretrial hearing, (5) he was denied preliminary hearings after his arrests on two dates, (6) the trial court erred in revoking his bond, (7) he was denied his right to confront witnesses against him by the trial court’s admission of the victim’s death certificate, (8) he was denied his right to testify by the trial court’s exclusion of his testimony regarding the reason he made statements to a witness, (9) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his purchase of a shotgun, (10) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of vandalism of the victim’s house and truck, (11) the trial court erred in receiving as exhibits the no true bills returned by the grand jury regarding a prior incident in which the victim hit the Defendant, (12) the assistant district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct by commenting on the Defendant’s silence when he was detained by the police, (13) the assistant district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument by misstating the evidence, (14) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding admissions against interest, and (15) the trial court violated the Defendant’s right to due process by entering judgment and sentencing him on the same day. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Danny Howard, appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. On appeal, Howard argues that the trial court abused its discretion (1) by permitting a juror to remain on the jury after learning that the juror worked with one of the State’s witnesses, and (2) by denying Howard’s motion for a mistrial based on an alleged Jencks violation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Elton Brent Stanfill, pleaded guilty to one count of initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine and one count of unlawfully using or possessing with intent to use drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of eight years for the methamphetamine conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the unlawful drug paraphernalia conviction. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve ninety days in custody and placed him on Community Corrections for the remainder of his sentence. In July 2012, the Defendant’s Community Corrections officer filed an affidavit alleging the Defendant had violated his Community Corrections sentence. The trial court issued a warrant, and, after a hearing, revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it revoked his Community Corrections sentence because the State failed to show that he had violated the conditions of his sentence and because he should have been given an opportunity for rehabilitation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The appellant, William Jamal Harris, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probationary sentences, contending that the State failed to adduce sufficient proof that the appellant committed new offenses. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Clarence D. Schreane, acting pro se, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary denial of habeas corpus relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Appellant, Tina B. Carroll, pleaded guilty to promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony, and received a two-year sentence, suspended to supervised probation. A violation of probation warrant was subsequently filed, alleging that she had violated her probation by testing positive for narcotic drugs and marijuana. Appellant now argues that one of the laboratory reports was admitted in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-311(c)(1) and that there is not substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Derrick Johnson, of first degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed a life sentence for the first degree murder conviction, with a consecutive six-year sentence for the aggravated assault conviction, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Derrick Johnson, No. W2008-02070-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3623619, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Sept. 20, 2010) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2011). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Anita Kay Broughton, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, she contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, she contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to pursue a defense of diminished capacity despite ample proof that the petitioner suffered from a mental condition. She also challenges the accuracy of the post-conviction court’s order denying relief. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant-Appellant, Kevin Anthony Graham, entered a guilty plea in the Hawkins County Criminal Court to the charged offense of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and requested that the trial court grant him judicial diversion or an alternative sentence. The trial court subsequently sentenced Graham to three years’ incarceration. On appeal, Graham argued that the trial court erred in denying (1) judicial diversion and (2) an alternative sentence. After reviewing the record on appeal, we reversed the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter an order sentencing Graham to serve ninety days’ confinement in the Hawkins County Jail with the remainder of his three-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. See State v. Kevin Anthony Graham, No. E2011-01382-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3594361, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2012). The State filed a Rule 11 application, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, requesting permission to appeal the case to the Tennessee Supreme Court. On January 8, 2013, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012), and State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273 (Tenn. 2012). Upon reconsideration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After his previous guilty-pleaded convictions were vacated, petitioner, Bruce Reliford, pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery charges and was found guilty by a jury of felony murder. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal and denial of discretionary review by our supreme court, he filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal follows, in which petitioner alleges the following: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to properly communicate with him; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel by advising him to plead guilty to the aggravated robbery charges; and (3) the post-conviction court’s error in denying his motion to recuse. Following our thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Putnam County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Lewis, of second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a fifteen-year prison sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to sequester the jury; (3) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the body of the deceased; and (4) the trial court erred by allowing certain witness testimony.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holdings that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of second degree murder.
 

A jury convicted the defendant, Keith Bates, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and he was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. The defendant testified that he had been in jail around the time of the crime, and the State then questioned him about the timing of his imprisonment and release. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s decision to allow the State to question him about the timing of his release from jail. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude there was no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Aldrick Lillard, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that both his trial attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel in their failure to raise in the motion for new trial or on direct appeal the trial court’s denial of the Petitioner’s motion for mistrial.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Charles Justin Woosley, was convicted of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-101, -111 (2010).  He was sentenced to ninety days in the county jail, which the trial court suspended and ordered to be served on unsupervised probation.  The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael T. Gibbs, Jr. (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Hamilton County Criminal Court, claiming that his sentences had expired. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner’s notice of appeal is untimely. Moreover, the Petitioner offers no reasons why the interests of justice would support a waiver of the filing deadline. Accordingly, we dismiss the Petitioner’s appeal.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Renitra Harlen, of two counts of theft of property valued at more than $1,000.00.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to concurrent terms of two years, to be served on probation following the service of fourteen days in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce a handwritten list of stolen items prepared by store employees immediately after the shoplifting incident occurred; (2) the State failed to disclose a victim questionnaire in violation of the rules of discovery; (3) the trial court erred by failing to merge the two theft convictions; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions.  After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we remand to the trial court for the entry of modified judgments reflecting the merger of the Defendant’s two convictions and affirm the trial court in all other respects.

A Haywood County jury convicted appellant, Lymus Levar Brown, III, of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III offender to serve thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with a release eligibility of eighty-five percent. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(k)(1) (release eligibility for aggravated robbery conviction). On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient; (2) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify despite a violation of the rule of sequestration; (3) the trial court erred by not granting him a mistrial or some other remedy for the State’s failure to provide previously requested discovery; (4) his right to a speedy trial was violated; (5) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear that appellant was a convicted criminal; (6) the State failed to provide a sufficient chain of custody for the cellular telephone found at the crime scene; and (7) the trial court erred by considering his prior convictions during the sentencing hearing despite not having certified copies of said convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Cory Lee Jackson, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000.  At trial, the jury convicted Jackson of the lesser included offense of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-14-103(a), -105(a)(3).  The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to six years in confinement.  On appeal, Jackson argues:  (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his missed court dates on unrelated charges; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony regarding Budget’s loss regarding the rental vehicle; and (4) his sentence was excessive.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Samuel Ryan Hawkins, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his conviction for aggravated child abuse. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to obtain an expert witness to rebut the State’s theory of shaken baby syndrome.  Following our review, we affirm the denial of relief.

Following a traffic stop premised on a possible violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-107 (the window tint statute), appellees were charged with several drug offenses.  Appellee Shaun Anthony Davidson was indicted for possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone.  Appellee Deedra Lynette Kizer was indicted for possession or casual exchange of hydrocodone.  Both appellees were indicted for possession or casual exchange of marijuana.  The trial court granted the appellees’ motion to suppress evidence, ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-107(c) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  As a result, the case was dismissed.  The State now appeals, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-107(c) is constitutional.  We reverse the ruling of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.