APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Dustin Marshall Goforth, was serving a suspended eight-year sentence on supervised probation. Violation of probation warrants were filed, and his suspended sentence was revoked after an evidentiary hearing. The trial court ordered the sentence to be served by incarceration in the Department of Correction. In his sole issue on appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for the judge to recuse himself in this case prior to the evidentiary hearing. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Albert Kelly, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for perjury and attempted failure to report as a sex offender and ordering his effective two-year, eleven-month, and twenty-nine-day sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by revoking his probation and (2) illegally recommended that he not be eligible for release after serving thirty percent of his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Dante Devon Omar Truitt, pled guilty to explosive weapon possession with an agreed eight-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve the eight-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred when it denied alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we find no error in the trial court’s judgment.

Appellee, Jay Hart Frier, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (“DUI”), DUI per se, DUI with a blood alcohol concentration of .20% or more, and DUI second offense. Prior to trial, Appellee filed a motion in limine to dismiss the last count of the indictment based on the fact that his prior DUI was facially invalid. The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion. Appellee filed a motion to reconsider. The trial court ultimately granted the motion in limine and dismissed the last count of the indictment. The State sought reconsideration of the ruling. The trial court declined to reconsider. The State sought an interlocutory appeal. The trial court denied the application. The State then sought an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court granted the application. On appeal, after a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the trial court improperly dismissed the indictment where Appellant sought to collaterally attack his previous conviction rather than seeking review of the underlying conviction via a writ of habeas corpus. As a result, thedecision of the trial court is reversed. On remand, the indictment should be reinstated and the matter set for further proceedings.

Petitioner, Venus L. Viera, plead guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to one count of aggravated robbery. Pursuant to her plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to a sentence of eight years to be served at eighty-five percent incarceration. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which she argued that she was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and that she entered her guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing and subsequently entered a written order denying the petition. Petitioner appeals to this Court. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the denial of the petition should be affirmed. However, in our review of the record, we have discovered that the judgment form provides that the sentence is eight years to be served at 100 percent. Therefore, in addition to affirming the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief, we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment.

The Petitioner, Antoinette Hill, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis. She asserts that newly discovered evidence, namely an addiction to alcohol and pills by the trial court judge who presided over her trial for first degree premeditated murder, warrants a new trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The petitioner, Timothy R. Chatmon, filed in the Hamilton County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his two convictions for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Stephan L. Beasley, Sr., filed for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for first degree murder. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Appellant, Joseph W. Jones, pleaded guilty to sale of a Schedule II controlled substance and received a three-year sentence, suspended to probation. A violation of probation warrant was subsequently filed, alleging that he had violated a condition of his probation by testing positive for methamphetamine on a drug screen. The trial court revoked his probation, and this appeal follows. Appellant now alleges that the trial court erred in admitting the laboratory report of his drug test without the proper chain of custody and that the trial court should have extended his probation rather than ordering execution of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jason Clark, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition without providing a reason for the dismissal in its order, depriving the Petitioner of an opportunity to respond. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas court properly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Ako Hassan Nejad, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 convictions for conspiracy to commit first degree murder and attempt to commit second degree murder and his effective Range I, thirty-seven-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to call a material witness and failed to present a defense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kevin D. McMillan, pled guilty to the sale of a controlled substance, less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to three years of incarceration, to be served consecutively to two other convictions, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas court erred when it summarily dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Jarrell Antonio Campbell, has appealed the habeas corpus court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that his conviction for possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver was void because it was not ordered to be served consecutively to a previous conviction for which he was on parole at the time he committed the offense. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Norman G. Page, was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to twelve years as a career offender in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 

Appellant, Nora Hernandez, was convicted by a jury of two counts of felony failure to appear.  The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced her to two years, suspended after service of twenty-five days.  On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) her action in failing to report to the jail to serve a delayed sentence did not constitute the criminal offense of failure to appear; (2) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the indictment based on prosecutorial vindictiveness; (3) her conviction should be dismissed because the jury only found her guilty of the elements of misdemeanor failure to appear, an offense for which the statute of limitations had passed; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing.  Following our review, we affirm appellant’s convictions, but we vacate the two failure to appear judgments and remand the case for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of these convictions

The Defendant, Zachary Carlisle, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-211, 39-17-1324 (2010). The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years’ confinement for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and to a consecutive fifteen years’ confinement as a violent offender for the firearm conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the indictment for the firearm conviction failed to charge an offense, (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense, and (4) the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that the Defendant’s statements could qualify as a confession. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Ronnie Joe Stokes, was convicted by a Cumberland County Criminal Court jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced to twelve years as a persistent offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for new trial because a juror was exposed to extraneous prejudicial information. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Malcolm McKoy, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $500 and burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent four-year and six-year terms, suspended to be served on unsupervised probation. These sentences were to run consecutively to another sentence unrelated to this appeal. After two subsequent probation violations based on new arrests, the Defendant was arrested for aggravated assault. A probation violation warrant was issued based upon this arrest, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a revocation of his probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Kenneth L. Anderson, was convicted of one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years as a Range III, persistent offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that his right to confront one of the State’s witnesses was violated; (2) that his right to present witnesses in his defense was violated; (3) that one of the State’s witnesses, Penny Webber, was not competent to testify at trial; (4) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a recorded phone conversation between himself and Ms. Webber and video recordings of the drug buy; (5) that he was denied his right of access to the courts; (6) that the jury venire did not represent a fair cross-section of the community; (7) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (8) that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence; and (9) that his sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 2011, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Marco Blanch, for aggravated rape based upon bodily injury sustained by the victim. A jury convicted Appellant of the lesser included offense of rape. Appellant was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to an eleven-year sentence at 100 percent. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence presented  by the State at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because the victim consented to sexual activity. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction.

The defendant, Darrell Johnson, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated burglary, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of his sentences. We affirm the convictions and sentences. On remand, however, we direct the trial court to correct the judgments to properly effectuate merger of the alternative counts of aggravated burglary.

The petitioner, Johnie Jefferson, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. He argues that he is entitled to coram nobis relief because the State suppressed exculpatory evidence that became known to him after the limitations period had expired. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

In this consolidated appeal, the pro se appellant, Clarence D. Schreane, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s orders denying relief from his 2004 convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Prior to this court’s consolidation of the case, the State filed motions to dismiss the appeals or, alternatively, to affirm the trial court’s denials of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. In light of the complexities of the issues raised in this appeal, we conclude that the State’s motions should be treated as responsive briefs. Following our review, we affirm the orders of the Hamilton County Criminal Court.

Petitioner, Ray Junior Turner, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine and one count of delivery of 300 grams or more of cocaine.  Each of the offenses is a Class A felony.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(j).  The trial court sentenced petitioner to sixty years for each conviction as a career offender to be served concurrently. He unsuccessfully appealed his convictions and sentences.  See State v. Kenneth Miller and Ray Junior Turner, No. M2008-02267-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1644969, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2010).  Petitioner filed the current petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief.  On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel: (1) failed to properly investigate petitioner’s case and communicate with petitioner; (2) failed to file a motion to suppress wiretap evidence; and (3) failed to properly inspect all discoverable evidence introduced at trial.  Following our review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Andre L. McKinney, pled guilty to criminal simulation, a Class E felony, and received a negotiated sentence of two years. On the same day, he pled guilty to possession with intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine and received a negotiated sentence of eight years, consecutive to the sentence of two years. Ultimately, the effective ten-year sentence was suspended, and he was placed on supervised probation. Following the filing of a probation violation warrant, the trial court conducted a hearing where Defendant and his probation officer testified. Defendant admitted that he had used marijuana multiple times while on probation, that he had been charged with and pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana while on probation, and that he knew he was supposed to report any new charges to his probation officer but failed to do so. The trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered the ten-year sentence to be served by incarceration. Defendant asserts in his appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.