APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Aaron Tate, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery; one count of especially aggravated burglary; one count of employment of a firearm during a felony offense; one count of especially aggravated kidnapping; one count of aggravated kidnapping; two counts of aggravated assault; and one count of facilitation to commit aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Tate as a Range II, multiple offender and ordered each of his sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of one-hundred-thirty-eight years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, Tate argues that the jury was not provided with an instruction consistent with State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012); therefore, his “convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping offend due process.” He further argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon our review, we conclude that the absence of an instruction pursuant to White was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to Tate’s convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and facilitation of aggravated assault. However, the lack of the White instruction was reversible error as to his convictions for aggravated assault charged in counts six and seven. Accordingly, we reverse Tate’s kidnapping convictions charged in counts four and five and remand the matter for a new trial as to those offenses. We modify count two and reduce the especially aggravated burglary conviction to aggravated burglary and remand for resentencing on this conviction. We reverse Tate’s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony offense and remand for a new trial on count three. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Nasir Hakeem, was convicted after a bench trial of two counts of sexual battery, a Class E felony, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-505 (2010).  On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, pointing to inconsistencies in the testimony of the State’s witnesses.  After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Rodney Turner, was convicted by a jury of two counts of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-202, -17-1324. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of forty years for both counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court also imposed a ten-year sentence for the employment of a firearm conviction and ordered that six years of that sentence be served at one hundred percent. The trial court ordered that the sentence for the employment of a firearm conviction be served consecutively to the sentences for the attempted first degree murder convictions, for a total effective sentence of fifty years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to produce a prior statement made by one of the State’s witnesses. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Douglas Ray Murrell, pled guilty to one count of driving a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401(a)(1) (2010), a Class A misdemeanor; pled nolo contendere to one count of failure to maintain lane in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-123, a Class C misdemeanor; and pled guilty to one count of driving a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08 percent in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401(a)(2), a Class A misdemeanor.  The trial court merged the two DUI convictions.  In pleading guilty to the DUI charges, the defendant reserved a certified question pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, challenging the trial court’s conclusion that the initial stop of his vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion.  After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his conviction of second degree murder. He argues that the jury should have found that he was acting in self-defense or, in the alternative, that he committed voluntary manslaughter. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jody Kyle Banks, pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (second offense), a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401(a)(1) (2010).  He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days imprisonment, with fifty days to be served in jail and the remainder of the sentence to be served on probation.  In entering his guilty plea, the defendant reserved, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2),  a certified question of law challenging the initial stop of his vehicle based on a broken taillight. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that this case is governed by the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Brotherton, 323 S.W.3d 866 (Tenn. 2010), and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Archie Tyrone Wilson, was in custody in the State of Tennessee. In July 2012, the State of Florida submitted a request under the Interstate Compact on Detainers for custody of Appellant in connection with a charge of sexual battery. Appellant requested a hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered his transfer to Florida for prosecution. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not err. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order of transfer.

The defendant, William Roger Henderson, III, pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated robbery,  Class C felonies.  The trial court sentenced him as a multiple offender  to serve nine years in the Department of Correction on each count, with the counts to run concurrently.  The trial court refused to give the defendant an alternative sentence, and the defendant appeals.  Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendant’s confinement to prison, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendants, Wesley Clayton Nightwine and Ruby Michelle Bush, were indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for various drug and firearms offenses following the execution of a search warrant at Mr. Nightwine’s residence.  The Defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized, and the trial court granted that motion and dismissed the case as to each defendant.  The State appeals, asserting that the search warrant was valid and the evidence was admissible.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Mark Dunlap, appeals from the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence. The Defendant previously entered guilty pleas to kidnapping, aggravated assault, attempted aggravated burglary, and vandalism. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of six years, which was suspended to time served with the balance of his sentence to be served in the community corrections program. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement after revoking his community corrections and erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Hollace Donte Richards, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation.  He previously entered guilty pleas to one count of theft of property valued over $500 but less than $1,000 and one count of sale of marijuana, a Schedule VI controlled substance.  Subsequently, Richards entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of failure to appear.  He was ordered to serve his four sentences consecutively for a total effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction.  The trial court ordered Richards to serve his two-year sentence for theft in confinement and suspended the other three sentences to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Richards argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his entire sentence in confinement.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jamelle M. Felts, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  He also appeals the denial of coram nobis relief, arguing that an eyewitness’s affidavit recanting his trial testimony is newly discovered evidence entitling him to a new trial.  Upon review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief and the denial of coram nobis relief.

The defendant, Tammy Kay Scott, alias, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of possession of less than 200 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell and possession of less than 200 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver, Class C felonies. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant to five years of probation after service of thirty days. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress her statement as it was obtained in violation of her right to counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Heather McMurray, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of three counts of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, three counts of the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone, possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school zone, and possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone, all Class B felonies. The trial court merged the convictions based on the same incidents and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of twelve years for each conviction, with a mandatory eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction due to the fact that the offenses were committed in a drug-free school zone. The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain her convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as an expert witness; and (3) whether the trial court erred by denying her motion for a mistrial after the State played a redacted version of her statement to police. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Allan Pope, of one count of using public equipment for private purposes, one count of official misconduct, and one count of theft of services over $10,000 but less than $60,000. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Defendant’s conviction for theft of services and reversed and dismissed the Defendant’s convictions for official misconduct and private use of public property. State v. Pope, No. E2011-01410-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4760724, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 5, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. March 5, 2013). On remand, the Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting that the trial court reconsider its previous denial of the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion; the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal.

The defendant, Tommie Phillips, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of four counts of first degree felony  murder, one count of reckless homicide, two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of aggravated rape, one  count of aggravated sexual battery, six counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the four counts of felony murder and one count of reckless homicide into one felony murder conviction and merged the aggravated sexual battery conviction with the aggravated rape conviction. The trial court also merged the six counts of especially aggravated kidnapping into three convictions – one per victim – and merged the two especially aggravated burglary convictions into one conviction. He was sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment  plus sixty years. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress his statement to police and the photographic and subsequent identifications of him as the perpetrator; (2) the trial court’s erroneous jury charge on especially aggravated kidnapping deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 14 to reflect the sentence length of twenty years, which was omitted, and we vacate the judgment for especially aggravated burglary in Count 16 and remand for resentencing for the modified conviction of aggravated burglary in that count. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Troy Lloyd, of one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Michael D. Green, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of multiple crimes, including first degree felony murder, and received a sentence of life plus twenty-four years. That sentence was ordered to be served concurrently to a federal sentence of life plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to request sequestration of the jury; (2) failing to utilize all available preemptory challenges or to challenge potential jurors for cause; and (3) failing to limit testimony concerning the prior federal trial. Following review of the record, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Keeanna Luellan, guilty of forgery over $500 and fraudulent use of a credit card over $500. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range III, persistent offender to six years for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of other bad acts or crimes and that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain her convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Frederick Parks, appeals from the trial court’s order summarily dismissing Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tavaria Merritt, pleaded guilty to nine counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2010).  He was sentenced to nine consecutive terms of twenty-five years for an effective 225-year sentence to be served at 100%.  The Defendant was seventeen years old when the offenses were committed and nineteen years old when he pleaded guilty.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that his effective sentence is the equivalent of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and is cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions.  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  Although Graham does not apply to the Defendant’s effective 225-year sentence, we conclude that the sentence is excessive, reverse the judgments of the trial court, and remand for entry of judgments reflecting an effective fifty-year sentence.

The Petitioner, Robert Lee Polk, appeals the Circuit Court for Lake County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I join the majority in all respects with the exception of sentencing.  While I agree that the effective 225-year sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive, I disagree that an effective fifty-year sentence complies with the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act.    
 

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dearaysun Wright, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, Kimberly Wilson Wentzel, of six counts of prescription fraud and two counts of identity theft.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a persistent offender and imposed concurrent eleven-year sentences for each of the Defendant’s eight felony convictions.  The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her entire sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it denied her request for alternative sentencing.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing.