APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Roy Pierson, Jr., was convicted by a Shelby County jury for possession of one hundred or more recordings that did not clearly and conspicuously disclose the name and address of the manufacturer in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-139 (Supp. 2009). He received a sentence of twenty-five months in the workhouse to be served at thirty percent. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his business. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James D. Beaird, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon allegations that Counsel failed to exclude or introduce certain evidence at trial and failed to conduct a reasonable investigation prior to trial.  Additionally, he asserts that the cumulative errors made by Counsel entitle him to relief.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Otis Melvin, Jr., was convicted by a Perry County jury of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105 (2010).  The trial court denied Melvin’s request for judicial diversion and sentenced him as Range I, standard offender to one year in the Department of Correction.  The sentence was suspended to two years on supervised probation.  Melvin was also ordered to pay $7,022.11 in restitution to the Social Security Administration.  On appeal, Melvin argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him judicial diversion.  Upon review, we affirm the theft  conviction and the two-year probationary sentence imposed by the trial court.  However, we remand the matter for entry of an amended judgment consistent with this opinion.

The appellant, Chad Walter Cook, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to two counts of selling one-half gram or more of methamphetamine and received an effective eight year sentence to be served on supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered that he serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original sentences. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants, Daryl and Shannon Maness, were each indicted by the Chester County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated statutory rape. After a jury trial, Appellants were found guilty as charged. They were each sentenced to an effective sentence of three years. The trial court denied Appellants’ request for alternative sentencing. On appeal, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions in limine requesting the exclusion of certain sexually explicit photographs, that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, and that the trial court erred in denying their request for alternative sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion in limine and that the evidence was sufficient. However, we conclude that the trial court based the denial of alternative sentencing on deterrence grounds without sufficient evidence as required under State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000). Therefore, we affirm Appellants’ convictions, but remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The defendant, Steven Matthew Messer, appeals the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s denial of judicial diversion for his convictions of statutory rape. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Corey Tarvin, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 conviction for first degree murder and resulting life sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel (1) denied him the right to subpoena witnesses, (2) failed to investigate adequately and hire an investigator, (3) advised him not to testify, (4) failed to impeach a key witness and request a related jury instruction, and (5) failed to present evidence that he suffered from macular degeneration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Qawi Nur, also known as Darrius James, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Maurice Shaw, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Keith Williams, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, one count of assault, and one count of domestic assault in case numbers 5338, 5767, 6756, and 6757 in Haywood County over a period of several years. For each of the convictions, Petitioner was sentenced and ordered to serve the sentence on probation. Several probation violation reports were filed against Petitioner. Eventually, probation was revoked. Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in Hardeman County on the basis that his sentences had expired. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition for relief without a hearing, finding that Petitioner failed to show that his judgments were void or that his sentence had expired. Petitioner appealed. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court because Petitioner has failed to show that his sentences have expired or that the judgments are void.

Appellant, Courtney Wesley, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of ten years and four years, respectively. Appellant now challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Roger Brent Banks, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him as a child sexual predator and that he therefore should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas to aggravated sexual battery. The State acknowledges that the petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was erroneously sentenced as a child predator but argues that the appropriate remedy is the entry of corrected judgments to reflect that the petitioner is to serve his three sentences for aggravated sexual battery at 100% as a violent offender, rather than as a child predator. We agree with the State. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court and remand for entry of corrected judgments to reflect the petitioner’s correct sentencing status.

The defendant, Daniel Clarke Doyle, pled guilty to statutory rape, a Class E felony, in the Carroll County Circuit Court and was sentenced to one year and six months in the county jail, suspended to supervised probation upon serving eighteen days. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of split confinement instead of a grant of judicial diversion or full probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Frederick Herron, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of rape of a child. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to serve 25 years at 100%. Defendant appeals his conviction and asserts that: 1) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to admit into evidence a video recording of the victim’s forensic interview; 2) the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that the State could ask Defendant about prior arrests and an unnamed prior felony conviction if Defendant chose to testify; 3) the State failed to ensure a unanimous verdict by electing an offense that occurred on an unspecified date, and the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for the offense; 4) the trial court should have granted a mistrial after a State’s witness testified about Defendant’s alleged prior DUI conviction; 5) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding a letter written by the victim to her sister; and 6) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors deprived Defendant of a fair trial. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

As the majority says, this appeal presents a close case. After much consideration, I respectfully conclude that one error requires a reversal and a new trial.

The Petitioner, Jason McCallum, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 conviction for sale of one-half gram or more of methamphetamine in a drug-free school zone and his eighteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Herbert B. Ward, was convicted by a Blount County Circuit Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, and domestic assault. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305; 39-13-304; 39-13-111. He received a seventeen-year sentence for especially aggravated kidnapping, a nine-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping, and an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence for domestic assault, all to be served concurrently for an effective seventeen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated kidnapping of his wife and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping of his eleven-year-old daughter. The State contends that with regard to the kidnapping convictions, the trial court did not instruct the jury in accord with State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We vacate the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and dismiss the charge. We reverse the aggravated kidnapping conviction and remand for a new trial. We affirm the domestic assault conviction.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Ken Parker, charging him with first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of facilitation of first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years for facilitation of first degree murder and ten years for attempted second degree murder with the sentences to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to a life sentence that Defendant had received in a separate case. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of certain writings and drawings found on Defendant’s person and in his backpack at the time of his arrest; and (3) that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect which facts it relied upon to establish the offense of attempted second degree murder. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, David Easton Jones, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition.  After review of the entire record we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In keeping with the directions provided in State v. James Allen Pollard, No. M2011-00332-SC-R11-CD, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1011 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2013), the majority takes a reasonable (and what I feel may be the preferred) action suggested by the Tennessee Supreme Court and elects to simply remand this case due to the trial court’s failure to discuss some of the seven legally-relevant factors (listed in State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)) during its sentencing soliloquy. Like the majority, I too believe that trial courts should endeavor to address each and every criterion discussed in Electroplating during their judicial diversion decisions, and I urge them to do so in order to avoid having their cases remanded. In this case, however, I would address the trial court’s omission by simply choosing the other option provided by our supreme court in Pollard: “conduct[ing] a de novo review to determine whether there is an adequate basis” for the trial court’s decision. See Pollard, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1011, at *32.

A jury convicted Omar Biviano (“the Defendant”) of one count of aggravated robbery, one count of carjacking, and one count of facilitation of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to an effective term of twelve years’ confinement. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Roosevelt Brice, Jr. (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of attempted premeditated first degree murder and aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years’ incarceration for his attempted premeditated first degree murder conviction and fifteen years’ incarceration for his aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered that the two sentences be served concurrently for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempted premeditated first degree murder. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Stephen McKinley, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The appellant, Stanley Jason Daniels, pled guilty to sexual contact with an inmate and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Brandi Clutts, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her original four-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, Clutts argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a sentence of full confinement rather than imposing split confinement.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.